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Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking 
and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law
William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson
AbstRAct
Decarbonizing the electric power sector will be central to any serious effort to fight 
climate change.  Many observers have suggested that the congressional failure to enact 
a uniform system of electricity regulation could stifle the transition to a low-carbon 
electricity grid.  This Article contends that the critique is overstated.  In fact, innovation 
is occurring across different aspects of the electricity system and across different types 
of states in ways one would not expect to see under a single, national approach.  As the 
Article demonstrates, this innovation stems in part from Congress’s failure to enact a 
single, national approach to electricity regulation, which has given states the ability to 
choose whether and how to participate in restructured electricity markets.  This ability 
to opt into or out of wholesale and retail competition has resulted in three regulatory 
models now operating across the country, combining different approaches to wholesale 
and retail regulation.  Under each of these models, a number of state public utilities 
commissions (PUCs) are using their powers to set utility rates in surprisingly innovative 
ways and are targeting different aspects of the electricity system in a manner that will 
help transition to an electricity grid that is greener, less carbon-intensive, more efficient, 
and more distributed than the current system.  The Article claims that the diversity of 
policy innovations occurring across these different models, and the system-wide benefits 
they are producing, are unexpected outcomes of the distinctive structure of federalism 
that continues to animate the U.S. system of electricity regulation and the limited 
reach of policies to promote competition in the sector.  When combined with specific 
federal policy nudges and subsidies to encourage state experimentation in ratemaking, 
the three-model system is producing significant and underappreciated benefits as the 
United States confronts the challenges of decarbonizing the electricity grid.  While the 
current system may not be ideal, it is the system we will likely be working with for some 
time to come.  As a result, understanding the nature of these ratemaking experiments, 
and the innovations they enable, will be key to the successful implementation of EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan or any other federal effort to cut greenhouse gas emissions from the 
power sector.
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INTRODUCTION 
Any serious effort to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the Unit-
ed States will require a dramatic transformation of the nation’s electric power sys-
tem.  The electricity sector currently accounts for nearly a third of U.S. GHG 
emissions, the largest single source in the economy.1  A decarbonized electric 
power system is also critical to reducing emissions from transportation, the na-
tion’s second largest source of GHG emissions, given the need to replace much of 
the existing fleet with electric vehicles.2  Put simply, decarbonizing the electric 
power sector is far and away the most important component of any effort to meet 
ambitious U.S. GHG reduction targets by 2050 and beyond.3 
Transitioning to low-carbon electricity will require overhauling what has 
been called the most complex machine ever built.4  We will need to see changes 
across the machine, from the sources of energy used to generate electricity, to the 
means of transmitting and distributing that electricity, to the way in which end 
users interact with the grid.  Not only is the machine complex, but the regulatory 
system that governs it is multilayered, messy, complicated, and technical.  Un-
derstanding and grappling with both the complexity of the machine and its 
regulatory overlay will not be easy. 
Policymakers and legal academics have appropriately focused much 
of their attention to date on how the government can best reduce GHG 
emissions.  Debates about whether to adopt a cap-and-trade system or a 
  
1. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
SINKS: 1990–2012, at ES-23 (2014). 
2. See MASS. INST. TECH., ELECTRIFICATION OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 2, 
19–25 (2010), https://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/electrification-transportation-system.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VC3N-2MLM]. 
3. The Obama Administration has committed to reducing domestic emissions by 26–28 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2025 as part of a pathway to 80 percent reductions by 2050.  See United 
States Cover Note, INDC and Accompanying Information, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/ 
Published%20Documents/United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20I
NDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf.  At the heart of the U.S. commitment is 
the Clean Power Plan, designed to cut emissions from existing power plants by 32 percent by 
2030.  See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, at 64,665 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 60). 
4. PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE GRID: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE HEART OF OUR ELECTRIFIED 
WORLD 1 (2007) (“Taken in its entirety, the grid is a machine, the most complex machine ever 
made.”); see also THOMAS P. HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER: ELECTRIFICATION IN 
WESTERN SOCIETY, 1880–1930, at 1 (1983). 
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tax5 or whether the U.S. EPA has legal authority to use various sections of 
the Clean Air Act6—including Section 111(d), the basis for the Clean Power 
Plan regulations for existing power plants7—are important and difficult ones.  
So are questions about the role of various policy instruments to promote re-
newable energy, such as Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) and tax cred-
its.8  But not enough attention has been given to the structure and practice of 
electricity regulation in the United States and the tools available under public 
utility law to promote decarbonization.9 
Despite significant changes in the electricity sector over the past twenty 
years as the federal government has opened up wholesale electricity markets to 
competition and as some states have embraced retail competition, Public Utility 
Commissions (PUCs) and state public utility law more generally continue to play 
fundamental roles in determining basic features of our electricity system.  In part, 
this is by design, but in part it is also by accident.  Because the push to create 
competitive electricity markets never took complete hold across the country—a 
reflection of the commitment in the Federal Power Act10 (FPA) to a strong state 
role in electricity regulation11—states have enjoyed considerable leeway in 
  
5. See generally SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR 
HANG-UPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY (2011); Gilbert E. Metcalf & David 
Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009). 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012). 
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012).  See generally Robert R. Nordhaus & Ilan W. Gutherz, Regulation 
of CO2 Emissions From Existing Power Plants Under § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: Program Design 
and Statutory Authority, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10366 (2014). 
8. See MARK BOLINGER, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LABORATORY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
COSTS, BENEFITS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO CAPTURING THE 
VALUE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY TAX INCENTIVES 1–13 (2014) (evaluating various renewable 
energy tax credits and their implications for different technologies); Lincoln L. Davies, Power 
Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (2010); David B. 
Spence, The Political Barriers to a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1451, 1451 (2010) 
(discussing pros and cons of renewable portfolio standards). 
9. For a thoughtful counterexample, see Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy 
Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 44–54 (2014) (describing innovative policymaking by the 
Midwest Independent System Operator and other ISOs in integrating wind and renewable energy 
and encouraging transmission line financing); Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and Its 
Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 379, 379–80 (2009) (arguing that 
understanding the electricity sector and the way it is regulated is crucial for designing effective 
climate policy). 
10. 16 U.S.C. § 791 (2012). 
11. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012) (declaring that federal regulation of the sale and transmission of 
electricity shall “extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States”); 16 
U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012) (providing that the Commission “shall not have jurisdiction, except as 
specifically provided . . . over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities 
used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or 
over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.”). 
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deciding whether they will participate in wholesale and retail electricity mar-
kets, continue with the traditional model of utility regulation, or pursue a 
mix of the two.12  Although the goal of electricity restructuring was to fully de-
regulate the sector, the result has been messier, with three basic models of elec-
tricity regulation emerging across the country: a fully restructured model that 
combines competition at wholesale and retail levels;  a traditional model that con-
tinues to employ the basic cost-of-service approach to regulating vertically inte-
grated Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs); and a hybrid model that combines 
competitive wholesale markets with regulated retail service.13  Notwithstanding 
the introduction of wholesale and retail competition in a number of states, PUCs 
retain important power in designing and setting electricity rates under each of 
these regulatory models.  It is this ratemaking power across a diverse group of 
states—and the role it can and is playing in developing a greener, nimbler, more 
distributed grid—that is the focus of this Article. 
Our focus on electricity ratemaking and its role in decarbonizing the grid 
has several aims.  First, we argue that the need for innovative ratemaking is crucial 
to promoting technological innovation and deployment in the power sector.14  As 
the traditional distribution system shifts from a one-way network that provides 
power to end users to a multi-directional grid where some users generate their 
own electricity and feed excess power back to the grid, individual actors and tech-
nologies are interacting with the system in new and dynamic ways.  Still more 
change is occurring in response to the need for low- and zero-carbon generation, 
with policies aimed at producing more solar, wind, and nuclear power, and even 
new coal generation from plants equipped with the ability to capture and store 
carbon emissions.  Making this greener grid a reality will require substantial new 
investments across all aspects of the machine.  We will need innovation and in-
vestment in everything from generation to transmission to local distribution to 
end use, which will in turn require new rate designs to accommodate cost re-
covery, promote and reward the proliferation of different energy resources and 
services, and encourage consumer behavior to take advantage of technology that 
  
12. For an excellent overview of the move to competitive markets in the United States and Europe, see 
David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 776–
87 (2008). 
13. See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1630–31, 
1661–74 (2014) (discussing electricity restructuring and the resulting three models of regulation). 
14. We use innovation as a general term in this Article to refer not only to novel approaches to policy 
and ratemaking, which we sometimes refer to as “experimentation,” but also to new technologies 
and, particularly, the testing and deployment of technologies and programs to promote low-carbon 
electricity.  Innovative ratemaking, in this respect, serves as a critical tool to promote technological 
innovations directed at decarbonizing the power sector. 
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creates a more dynamic and more efficient grid.  Given their jurisdiction over de-
cisions about generation, the use of local distribution systems, and the design of 
retail rates, PUCs will be at the center of these changes. 
Second, we demonstrate that the United States is, in fact, seeing interesting 
examples of policy innovation and the use of ratemaking powers in each of the 
three models of electricity regulation (traditional, restructured, and hybrid) that 
have emerged out of electricity restructuring.  To be sure, there are numerous 
states that are not innovating, and some that are innovating in ways that are in-
hibiting rather than facilitating decarbonization.  But our focus here is on states 
that are pushing forward with potentially important experiments for the broader 
effort to decarbonize the grid.  To that end, we describe and analyze four areas of 
ratemaking that are driving investments and changing behavior in ways that 
could be crucial to decarbonizing the grid: 1) promoting low- or zero-carbon 
baseload generation; 2) modernizing the grid; 3) promoting distributed energy 
resources; and 4) using time-variant pricing to encourage more efficient customer 
behavior.  In examining each of these, we find that the nature of the policy exper-
iments and the use of ratemaking appear to differ, at least in part, depending on 
the particular model of electricity regulation.  In states operating under the tradi-
tional model, which still retain the most regulatory authority over the develop-
ment and funding of large-scale generation sources, we see PUCs using their 
ratemaking powers to promote the development of coal-fired power plants with 
carbon capture and sequestration and nuclear power plants.  In states operating 
under a restructured or hybrid model, by contrast, we see utility commissions fo-
cusing more heavily on the distribution side of the grid, which is the portion of 
the grid that delivers electricity directly to customers.  Some states are experi-
menting with performance-based rates to encourage utilities to make large-scale 
investments in distribution system infrastructure while others are allowing distri-
bution utilities to recover the costs of these investments in advance through ex 
ante prudency determinations and accelerated cost recovery.  These investments 
are crucial to integrating distributed generation into the grid, optimizing perfor-
mance, and using rate design to promote more efficient consumer behavior.  
These states are also using their ratemaking powers to encourage distributed gen-
eration by imposing storage mandates, developing infrastructure to incorporate 
large numbers of electric vehicles into the system,  and compensating customers 
for providing excess generation from rooftop solar and other local generation 
sources, while simultaneously devising policies to eliminate cross-subsidies from 
traditional customers who continue to receive electricity from utilities.  And in 
hybrid and restructured states we see PUCs developing more robust time-
variant pricing policies, including opt-out rather than opt-in designs for 
816 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016) 
 
residential programs, to align customer pricing with the actual cost of elec-
tricity generation and to encourage more efficient energy use. 
Third, we suggest that this diversity of experimentation is in part the result 
of what we call “accidents of federalism.”15  The three models of U.S. electricity 
regulation can hardly be considered the rational result of intentionally designed 
federal policy.  To the contrary, they might even be viewed as the result of policy 
failure as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)’s vision of fully 
restructured wholesale energy markets (endorsed in broad terms by the U.S. 
Congress) never took complete hold and as the move to introduce competition 
into retail electricity faltered after the California energy crisis.  Numerous com-
mentators decry the current system for its lack of national coherence, and more 
than a few have called for a larger federal role in electricity regulation.16  Never-
theless, despite the messy and complex federal system, or maybe because of it, 
some states and PUCs are deploying new and innovative approaches to ratemak-
ing as a means of promoting investment in low-carbon technologies and practices 
across the sector.  Taken as a whole, we argue that this mix of innovative 
ratemaking, and the range of technological innovations that it enables, is 
different than the innovation that might emerge from a more uniform sys-
tem.  As we demonstrate, traditional states that still regulate the generation 
side of the grid through cost-of-service regulation have different powers and 
  
15. In using this term, we recognize that any commitment to federalism, and certainly the dual model 
of state and national authority in the electricity sector, is going to produce unanticipated results.  
That is, we recognize that contingency is embedded in the deep structure of American federalism.  
While our use of the term “accidents” is intended in part as recognition of that contingency, it also 
seeks to capture the unintended outcome of the incomplete national effort to restructure electricity 
markets.  As discussed in Part I infra, in the wake of the failure of restructuring to take complete 
hold across the country, the Federal Power Act (FPA)’s commitment to federalism has led to the 
diversity of policy innovation now seen across the three models of electricity regulation.  Put 
another way, out of the interaction between the structure of federalism at the heart of the FPA (left 
largely undisturbed by the U.S. Congress for the last 80 years) and the partially realized 
commitment of federal policy (from both the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
and Congress) to push for restructuring across the country, has come the unintended or 
“accidental” result of three models of electricity regulation that are together producing a diversity of 
policy innovations in the electricity sector. 
16. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 20–21 (2013) (describing federal-state tensions in utility law); Jody Freeman & David B. 
Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014) (suggesting that “dramatic 
technological, economic, and social changes [in the electricity sector] . . . would seem to demand a 
legislative response”); Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 9, at 1 (describing the complexity of energy 
regulation as “problematic” and proposing new models of regulation for addressing such 
complexity); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. 
REV. 773, 827–35 (2013) (critiquing system of energy governance for providing inadequate 
authority to principal actors to address transitioning markets and for excessive fragmentation in 
assignment of regulatory authority). 
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are innovating in different ways than states in fully restructured markets that 
have largely residual power over the distribution side.  Thus an important re-
sult of the failure to establish a uniform national system of electricity regulation is 
the production of a diverse set of regulatory experiments that would likely not 
have arisen otherwise.  We should be clear that our claim is not that the current sys-
tem is superior to an alternative system with a more centralized approach to elec-
tricity regulation (or decentralized through markets).  Instead, our argument is 
that innovative use of ratemaking powers is occurring in the current system, that 
such innovation is different from what would have occurred had the push for 
wholesale and retail competition taken hold across the whole country, and that 
legal scholars have largely ignored these developments. 
The innovations in ratemaking we identify are not, however, only the unin-
tentional byproduct of a lack of a uniform national policy.  Instead, we also show 
that through a variety of mechanisms, the federal government has used more in-
tentional policy nudges and subsidies to push states to innovate.  These include 
statutory changes, FERC rulemakings, and federal spending, each of which has 
helped encourage states to use their ratemaking powers to promote low-carbon 
technologies and practices by reducing some of the risk of these experiments.  
This more directed federal policy, combined with the three-model system, is 
helping to drive low-carbon investments across the whole sector in a manner that 
might not occur under a more uniform system.  We also suggest, however, that 
federal policy could be used in a more systematic way to encourage and learn from 
the kinds of policy experiments that are underway in the three different regulato-
ry models. 
One additional aim of this Article, then, is to demonstrate the ways in 
which our account of ratemaking speaks to ongoing debates about federalism.  
Two debates seem especially pertinent.  One asks whether federalism promotes 
or produces too little policy innovation.  Although standard claims about the vir-
tues of federalism focus to a large extent on states as innovators—and PUCs can 
rightly claim to be the original Brandeisian laboratories of democracy17—an op-
posing theory suggests that federalism produces too little innovation.18  The basic 
  
17. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (characterizing 
states as laboratories in case involving Oklahoma effort to extend a scheme of quasi-public utility 
regulation to the manufacture and sale of ice); see also Boyd, supra note 13, at 1645–47, 1704–08 
(discussing earlier “experimentalist” views of public utility and the importance of recovering PUCs’ 
capacity for policy experimentation and innovation). 
18. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 
J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980) (arguing that state politicians are risk averse and unlikely to 
engage in experimentation); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a 
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 909 (1994) (“[F]ederalism . . . does not encourage 
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argument is that states will free ride on the innovative efforts of other states be-
cause any individual state bears all the policy risk for innovations that fail and 
gains only some of the benefits from policy successes since other states can wait 
and adopt only those policies that succeed.  If states, in fact, reason in this way, 
too little policy innovation may be occurring.  Without resolving this theoretical 
debate, our account of innovation and electricity ratemaking suggests that the 
federal government—acting largely through policy nudges and subsidies—may 
be reducing the risk of state policy innovation failure and hence helping to spur 
more experimentation in electricity ratemaking across the three models than 
would otherwise occur. 
Our account also allies us with an emerging school of federalism that sug-
gests that structures of federalism, including the devolution to states of poli-
cymaking authority, can be deployed not only to support traditional values 
like local control and policy diversity but also to promote national values and 
policies.19  We think the system of electricity regulation that has emerged in the 
wake of restructuring—one that combines considerable state autonomy to choose 
whether and how to participate in wholesale and retail electricity markets with 
federal policies and subsidies to promote low- and zero-carbon electricity produc-
tion across the grid—effectively illustrates this “federalism as nationalism.”  
Through a largely federal structure that has led to regulatory diversity, states op-
erating in quite different political and economic circumstances are using their 
ratemaking powers to construct a lower-carbon, greener grid in alignment with 
  
experimentation.”); Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in 
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1339 (2009) (evaluating three decades of 
scholarship on Rose-Ackerman’s hypothesis and concluding that “there is at least a large grain of 
truth to [her] assessment” and that state and local governments “are unlikely to innovate at the 
optimal social level, or in a way that captures the true benefits of experimentation”).  But see DAVID 
L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85–88 (1995) (arguing that federalism has produced 
innovation in numerous policy areas). 
19. Many scholars have recognized the broad virtues of a system of federalism that is far more dynamic, 
more complex, and more interactive than sometimes characterized in the literature.  See, e.g., 
William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005) 
(arguing that multiple layers of government produce more dynamic and more protective 
environmental outcomes); ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE 
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009) (highlighting the ways in which federalism 
has become more, not less important in an era of stronger national government); Ann E. Carlson, 
Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV 1097, 1100 (2009) (examining the 
interaction between state and federal law in producing innovative policy outcomes).  Heather 
Gerken has argued that these and other federalism scholars recognize the ways in which federalism 
is not merely a system that promotes parochial state views, but can instead promote national 
policies and politics.  See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 
YALE L.J. 1889, 1892 (2014) (“It is possible to imagine federalism integrating rather than dividing 
the national polity.”); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J 1996, 1997 
(2014) (describing the ways in which Congress uses states to achieve national ends). 
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national goals to develop cleaner generation, promote diversity of supply, transi-
tion to a nimbler and more efficient grid, and even, at least at the executive 
branch level, to reduce GHG emissions20—all with a push from the federal gov-
ernment to guide them. 
Our final purpose in focusing on innovative PUC ratemaking is simply to 
highlight an under-examined policy tool that states across the country are using 
to encourage and, importantly, to pay for some of the large-scale innovations that 
will be necessary to decarbonize the electricity sector.  Governments use various 
tools to encourage innovation all the time, from traditional regulation to taxation 
to direct subsidy to the protection of intellectual property.  All of these tools will 
be (and to some degree already are) important in the effort to decarbonize.  Each 
of these tools raises questions about efficiency, distributional consequences, and 
efficacy.  Ratemaking presents another tool to encourage, de-risk, and socialize 
the costs of large-scale innovations in electricity infrastructure.  We tend not to 
think of ratemaking in this way, yet it raises the same questions about efficacy, 
distributional effects, and efficiency.  Our aim is to bring more attention to 
ratemaking and its role in promoting innovation. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides background on the U.S. 
electric power system and the regulatory frameworks that govern it, with particu-
lar attention to the role of PUCs.  It has three objectives: (1) to describe briefly 
the physical nature of the electric power system and the challenges this poses for 
regulation; (2) to explain the traditional model of electricity regulation and the ju-
risdictional split between federal and state law; and (3) to establish the main fea-
tures of the three different models of electricity regulation in operation today and 
the continuing relevance of rate design in each.  Part II analyzes four specific and 
ongoing areas in which states and PUCs are using their ratemaking powers to 
promote various aspects of a low-carbon electricity system: advanced cost recov-
ery for low-carbon baseload generation, grid modernization, distributed energy 
resources, and time-variant pricing.  Part III then elaborates on broader lessons 
from these four cases, with specific attention to the role of PUCs and public utili-
ty law in driving clean energy innovation through ratemaking.  It argues that the 
diversity of approaches to electricity regulation in our federal system has gen-
erated innovation across all three models of regulation and across all aspects 
  
20. For an explanation of why states are pushing for cleaner energy, see BARRY G. RABE, PEW CTR. 
ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, RACE TO THE TOP: THE EXPANDING ROLE OF U.S. 
STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS iii (2006).  For the President’s rationale for clean 
energy investments, see Promoting Clean, Renewable Energy: Investments in Wind and Solar, 
WHITE HOUSE,  https://www.whitehouse.gov/recovery/innovations/clean-renewable-energy 
[https://perma.cc/HF4E-HMJK] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
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of the grid over which PUCs have jurisdiction.  Part III also offers provisional 
explanations for why some regulatory innovations appear to come out of tradi-
tional cost-of-service states whereas others emerge from hybrid and restructured 
states and suggests reasons why some state PUCs lead while others lag behind.  
Finally, Part III intervenes in contemporary debates about federalism, turning 
first to questions about the role of federalism in spurring or hindering policy ex-
perimentation and next to debates about whether structures of federalism can be 
used to push national aims. We conclude by suggesting that the current moment 
of innovation in electricity ratemaking represents a realization in some respects of 
the experimentalist impulse that animated the establishment of PUCs in the early 
twentieth century. 
I. THE U.S. ELECTRICITY SYSTEM AND REGULATORY JURISDICTION 
The U.S. electric power system has been described as the most complex ma-
chine ever built.21  Organized into three major grids, or interconnects, (Eastern, 
Western, and Texas),22 it joins a diverse array of generation assets with high-voltage 
transmission lines, local distribution systems, and increasingly active demand-side 
and distributed resources to deliver a highly reliable service to millions of 
households and businesses in a manner that must precisely balance generation 
(supply) and load (demand) in real-time. 
Roughly speaking, the system can be divided into three major components: 
(1) generation, (2) transmission, and (3) distribution (see Figure 1 below).  Gen-
eration converts primary energy (fossil hydrocarbons such as coal or natural gas, 
nuclear, wind, solar, hydro, and other renewable sources) into electricity.23  Gen-
erators must then step up the voltage of their electricity for it to be transmitted 
long distances over high voltage power lines.  This system of high-voltage trans-
mission lines is used to move large amounts of power across the three major grids 
in the United States and is sometimes known as the bulk power grid.24  At the 
  
21. See HUGHES, supra note 4; MASS. INST. TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 1 (2011), http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/Electric_Grid_ 
Full_Report.pdf; SCHEWE, supra note 4; S. Massoud Amin, Securing the Electricity Grid, 40 
BRIDGE 13, 14 (2010). 
22. See MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 21, at 3. 
23. Electricity is, in this sense, a secondary form of energy or what is sometimes referred to as an 
“energy carrier.”  See ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS i (Michael Crappe ed., 2008) (“Electricity is an 
energy carrier . . . .”).  
24. See Massoud Amin & John Stringer, The Electric Power Grid: Today and Tomorrow, 33 MRS 
BULL. 399, 400 (2008), http://massoud-amin.umn.edu/publications/The_Grid_Amin_ 
Stringer.pdf (describing generation and high voltage transmission segments of U.S. electric power 
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other end of the transmission system, the electricity is then stepped down to low-
er voltage and distributed, via local distribution systems, to electricity consum-
ers.25  These local systems have historically transmitted power in one direction for 
end use in homes and businesses.  It is this component of the system, however, 
that is changing most dramatically today as electricity consumers become active 
participants in the system through increased demand response, distributed gener-
ation, and storage. 
 
FIGURE 1.  MAJOR COMPONENTS OF A MODERN ELECTRIC POWER 
SYSTEM 
Viewed as a whole, the electric power system is a complex, highly interde-
pendent machine that operates on multiple time scales, ranging from millisec-
onds to years.26  Because electricity cannot be stored on any significant scale and 
cannot be directed (as in the case of classic switched networks), and because gen-
eration and load must be precisely balanced in real time, sophisticated systems 
operation capabilities are necessary to ensure continuous delivery of reliable 
  
grid); see also B.M. WEEDY ET AL., ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS 443–72 (5th ed. 2012) 
(describing basic components of electric power systems). 
25. Amin & Stringer, supra note 24, at 400 (describing local distribution segment of U.S. power grid).  
26. See ALEXANDRA VON MEIER, ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS: A CONCEPTUAL 
INTRODUCTION 260–68 (2006). 
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electric service.27  The electric power industry has been described, in this respect, 
as the ultimate just-in-time system.28 
A. The Traditional Regulatory Framework 
These distinctive features of the electric power system create challenges for 
regulation and have informed the regulatory frameworks governing electricity 
over the last century.  During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
when electricity was generated in small power plants located close to demand, 
there was little need for state or federal regulation.29  As the system grew, made 
possible in part by the use of alternating current and by increasing economies of 
scale in power generation, the need for regulation became more apparent, par-
ticularly in the wake of conflicts between electric utilities and municipal govern-
ments.30  Utilities and their advocates pushed for state regulation by independent 
commissions as a way of avoiding logrolling in state legislatures and corruption in 
municipal governments.31  Such regulation, it was hoped, would provide much-
needed stability with respect to cost recovery and protection from wasteful com-
petition.32 
At the heart of this model was the independent public utility commission or 
PUC.  Given the complexities of electricity and the need for continuous supervision 
  
27. For a good overview of the distinctive features of electric power systems and their implications for 
the current grid, see Brief for Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 2, 6–9, New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (No. 00-568). 
28. See Paul L. Joskow, Creating a Smarter U.S. Electricity Grid, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 33 (2012). 
29. See PAUL J. GARFIELD & WALLACE F. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 28 (1964) 
(“From the late nineteenth century to about 1920, public utilities were regulated principally by local 
governments through franchise contracts.”); MARTIN G. GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN 
AMERICAN CAPITALISM 54–55 (1957) (discussing development of small, urban central station 
electricity using direct current for city lighting during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries); RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS 12 (2002) (discussing spatial limits of direct 
current systems).  
30. Alternating current allowed for higher voltage transmission across longer distances.  See HIRSH, 
supra note 29, at 12–14 (discussing development of alternating current and use of steam turbines to 
capture economies of scale in power generation in the early twentieth century). 
31. See Mansel Griffiths Blackford, Businessmen and the Regulation of Railroads and Public Utilities in 
California During the Progressive Era, 44 BUS. HIST. REV. 307, 313 (1970) (noting that “the public 
utility companies, especially the larger ones, were in the vanguard of those clamoring for . . . 
passage” of the California Public Utilities Act); Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins and Development 
of Electric Power Regulation, in THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND 
COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 43, 46–61 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel 
H. Cole eds., 2003) (discussing the municipalization movement at the turn of the century and the 
move to regulation by state commissions); Forrest McDonald, Samuel Insull and the Movement for 
State Utility Regulatory Commissions, 32 BUS. HIST. REV. 241, 247–51 (1958). 
32. See William J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, The Market for Capital and the Origins of State 
Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 1050, 1053 (2002). 
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of utilities, regulation by an independent commission staffed with experts and in-
sulated from politics was viewed as superior to regulation by municipal govern-
ments or by the legislature.33 
Between 1907 and 1930, every state but Delaware enacted public utility leg-
islation that charged some type of administrative entity with responsibility for 
regulating public utilities such as water, gas, and electricity.34  These were quin-
tessential Progressive-era laws, built on principles of scientific management and 
regulation by experts.35  Statutory mandates were typically broad and open-ended, 
founded on the goal of ensuring that rates were just, reasonable, and nondiscrimi-
natory in order to strike the appropriate balance between ratepayers and investors.36  
These mandates remain at the heart of PUC powers and afford commissions sig-
nificant discretion in exercising their ratemaking powers.37 
As electric utilities expanded in the early twentieth century, interstate trans-
fers of power became more common, but the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited 
states from regulating such transfers in 1927, creating a gap in the regulatory 
scheme.38  In 1935, Congress responded with new legislation that gave the Fed-
eral Power Commission (FPC), predecessor of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), jurisdiction over rates for wholesale sales of electricity in 
interstate commerce and transmission of electricity in interstate commerce.39  
  
33. See MARTIN G. GLAESER, OUTLINES OF PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 251 (1927) 
(discussing advantages of independent, expert commissions); John R. Commons, How Wisconsin 
Regulates Her Public Utilities, 42 AM. REV. REVIEWS 215, 215 (1910). 
34. See GARFIELD & LOVEJOY, supra note 29, at 32–33; William E. Mosher, A Quarter-Century of 
Regulation by State Commissions, 14 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 35, 36–37 (1930). 
35. See, e.g., FINLA G. CRAWFORD ET AL., ELECTRICAL UTILITIES: THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC 
CONTROL 35 (William E. Mosher ed., 1929). 
36. See, e.g., Eugene A. Gilmore, The Wisconsin Public Utilities Act, 19 GREEN BAG 517, 517–18 
(1907). 
37. John Commons drafted Wisconsin’s statute and viewed public utility as one of the core concerns of 
institutional economics.  See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 
327–29 (1924) (discussing broad concept of public utility, its relation to “the public,” and its 
application to particular types of businesses); see also Malcolm Rutherford, Understanding 
Institutional Economics: 1918–1929, 22 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 277, 299 (2000) (“Public 
utilities, including issues relating to the valuation of utility property and the proper basis for rate 
regulation, were major areas of institutionalist research.”). 
38. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927). 
39. United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 345 U.S. 295, 307–08 (1953) (“Part II [of the Federal Power 
Act] was intended to ‘fill the gap’ . . . left by Attleboro in utility regulation.”); Conn. Light & 
Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515, 525 (1945) (“The new title II of the 
[Federal Power Act] is designed to secure coordination on a regional scale of the Nation’s power 
resources and to fill the gap in the present State regulation of electric utilities.” (quoting 
Commissioner Seavey of the Federal Power Commission)).  But see New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 
1, 20–21 (2002) (arguing that the FPA did more than merely close the gap but expanded federal 
jurisdiction to include transmission and some interstate wholesale sales over which states already 
had jurisdiction). 
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Intended primarily as gap filling, the newly enacted Part II of the FPA expressly 
reserved to the states jurisdiction over the planning and siting of generation infra-
structure and ratemaking for retail sales of electricity and use of local distribution 
systems.40  The overall intent was to clearly demarcate the line between state and 
federal jurisdiction, leaving states whole in their efforts to regulate electricity 
within their domain and to complement their regulatory authority with federal 
oversight of the interstate dimensions of the sector.41 
In practice, this jurisdictional split, which persists largely unchanged to the 
present day, meant that for much of the twentieth century, federal regulation of 
electricity was quite limited.  Because the electricity sector was dominated by ver-
tically integrated investor owned utilities (IOUs) that owned generation, trans-
mission, and distribution and provided a bundled service to retail customers, state 
PUCs carried the bulk of the regulatory responsibilities.42  In setting retail rates, 
they sought to capture all of the costs associated with these different activities.  
The FPC played a modest role in regulating occasional inter-utility sales of power 
and, more importantly, sales by IOUs to municipal utilities and rural electric co-
ops.43  Use (or attempted use) of the IOU’s transmission systems by third parties 
was very limited.44  Over time, as we will see, the federal role in regulating 
wholesale power transactions increased considerably with the move to 
  
40. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012) (declaring that federal regulation of the sale and transmission of 
electricity shall “extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States”); id. 
§ 824(b)(1) (providing that the Commission “shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically 
provided . . . over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local 
distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities 
for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter”). 
41. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) (“Congress meant 
to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction . . . .”). 
42. See Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector, 11 
J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 121 (1997) (“Most utilities have historically met their obligations to supply 
by owning and operating all of the facilities required to supply a complete ‘bundled’ electricity 
product to retail customers. That is, the typical utility is vertically integrated into four primary 
electricity supply functions: generation, transmission, distribution and retailing.”); Paul L. Joskow, 
Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the Electrical Power Industry, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 125, 134 (1989) [hereinafter 
Joskow, Regulatory Failure] (noting that because utility assets have historically been owned by the 
same corporate entity providing a bundled retail service, “most of a utility’s costs are subject to state 
rather than federal regulatory authority”). 
43. Joskow, Regulatory Failure, supra note 42, at 134 (noting limited role of federal regulation of 
electricity prior to restructuring).   
44. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 371 (1973) (discussing refusal by 
IOU to allow use of its transmission system to “wheel” power from Bureau of Reclamation 
hydroelectric facilities and electric cooperatives to municipal power systems).  Because the Federal 
Power Commission had no authority under the Federal Power Act to order the wheeling, the 
Court affirmed the district court’s decision to order wheeling as a remedy under the antitrust laws.  
Id. at 380–82.  
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competitive wholesale power markets.  But state authority to choose how 
to regulate the electricity sector has nevertheless remained strong.45 
B. The Structure and Practice of State Public Utility Regulation 
From the outset, most PUCs were (and are) composed of three members 
(though some have had as many as seven and others as few as one).46  Commis-
sioners have typically been appointed by the governor, often according to specific 
requirements for split party affiliations, although a substantial minority of states 
provide for direct election.47  Most commissioners in most states serve multi-year 
terms (six-year terms being the most common), with wide variation in staffing 
and budgeting.48  Some PUCs depend on annual appropriations while others re-
ceive their funding from fees imposed on regulated utilities.49  In leading states 
such as New York and California, commissions have been well staffed and rela-
tively well compensated since their inception.50  In other states, PUCs have been 
woefully understaffed and underfunded.51 
Typical duties in the early years included establishing rules for accounting 
and valuation of utility assets, adjudicating rate cases, making prudency determi-
nations for specific investments, investigating specific issues or companies, and 
  
45. For a compelling argument that recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the reach of 
both the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act are shifting from the previous model of dual 
sovereignty to one of concurrent jurisdiction, see Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy 
Federalism, 95 TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 7–8), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733731. 
46. See GARFIELD & LOVEJOY, supra note 29, at 262 (reporting numbers of commissioners ranging 
from one to seven and noting that the majority of state commissions had three commissioners).  
For the current status of state PUCs, including numbers of commissioners and staff, see Regulatory 
Commissions, NAT’L ASS’N REG. UTIL. COMM’RS, http://www.naruc.org/about-
naruc/regulatory-commissions/ [https://perma.cc/G6PL-95MT] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).  
California currently has five commissioners and New York currently has four. 
47. GARFIELD & LOVEJOY, supra note 29, at 262 (“The selection by commissioners in most states is 
by gubernatorial appointment.”).  
48. See id. at 262–63 (discussing variation in commissioner terms and differences in budgeting and 
staffing). 
49. Id. at 264–65 (discussing different approaches to financing commissions). 
50. In 1947, for example, the total amount appropriated to forty-eight state utility commissions was 
$15.5 million, almost half of which ($7 million) went to just four commissions (New York, 
California, Pennsylvania, and Illinois).  See John W. Ashley, A Suggestion for Improving Public 
Utility Regulation, 36 LAND ECON. 158, 158 (1960). 
51. GARFIELD & LOVEJOY, supra note 29, at 263–65 (discussing differences in budget and staffing 
among state commissions); HIRSH, supra note 29, at 44 (“Inadequately equipped commissions 
remained the rule for decades.  As late as 1967, only five state regulatory bodies employed two 
economists each, and forty-four bodies had no formal ability to perform economic analysis on an 
in-house basis.”).  These differences have persisted to the present. California, for example, currently 
has 940 staff members while Utah has just fifteen.  See Regulatory Commissions, supra note 46. 
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enforcing orders.52  PUCs were expressly conceived as “instruments of blended 
power” and provided some of the earliest test cases for emerging doctrines of ad-
ministrative law.53  In general, and notwithstanding a long and costly detour into 
constitutional review of ratemaking methodology precipitated by the Supreme 
Court’s fair value rule in Smyth v. Ames, courts have generally been quite deferen-
tial to PUCs.54  Most courts in most states accord PUCs significant deference 
when reviewing their actions.55  PUCs whose powers stem from the state consti-
tution may receive even greater deference.56 
Given their broad statutory mandates and relative novelty as a governmental 
form, PUCs were viewed early on in “experimentalist” terms.  Progressive-era 
lawyers and legal scholars, early institutional economists, and several prominent 
legal realists saw public utility regulation as an open-ended experiment with the 
potential to carve out a third way between outright public ownership and lais-
sez-faire capitalism.  Ratemaking was viewed as the core of this experimental 
potential.57 
  
52. See GLAESER, supra note 33, at 233–62 (discussing typical duties and procedures of state 
commissions in the early twentieth century). 
53. James O. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1041, 
1048 (1975) (describing PUCs as “instruments of blended power[]”); see also DANIEL R. ERNST, 
TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 
1900–1940, at 33–50, 82 (2014) (discussing early development of administrative law principles and 
procedures in the context of PUC rate determinations). 
54. Smyth v. Ames, 171 U.S. 361 (1898); see also Boyd, supra note 13 at 1644–45 (recounting history).  
Since the Supreme Court’s 1944 decision in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., the 
courts have no longer policed the methodology of ratemaking, leaving the details of the exercise to 
federal and state regulators as long as the end result satisfies the just and reasonable standard.  See 
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) (“Under the statutory 
standard of ‘just and reasonable’ it is the result reached not the method employed which is 
controlling.”). 
55. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-6-115 (2013) (establishing limited standard of review); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 756.610 (2013) (describing Oregon’s limited standard of review); PG&E Corp. v. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1181, 1194–97 (2004) (explaining deferential standard of 
review); Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Miss. Power Co., 337 So. 2d 936, 939 (1976) (describing 
Mississippi’s limited standard of review). 
56. See, e.g., Boris H. Lakusta, Operations in an Agency Not Subject to the APA: Public Utilities 
Commission, 44 CAL. L. REV. 218, 218 (1956) (“Through constitution and statute the California 
Public Utilities Commission enjoys an extraordinary sweep of substantive powers. . . . This sweep 
of powers derives particular strength from the 1911 constitutional amendments which have 
enabled the Commission to function unfettered by the doctrine of the separation of powers and the 
theories about unwarranted delegation of legislative or judicial power which so long plagued federal 
administrative agencies under former interpretations of the Federal Constitution and which 
continue to affect California agencies born under a less generous star.” (footnotes omitted)).  
Lakusta was senior counsel at the California Public Utilities Commission at the time he published 
this article. 
57. See, e.g., Commons, supra note 33, at 223 (noting that Wisconsin’s public utility law was designed 
to be “elastic enough to offer the opportunity for ingenuity and experiments that may combine the 
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For most of the twentieth century, the chief responsibility of PUCs was to 
establish rates for the services provided by IOUs.  Under the typical approach, 
which remains dominant in traditional states, IOUs received long-term monopo-
ly franchises in return for a commitment to provide reliable electricity to all cus-
tomers within a defined service area at rates, terms, and conditions set by the 
commission.58  Retail rates were established through trial-type “rate case” proce-
dures based on cost of service.59  Typically, the utility would initiate the rate case, 
presenting evidence of capital invested in generation, transmission, and distribu-
tion assets (known collectively as the rate base), a rate of return sufficient to cover 
the cost of financing investments in those assets, and estimates of expenses for 
depreciation, taxes, operations and maintenance.60  These elements provided the 
basis for determining an overall revenue requirement—that is, the amount of rev-
enue needed for the utility to recover its costs and continue as a going concern.61  
PUC staff and various interveners would respond to the utility’s proposal, leaving 
the commission to evaluate the evidence and decide what rates to allow.  Invest-
ments in rate base have typically been evaluated under the “prudent investment” 
standard, and in most states PUCs have only allowed assets to be included in rate 
base if they are “used and useful.”62  This basic approach was the core of the 
  
principle of State regulation with that of private enterprise”); Robert L. Hale, The “Physical Value” 
Fallacy in Rate Cases, 30 YALE L.J. 710, 717 (1921) (characterizing utility regulation as a 
“regulatory experiment” that deserved a “fair trial as a substitute for government ownership and 
operation”); Walton H. Hamilton, Price—By Way of Litigation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1008, 1031 
(1938) (noting that the determination of rates could hardly be “plucked from the air or conjured out 
of any system of accounts”; rather, it could only emerge through “experimentation” and “trial and 
error”).  Writing in the 1930s, Felix Frankfurter reflected that public utility law had “made possible, 
within a selected field, a degree of experimentation in governmental direction of economic activity 
of vast import and beyond any historical parallel.”  William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control of 
American Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J. 377, 404 (2010) (quoting Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., Rate Regulation, in 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 104 (Edwin R.A. 
Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1934)); see also Boyd, supra note 13, at 1645–51 (discussing early 
“experimentalist” understanding of public utility and rate regulation). 
58. This was the basis for what has sometimes been referred to in more recent years as the “regulatory 
compact.”  See, e.g., Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (Starr, J., concurring) (“The utility business represents a compact of sorts; a monopoly on 
service in a particular geographical area (coupled with state-conferred rights of eminent domain or 
condemnation) is granted to the utility in exchange for a regime of intensive regulation, including 
price regulation, quite alien to the free market.”). 
59. For a description of rate proceedings, see REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY 
REGULATION IN THE U.S.: A GUIDE 38–58 (2011). 
60. See, e.g., DOUGLAS D. ANDERSON, REGULATORY POLITICS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES: A 
CASE STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 64–65 (1981) (discussing elements of formal cost-of-
service ratemaking process). 
61. Id. 
62. On “prudent investment,” see, for example, JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 223 (2nd ed. 1988); CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION 
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traditional cost-of-service model of ratemaking that dominated public utili-
ty regulation up until the advent of electricity restructuring in the mid-1990s.63  
It remains central in those states that have continued to employ the traditional 
model of electricity regulation and is still used by restructured states in their ef-
forts to regulate local distribution systems and by hybrid states in setting retail 
rates, including charges for distribution systems. 
In addition to their role in setting rates and terms of service provided by in-
dividual utilities, PUCs were also given the power to initiate investigations and 
proceedings on their own accord.64  Together with individual rate cases, these 
general investigations and proceedings have provided the primary means for ex-
perimenting with new rate designs and other regulatory reforms.  In some cases, 
moreover, PUCs have used these two procedural pathways in tandem, with indi-
vidual rate cases providing the initial means for testing new rate designs before 
moving to more generic proceedings that would apply to all utilities operating in 
the state.65 
For much of the twentieth century, though, most PUCs assumed a largely 
reactive posture focused primarily on adjudicating rate cases.  The adjudicative 
role of PUCs thus came to crowd out their more creative policymaking functions, 
leading some to suggest that the commissions had entered into a terminal phase 
of stagnation and decline or succumbed to the inevitability of capture.66  In reali-
ty, the general lack of activity by PUCs during this time likely resulted as much 
from the fact that electricity prices continued to decline due to increasing 
  
OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 340–41 (1984).  On “used and useful,” see R.R. 
COMM’N OF WIS., PUBLIC UTILITIES: LAWS AFFECTING PUBLIC UTILITIES PASSED BY THE 
LEGISLATURE OF 1907, at 5 (1907); Gilmore, supra note 36, at 519. 
63. See BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 62, at 109–10 (describing widespread use of traditional “cost-
of-service” approach to ratemaking in the United States). 
64. See GLAESER, supra note 33, at 257–58 (discussing early PUC powers of investigation).  
65. When a PUC was unable to pursue its goal through a generic proceeding, it could fall back upon 
individual rate cases with specific utilities.  See ANDERSON, supra note 60, at 89–132 (discussing 
New York’s experiment with marginal cost pricing in the 1970s and the evolution of approach from 
a generic proceeding to a utility-specific rate case). 
66. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 74, 91–
95 (1955) (proposing that independent commissions followed a similar life cycle ending in 
stagnation and decline).  On capture, see Jim Rossi, Public Choice, Energy Regulation and 
Deregulation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 419, 421–22 
(Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010); Gregg A. Jarrell, The Demand for State 
Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry, 21 J.L. & ECON. 269, 271–72 (1978); George J. Stigler, 
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (“[A]s a rule, 
regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”).  The 
idea of capture, of course, had been around for some time.  See William J. Novak, A Revisionist 
History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST 
INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 25, 26–32 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014). 
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economies of scale.67  PUCs had little need, in other words, to exercise their crea-
tive policymaking functions as long as regulated utilities continued to deliver 
cheap power to their customers. 
Observers writing during the middle decades of the twentieth century, 
however, saw the judicialization of PUCs as a serious problem, and bemoaned 
the diminishment of PUCs’ more creative powers.68  Courts likely facilitated 
some of this, with early concerns about delegation and due process pushing 
commissions to restrain some of their more expansive ambitions and adopt in-
creasingly elaborate procedures.  Understaffing, resource constraints, various de-
grees of capture, and the use of PUCs by governors as political patronage 
machines surely also contributed to the generally reactive posture of many com-
missions.69  In the process, PUCs went from entities created to represent and 
pursue the public interest to umpires presiding over contests in which the “public” 
was all too often badly outmatched by utility lawyers.70 
Up until the 1970s, then, the role of PUCs in electricity regulation was not 
particularly creative.  In general, the overall system worked reasonably well, re-
flecting what one historian has called the “utility consensus.”71  Utilities built 
ever-larger plants to capture economies of scale and costs continued to come 
down accordingly.72  Declining costs translated into falling prices for electricity 
  
67. See Paul L. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public 
Utility Price Regulation, 17 J. LAW & ECON. 291, 312 (1974) (“Electric utilities, experiencing 
substantial scale economies and technological improvement through much of the 1950’s and 
1960’s, coupled with only moderate increases in the prices of inputs, were able to maintain or 
reduce nominal average production costs.  Firms could thus maintain or decrease prices for output 
while achieving increasing profits without resorting to price increases.  As long as prices were not 
going up, regulatory commissions were happy to ‘live and let live,’ engaging in little or no formal 
rate of return regulation.”). 
68. See Boyd, supra note 13, at 1646–47. 
69. See William E. Mosher, Defects of State Regulation of Public Utilities in the United States, 201 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 105, 107 (1939) (detailing problems with PUC 
regulation and concluding that “probably no commission in the United States is adequately 
financed to carry on the broad range of duties prescribed in the law”); see also THOMAS K. 
MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 243 (1984) (noting that all too often “regulatory 
commissions served as dumping grounds for political hacks and cronies of the governor”). 
70. See Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., Rate Regulation, in THE CRISIS OF THE 
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 1, 16 (Paul W. Mac Avoy ed., 1970) (“But in the main the public 
interest has suffered from too many mediocre lawyers appointed for political considerations, 
looking to the Public Service Commission not as a means for solving difficult problems of 
government but as a step toward political advancement or more profitable future association with 
the utilities.”); Mosher, supra note 34, at 43 (noting that “[t]he judicial function has encroached 
upon, if it has not practically supplanted, that of public defender”). 
71. See HIRSH, supra note 29, at 11–54 (discussing creation and consolidation of the “utility consensus” 
in the electric power sector during early and middle decades of the twentieth century). 
72. Id.; see also Joskow, supra note 67, at 312. 
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and healthy demand growth.  Most PUCs had little reason to pay much attention 
to what was happening in the sector, much less to embark upon new endeavors in 
rate reform.  For its part, the federal government played a largely residual role in 
regulating the limited interstate sales of wholesale electricity and occasional dis-
putes over access to transmission. 
C. Crisis and Restructuring 
By the early 1970s, however, the system was in crisis.  Economies of scale in 
power generation had been exhausted.  The oil shocks of the 1970s resulted in 
higher fuel costs for utilities, which led to higher electricity prices and reduced 
electricity demand.  And growing concerns about the environmental impacts of 
power generation led to additional regulation and costly delays for new construc-
tion.  Together, these developments resulted in much greater scrutiny and criti-
cism of the traditional approach to regulating utilities and setting electricity 
rates.73 
PUCs and public utility regulation came under sustained criticism from 
multiple sides.  Utilities and their lawyers could not get rate increases fast enough 
to protect them from rising energy costs, and for the first time they faced the very 
real possibility of being denied recovery through rates for some of their invest-
ments.74  Economists of various persuasions emphasized the perverse incentives 
embedded in the cost-of-service model and the general susceptibility of PUCs to 
capture.75  Environmentalists saw waste and inefficiency in the prevailing system 
of declining block rates, and an industry that was responsible for a large and 
growing share of the nation’s pollution burden.76 
As the crisis of the 1970s gave way to a growing movement for deregulation 
during the 1980s, critics of utility regulation pushed to open the sector to compe-
tition.77  Drawing on the experience with deregulation in other industries, advo-
cates for electricity restructuring mounted a concerted effort to introduce 
  
73. For discussion of these developments, see Joskow, Regulatory Failure, supra note 42, at 149–155, 
and HIRSH, supra note 29, at 55–68. 
74. See ANDERSON, supra note 60, at 70–73 (discussing huge increase in number of rates cases during 
late 1960s and early 1970s leading to frustrations among utility executives with the limited capacity 
of utility commissions to respond in a timely fashion).  
75. See Boyd, supra note 13 (discussing economic critiques of public utility regulation); Stigler, supra 
note 66 (discussing capture). 
76. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 60, at 74–75 (discussing efforts by the Environmental Defense 
Fund and other environmental groups during the early 1970s to intervene in utility rate cases). 
77. See Boyd, supra note 13, at 1651–58 (discussing economic critiques of public utility law and 
concomitant push for deregulation). 
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competition into the wholesale and retail segments of the industry.78  Congress 
signaled its general policy preference for competition in a comprehensive package 
of energy legislation in 1992, amending existing law to relax barriers to entry for 
independent generators and to enhance FERC’s authority to mandate transmis-
sion access.79  In doing so, however, it left largely intact the basic jurisdictional 
split at the heart of the FPA.  By failing to enact a broad statutory overhaul to de-
regulate the industry and by preserving state jurisdiction, Congress thus left 
FERC to utilize its existing authority under the FPA to create new markets for 
wholesale power.  States retained their ability to choose whether and how they 
would participate in these markets. 
Following its success in restructuring the natural gas industry, FERC 
moved to open wholesale electricity to competition in 1996.80  By mandating 
open access to transmission and by encouraging utilities to unbundle generation 
from transmission, the commission sought to promote competition among gen-
erators in new wholesale power markets that would, in theory, deliver prices that 
were just and reasonable.  Responding to FERC’s invitation and with the bless-
ing of their state regulators, utilities in various regions of the country established 
new wholesale power markets, growing out of, in several cases, the existing tight 
power pools that had long facilitated informal cooperation among neighboring 
utilities.81  As part of this effort, FERC also encouraged the creation of Inde-
pendent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmission Organizations 
(RTOs) (see Figure 2) to administer nondiscriminatory open-access transmis-
sion tariffs for member utilities and to oversee these emerging wholesale 
  
78. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1408–09 (1998) (describing the move to deregulate common 
carriers and public utilities as “[t]he great transformation in regulated industries law,” marking a 
shift from “hostility to competition to the maximum promotion of competition”). 
79. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992) created a new class of independent generators, 
known as exempt wholesale generators (EWGs), that would not be subject to the requirements of 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA).  EPAct 1992 also amended section 211 of 
the Federal Power Act giving FERC enhanced authority to mandate “wheeling” or transmission 
access for third parties.  See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 721, 106 Stat. 
2776, 2915 (1992) (amending Section 211 of the Federal Power Act); id. at §§ 724–26, 106 
Stat. 2920–21 (1992) (creating new category of exempt wholesale generators). 
80. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting 
Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540, 21541–43 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) 
(summarizing final rules designed to require open access non-discriminatory transmission service in 
order to promote competitive wholesale power markets). 
81. See, e.g., JEREMIAH D. LAMBERT, CREATING COMPETITIVE POWER MARKETS: THE PJM 
MODEL 23–101 (2001) (tracing PJM’s history from the first tight power pool agreement in 1927 
to FERC authorization as Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) in 1997). 
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power markets.82  As these markets took shape, a new class of independent pow-
er producers or merchant generators entered to compete with incumbent utilities. 
But not all states endorsed FERC’s restructuring efforts, leaving a 
patchwork of organized wholesale markets across the country.  Indeed, as Fig-
ure 2 below illustrates, large areas of the southeastern and western United States 
continue to operate outside of these RTO/ISO markets.83 
 
FIGURE 2.  MAP OF RTOS AND ISOS  
 
At the same time that FERC was seeking to open wholesale power markets 
to competition, a number of states began to move forward with efforts to restruc-
ture their retail electricity markets, giving customers the ability to choose their 
electricity provider based on different pricing options and services.  During the 
late 1990s roughly half of all states had initiated or were planning to initiate some 
  
82. See id.; Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 876–77 (Dec. 20, 1999) (to be 
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (discussing function of RTOs in designing and administering open 
access transmission tariff). 
83. Map is available at Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent SystemOperators (ISO), 
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-
act/rto.asp [https://perma.cc/Q68U-VL69] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
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version of retail competition.84  But in the wake of the California electricity crisis 
of 2000–2001, with supply shortages, capped retail rates, blackouts, and the 
bankruptcy of Pacific Gas & Electric, many states retreated from retail competi-
tion.85  Today, only sixteen states, including Texas and most of the northeastern 
and mid-Atlantic states, have competitive retail electricity markets.86  And even 
in these states, most residential consumers simply default into the incumbent 
utility and most continue to pay flat rates.87 
Thus, whereas the overall goal of electricity restructuring was fully competi-
tive wholesale markets across the entire country with retail competition in all fifty 
states, the result was a messy, uneven process that never fully replaced the tradi-
tional cost-of-service model.  Despite three pieces of omnibus energy legislation 
  
84. See Paul L. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the United States, in 
ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 1, 32 (James M. Griffin & 
Steven L. Puller eds., 2005). 
85. There is a voluminous literature on the California electricity crisis.  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER 
WEARE, THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS: CAUSES AND POLICY OPTIONS 1–2 (2003) 
(describing the severe malfunctioning of the California electricity market beginning in the late 
spring of 2001); Severin Borenstein, The Trouble With Electricity Markets: Understanding California’s 
Restructuring Disaster, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 198–200 (2002) (discussing substantial increases in 
California wholesale power prices in summer of 2000); Paul L. Joskow, California’s Electricity Crisis, 
17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 365, 365, 377–78 (2001) (discussing increases in wholesale 
electricity prices in California); Frank A. Wolak, Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis, 16 
ELECTRICITY J. 11, 20 (2003) (noting that “average market performance over the first two years of 
the market, from April 1998 to April 2000, was close to the average competitive benchmark price” 
and compared favorably to performance in the eastern ISOs); see also Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory 
Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 557–58 (2005) (“In the aftermath of competition’s disastrous failure 
in the early 2000s in California, states are beginning to slow, alter, or even reject progress toward 
restructuring, even where it had been embraced earlier.”); Joskow, supra note 84 (reporting that in 
the wake of the California electricity crisis no additional states had announced plans to pursue 
electricity restructuring and nine states that had planned to implement reforms had “delayed, 
canceled, or significantly scaled back their electricity competition programs”); David B. Spence, 
The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 417 
(2005) (“California’s disastrous experience with restructured electricity markets has given pause to 
restructuring’s proponents and ammunition to restructuring’s opponents.”). 
86. See Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html 
[http://perma.cc/Y46X-TSAT] (last updated Sept. 2010). 
87. In contrast to limited switching by residential customers, commercial and industrial users have 
taken more advantage of retail choice.  See State Electric Retail Choice Programs Are Popular With 
Commercial and Industrial Customers, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 14, 2012), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6250 [http://perma.cc/8D87-3GVG] (“While 
residential customer participation rates are low in almost all of these [restructured] states, a majority 
of commercial customers have signed up with competitive suppliers in 9 states and a majority of 
industrial customers have signed up in 12 states.”); see also id. (“The highest participation rates are 
found in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic states, and Texas where electricity is supplied through 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and states have unbundled generation from retail 
delivery and sales.”). 
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in 1992, 2005, and 2007, moreover, Congress never embarked on the kind of 
comprehensive statutory overhaul needed to fully restructure the sector.88  And 
when FERC sought to push wholesale restructuring further in the early 2000s 
with its Standard Market Design rulemaking, it became very clear during the ne-
gotiation and drafting of the 2005 energy legislation that FERC would either 
have to suspend the rulemaking or face a provision in the new legislation forcing 
it to do so.89  In contrast to its efforts in other sectors such as telecommunications, 
Congress has decided to leave the basic jurisdictional split in the FPA largely in-
tact, giving states considerable authority to decide whether and how they will en-
gage (if at all) in electricity restructuring.90  The overall result is three different 
models of electricity regulation: traditional, restructured, and hybrid (see Figures 








88. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, 106 Stat. 2776; Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594; Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–
140, 121 Stat. 1492.  
89. See Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard 
Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55452 (Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 
35).  This came to be known as Standard Market Design (SMD) rulemaking.  FERC terminated 
the rulemaking in 2005 in response to pressure from Congress, which was considering multiple 
draft provisions as part of Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) that would have prohibited or 
delayed finalization of the SMD rulemaking.  See Order Terminating Proceeding, 70 Fed. Reg. 
43140 (July 26, 2005).  See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the 
Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012). 
90. Recent developments have strained this jurisdictional split and the federal courts have been called 
upon to clarify the jurisdictional divide between FERC and the states.  See, e.g., FERC v. Elec. 
Power Supply Assoc., 136 S. Ct. 760, 765 (2016) (noting that the statutory division between 
federal and state jurisdiction over wholesale and retail rates respectively “generates a steady flow of 
jurisdictional disputes because—in point of fact if not in law—the wholesale and retail markets in 
electricity are inextricably linked”); id., at 773 (holding that FERC has statutory authority “to 
regulate wholesale market operator’s compensation of demand response bids”); PPL Energyplus, 
LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 136 S.Ct. 356 (2015), and cert. grant-
ed, 136 S. Ct. 382 (2015) (holding that the Federal Power Act preempts states in RTO and ISO 
markets from creating additional out-of-market payments to induce building of new generation 
capacity); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 28 (2002).  See generally Jim Rossi, supra note 45 
(arguing that the model of dual sovereignty embedded in the Federal Power Act is giving way to 
model of concurrent jurisdiction). 
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FIGURE 3.  KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. ELECTRICITY REGULATION 
D. Three Models of Electricity Regulation 
These three models of electricity regulation operate across a range of differ-
ent states.  The traditional cost-of-service model, in which vertically integrated 
IOUs provide service to captive customers through regulated monopoly fran-
chises, remains dominant among states in the Southeast and much of the West.  
The fully restructured model, which combines wholesale power markets man-
aged by RTOs or ISOs with retail electric competition in individual states, has 
been adopted by Texas and a number of northeastern and midwestern states.91  
The remaining states operate under a hybrid model, which combines wholesale 
power markets managed by RTOs or ISOs with retail service provided by IOUs 
through regulated monopoly franchises.92  With the exception of Texas, Alaska, 
  
91. See Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, supra note 86. 
92. For a map of current regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and ISOs, see Regional 
Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent Systems Operators (ISO), supra note 83.  To make 
matters even more complicated, although most states fall exclusively into one of the three models, 
some actually participate in two models at the same time.  Thus, for example, Arkansas and 
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and Hawaii,93 which operate largely outside of FERC jurisdiction, each of these 
three models blends (or integrates) federal and state authority in distinctive 
ways.94  And each, as we show in more detail below, continues to rely upon PUC 
ratemaking in important ways. 
1. Traditional Model 
Twenty U.S. states continue to regulate electricity under a traditional 
cost-of-service model across all or some of their territories.95  Major utilities in 
these states are vertically integrated, selling services that bundle together genera-
tion, transmission, and distribution.  Rates are established through the typical 
rate case procedure discussed above with the general aim of providing utilities 
with a reasonable rate of return while guaranteeing customers access to electricity 
at stable prices.96  While utilities in traditional states do not participate in orga-
nized wholesale electricity markets, they do engage in bilateral wholesale con-
tracting through long-term Power Purchase Agreements and short-term 
balancing transactions to satisfy some of their power needs.97 
PUC regulation is at its maximum in these states, with considerable author-
ity to use ratemaking and rate design to pursue various goals.  Most residential 
customers in these states, however, continue to pay flat rates, although a number 
of these states do offer alternative rate plans, including time-of-use rates, and 
some have engaged in various rate reform efforts to improve utility performance.  
As we describe in Part II, the most innovative ratemaking efforts in some 
  
Mississippi regulate some utilities in their states under the traditional model while other utilities 
that have chosen to participate in the regional wholesale power market managed by MISO are 
regulated under the hybrid model. 
93. Because these three states operate largely outside of federal jurisdiction we have not focused 
extensively on them in this Article.   
94. Cf. Gerken, supra note 19. 
95. As illustrated by the map in Figure 2 above, sixteen states in the continental U.S. have very little or 
no contact with wholesale electricity markets.  Four additional states have some utility service 
territories that are outside of the wholesale power markets.  See Regional Transmission Organizations 
(RTO)/Independent Systems Operators (ISO), supra note 83 (map of RTOs and ISOs).  None of the 
twenty offer retail competition in their electricity markets with the exception of Oregon, which 
offers choice to large industrial and commercial customers.  See Annual Baseline Assessment of Choice 
in Canada and the United States, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY FIN. GRP. 16–17 (2014), 
http://www.competecoalition.com/files/ABACCUS-2014-vf.pdf [http://perma.cc/3PN3-VHMQ]. 
96. See ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 11, 
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/3B6M-
HPZZ] (describing the cost-of-service model for states that do not participate in wholesale 
markets).  
97. Id. at 3 (describing bilateral sales contracts, which predominate in the northwest and southeast).  
Accidents of Federalism 837 
 
 
traditional states has been in the area of advanced cost recovery for large-scale, 
risky generation projects such as new nuclear or coal with carbon capture and 
storage. 
2. Restructured Model 
The fully restructured model combines competitive wholesale power mar-
kets with retail choice in the provision of electricity service.  This was the model 
that advocates of restructuring hoped would be adopted across the entire coun-
try.98  States operating under this model are located in regions covered by RTOs 
or ISOs that administer markets for wholesale power and also coordinate and 
manage the bulk transmission system across large interstate areas.  The map in 
Figure 2 above depicts the RTOs and ISOs in the U.S. and parts of Canada. 
Together with Washington, D.C., sixteen states, largely in the Northeast 
and Texas, fall into this category.99  PUCs continue to play an important role in 
these states in setting rates for use of local distribution systems, certifying retail 
providers, setting rules on the kinds of rates, though not typically the price, that 
retail providers can offer, and establishing standard-offer default or provider-of-
last-resort service for those customers who choose not to switch or are unable 
to do so.100 
In restructured states, Retail Electricity Providers (REPs) buy electricity in 
the wholesale markets, either through auction or through longer-term Power 
Purchase Agreements with electricity generators.  REPs then compete for retail 
customers along a number of dimensions, most importantly price.  Though the 
PUC’s role is less involved than in traditional states, it remains quite important 
not only in certifying electricity providers but in setting the rules under which 
REPs can operate.  These rules can cover a range of subjects, including requir-
ing REPs to offer time-variant rates and smart meters, to procure set percentages 
of renewable energy, and to offer net metering or other incentives for distributed 
generation.  REPs, in other words, remain subject to a wide range of regulatory 
requirements with the exception of the actual setting of rates for their retail sales 
of electricity.  Moreover, customers who do not choose their REP (most residen-
tial consumers) are assigned to a default service provider (sometimes known as 
  
98. See discussion supra note 79–80. 
99. Annual Baseline Assessment of Choice in Canada and the United States, supra note 95. 
100. In retail-choice states, consumers who fail to choose a retail provider are defaulted into a standard-
offer or provider-of-last-resort contract, often with the incumbent utility, that is regulated more 
heavily than contracts with other retail providers.  See STEVEN BRAITHWAIT ET AL., RETAIL 
ELECTRICITY PRICING AND RATE DESIGN IN EVOLVING MARKETS 23 (2007). 
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the provider of last resort), typically the incumbent utility.  PUCs often exert 
more traditional rate-setting authority over these residential rates, an authority 
that remains quite important because the bulk of residential customers in most re-
structured states remain with the default service provider.101 
PUCs in restructured states also continue to regulate the distribution sys-
tem.  Because this part of the system exhibits natural monopoly characteristics, it 
is still regulated under traditional cost-of-service principles.102  In most restruc-
tured states, the incumbent utility serves as the distribution utility, in addition to 
providing the default services mentioned above.  As discussed in more detail 
below, a number of PUCs in restructured states are using their ratemaking 
authority over the distribution system to drive grid modernization.103  They 
are also using their authority over the rates paid by customers of the default ser-
vice provider (typically the distribution utility) to encourage shifts in electricity 
use away from peak usage. 
3. Hybrid Model 
Twelve states, including most of the Midwest and mid-Atlantic states and 
California, operate with a hybrid model that combines competitive wholesale 
electricity markets with the traditional IOU franchise at the retail level.104  Like 
the restructured states, these hybrid states are located in regions with organized 
wholesale power markets.  The major difference between traditional states and 
hybrid states is that regulated utilities in hybrid states have the option to purchase 
power through wholesale power markets administered by the RTOs or ISOs, do 
not have any operational control over their transmission systems, and do not con-
trol how power is dispatched over that system.  PUCs in these states continue to 
set retail rates largely in the same fashion as traditional states and have significant 
power over rate design.  They have less ability than traditional states, however, to 
  
101. See BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 100; Certification and Licensing: REP—Retail Electric 
Providers Certification and Reporting, PUB. UTILS. COMM’N TEX., https://www.puc.texas.gov/ 
industry/electric/business/rep/rep.aspx [https://perma.cc/6LKT-YK26] (last visited Mar. 20, 
2016); Electricity Primer—The Basics of Power and Competitive Markets: How Is Electricity Sold at 
Retail?, ELEC. POWER SUPPLY ASS’N, https://www.epsa.org/industry/primer/?fa=sold 
[https://perma.cc/FK8X-QNSL] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
102. See THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 59, at 10. 
103. See infra Part II.B. 
104. Twenty-eight states in the continental United States participate in wholesale electricity markets 
governed by RTOS or ISOs.  See Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent Systems 
Operators (ISO), supra note 83 (map of RTOs and ISOs).  Of the twenty-eight states operating in 
wholesale markets, sixteen offer competitive retail rates to their consumers.  See State-by-State 
Information, supra note 95. 
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influence utility sources of generation capacity since utilities in these states partic-
ipate in wholesale markets.105  Some innovative hybrid states, as we describe 
below, are harnessing their IOUs to modernize the grid, promote distributed 
energy resources, and alter retail customer energy usage through time-variant 
rates. 
In sum, and as elaborated in the chart below (see Figure 4), there is no sin-
gle overarching regulatory framework governing electricity in the United 
States.  Instead there is a messy, complex system that can usefully be divided into 
three major models.  This was certainly not the result that advocates of electricity 
restructuring anticipated or desired.106  The standard narrative has been that this 
messy system is problematic, standing in the way of a more rational, efficient, and 
even environmentally beneficial system of electricity regulation.107  Our view, 
however, is that there may be some underappreciated virtues in this three-model 
system and that the current system may in fact have greater potential for policy 
experimentation and innovation across various aspects of the power sector than 
might have occurred under a single, uniform approach.  We will return to this 
topic in Part III below. 
 
FIGURE 4.  THREE MODELS OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION 
 
  
105. For a description of RTO and ISO responsibility for power dispatch, transmission and wholesale 
markets, see ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, supra note 96, at 30–31. 
106. See discussion supra note 79–80. 
107. See sources cited supra note 16. 
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E. The Continuing Relevance of Ratemaking 
The potential for policy experimentation and innovation across the three 
models of electricity regulation, we argue, is most apparent in the area of rate-
making and rate design.108  In all three of the models we identify, some PUCs are 
using their ratemaking powers in innovative ways that offer valuable experiences 
for any effort to decarbonize the power sector.  Indeed, even fully restructured 
states are using ratemaking and rate design in important ways, including as a 
driver of grid modernization, the promotion of distributed energy resources, and 
adoption of time-variant pricing.109 
Despite its continuing relevance across the power sector, however, ratemak-
ing has received limited attention from policymakers and legal scholars.110  This 
likely reflects, at least in part, the fact that most of the attention over the last two 
decades has focused on the introduction of competition into various segments 
of the industry and the concomitant challenges of designing and regulating 
well-functioning markets for electricity.  These electricity restructuring efforts 
(at wholesale and retail levels) have generally proceeded on the assumption that 
robust competition in the sector would result in just and reasonable rates and, ac-
cordingly, that the market would largely replace the previous regulatory task of 
designing and setting rates.111 
That assumption has proven mistaken for at least two reasons.  First, as we 
have described, the actual course of electricity restructuring in the United States 
has been uneven, leaving large segments of the country without any competitive 
markets at either wholesale or retail levels.  Second, even in those parts of the 
country that have made the transition to robust wholesale and retail competition, 
  
108. We use the term ratemaking here to refer to the general practice of setting rates (or prices) for 
electricity as understood in traditional public utility regulation and as described infra Part I.B.  In 
simplest terms, ratemaking involves establishing the total revenue required for the utility to cover its 
cost of service (including earning a rate of return) and then allocating or structuring rates among 
different classes of customers (industrial, commercial, residential) in a manner intended to ensure 
that the utility meets its overall revenue requirement.  This practice of structuring rates between and 
among customer classes is typically referred to as “rate design.”  Thus, rate design can be considered 
a subset of the more general practice of ratemaking. 
109. See discussion infra Parts II.B, II.C, II.D. 
110. Of course, this has not always been the case.  During the early twentieth century, ratemaking and 
rate regulation more generally were of major interest to Progressive lawyers and legal scholars, 
institutional economists, and several prominent legal realists.  See Boyd, supra note 13, at 1636–51 
(discussing this history).  During the 1960s and 1970s, moreover, the traditional model of rate 
regulation was the subject of a series of hard-hitting critiques from economists and legal scholars.  
Id. at 1651–58 (discussing some of these critiques). 
111. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 85, at 418–27 (discussing theoretical and political cases for restructuring 
and the goal of using competition rather than regulation to control prices). 
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PUCs continue to grapple with important ratemaking issues involving the distri-
bution system, incentives for distributed energy resources, time-variant rates, and 
the rates that customers who refuse to choose a retail electricity provider will pay 
to the distribution utility that offers default services.112  Ratemaking, in short, is 
here to stay. 
While these topics of rate regulation have long been viewed as technical 
subjects best left to economists and engineers (and they are highly technical), it is 
crucial to recognize that questions and choices regarding electricity rates are fun-
damental to the broader policy issues affecting the sector.113  They determine 
whether or not certain technologies and fuels move forward and at what speed.  
They reward or penalize certain practices and business models.  And they provide 
incentives for a whole range of consumer behavior.  In effect, by adjusting the 
bundle of entitlements that structures the enterprise of public utility, electricity 
rates change the way the grid operates.  Part of our argument is that the three-
model system of electricity regulation that has emerged in the wake of restructur-
ing might provide an expanded set of opportunities to experiment with different 
rate designs affecting different aspects of the grid when compared to those availa-
ble under a single, national framework—and at precisely the moment when the 
sector is undergoing rapid technological change and facing new environmental 
constraints.  The next Part develops four case studies of ratemaking innovations 
among the three models and across different aspects of the power sector in sup-
port of this claim. 
II. RATEMAKING AND POLICY INNOVATION FOR A LOW-CARBON 
FUTURE 
Efforts to decarbonize the electricity sector, we argue, will need to harness 
the power of ratemaking in multiple ways.  By determining the relationship that 
residential, commercial, and industrial end-users have to the grid (and to the var-
ious actors involved in the generation, transmission, and distribution of electrici-
ty), retail electricity rates influence what kind of generation will be built, how and 
when customers will use electricity, and what kinds of activities will be promoted 
or penalized.  As efforts to decarbonize the electric power sector proceed at state 
and federal levels, ratemaking and rate design will thus become increasingly im-
portant topics for regulators, utilities, and various third parties, especially in the 
  
112. See discussion infra Parts II.B, II.C, II.D. 
113. See RICHARD WHITE, THE ORGANIC MACHINE: THE REMAKING OF THE COLUMBIA 
RIVER 67 (1990) (describing public utility regulation and ratemaking as “technical and abstract”—
“exactly the kinds of issues that make the eyes glaze and the mind wander”). 
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context of widespread deployment of distributed energy resources and a more 
participatory, multi-directional distribution system.114 
In various ways over the last several decades, the federal government has en-
couraged states to use their ratemaking powers to innovate.  Some of these efforts 
have involved explicit policy nudges in federal energy legislation.  The Public 
Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA), for example, created a program 
that required utilities to purchase power from small renewable energy and co-
generation facilities (Qualifying Facilities or QFs) and authorized states to devel-
op avoided-cost rate schedules to compensate these generators.115  Some states, 
such as California, responded by developing generous long-term QF contracts 
that led to significant growth in renewable energy.116  PURPA also encouraged 
states to deploy time-of-use rates and other rate designs to promote conservation 
and efficiency.117  The 2005 Energy Policy Act118 required states to consider add-
ing advanced metering in order to implement more effective time-based pricing 
and pushed states to offer net metering programs for distributed generation.119 
Other federal interventions have come in the form of direct financial subsi-
dies.  The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act Smart Grid Investment 
Program, for example, has subsidized the installation of more than sixteen mil-
lion smart meters across the country with smart grid expenditures totaling almost 
$4.4 billion and funded time-variant rate pilot programs in every region of the 
country.120  And the Department of Energy has provided more than $13 billion 
in loan guarantees and other incentives for new nuclear power plants in Georgia 
  
114. See generally DEVI GLICK ET AL., RATE DESIGN FOR THE DISTRIBUTION EDGE: 
ELECTRICITY PRICING FOR A DISTRIBUTED RESOURCE FUTURE (2014). 
115. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–617, § 210, 92 Stat. 3117, 3144–
47. 
116. See HIRSH, supra note 29, at 89, 94–98 (discussing state approaches to PURPA’s QF program and 
lucrative QF contracts in California).  
117. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d) (2012). 
118. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). 
119. See KENNETH ROSE & KARL MEEUSEN, REFERENCE MANUAL AND PROCEDURES FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE “PURPA STANDARDS” IN THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005, at 
10 (2006). 
120. See Advanced Metering Infrastructure and Customer Systems, SMARTGRID.GOV, 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/deployment_status/ami_and_customer_systems.html## 
[https://perma.cc/ZK8D-VU6D] (last updated Mar. 13, 2015).  This was also matched by private 
investment of roughly the same amount, resulting in a combined investment of almost $10 billion 
in advanced metering infrastructure around the country.  For a description of dynamic pricing pilot 
programs funded by the federal government, see U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AMERICAN 
RECOVERY AND INVESTMENT ACT OF 2009: EXPERIENCES FROM THE CONSUMER 
BEHAVIOR STUDIES ON ENGAGING CUSTOMERS 1–2 (2014) (describing and evaluating pilot 
programs); Consumer Behavior Studies, SMARTGRID.GOV, https://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_ 
act/overview/consumer_behavior_studies.html [https://perma.cc/45EE-63FF] (last visited Mar. 
20, 2016). 
Accidents of Federalism 843 
 
 
and South Carolina,121 and hundreds of millions of dollars in grants and tax sub-
sidies for a carbon capture and sequestration plant in Mississippi.122  Each of 
these federal nudges is, as we describe below, playing a role in partially de-
risking various experiments in a number of states across all three models of 
electricity regulation. 
EPA’s rules for existing power plants under section 111(d) of the Clean Air 
Act—one of the more ambitious environmental regulatory programs EPA has 
ever issued—also recognize the importance of ratemaking and rate design in re-
ducing emissions.123  The Clean Power Plan gives states considerable flexibility in 
developing required plans to reduce emissions across the power sector rather than 
exclusively at each individual source.124  By going “outside the fenceline” of indi-
vidual power plants and allowing states to devise compliance strategies that take 
account of the interconnected nature of the electric power system, the Clean 
Power Plan will inevitably call upon the ratemaking power of PUCs. 
This Part examines four areas in which states are using their ratemaking 
powers to experiment with important components of the electric power system: 
(1) advanced, low-carbon baseload generation; (2) grid modernization; (3) dis-
tributed energy resources; and (4) time-variant rates.  All of these areas have po-
tentially crucial roles to play in any transition to a low-carbon future.  The 
discussion that follows identifies particularly innovative examples in each area, fo-
cusing on why certain experiments are emerging in certain kinds of states.  It also 
describes the advantages and disadvantages each model of regulation might have 
to promote certain kinds of investments and behaviors.  This section also exam-
ines the specific role PUCs play in driving innovation in these four areas, situat-
ing them within the broader landscape of actors involved in state public utility 
  
121. In addition to loan guarantees, EPAct 2005 also provided regulatory risk insurance for the first six 
new reactors licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and production tax credits 
for new nuclear units placed in service by 2021.  See LARRY PARKER & MARK HOLT, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., NUCLEAR POWER: OUTLOOK FOR NEW U.S. REACTORS, CRS-10 to 13 
(2007). 
122. See Kemper County IGCC Fact Sheet: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Project, MASS. INST. 
TECH., http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/kemper.html [https://perma.cc/2N9U 
MPAA] (last updated Mar. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Kemper County IGCC Fact Sheet]. 
123. See EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,832–38 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
60) (discussing different approaches that states can take in their state plans to demonstrate 
compliance).  On February  9, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a stay of the Clean Power Plan 
pending a Supreme Court judgment on the merits or a denial of a petition for review by the Court.  
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law.  We conclude by discussing some general lessons from these cases for institu-
tional design and their relevance to our broader arguments regarding federalism 
and experimentation in the Part that follows. 
A. Advancing Low-Carbon Baseload Generation 
“Too cheap to meter.”  That was the line atomic energy boosters sometimes 
used during the 1950s at the dawn of the commercial nuclear power industry in 
the United States.125  Had it turned out to be true, there would be no need for 
special rates or innovative cost recovery mechanisms to promote nuclear power.  
But, of course, the hope that nuclear power would provide cheap and virtually un-
limited power never materialized. 
Fission-based reactors are enormously complicated machines to construct and 
operate.  They take years to build and cost huge sums of money.126  The “too cheap 
to meter” refrain likely referred to the dreams that various nuclear enthusiasts had of 
commercial fusion reactors, which are still apparently twenty years away.127  In the 
1960s, with demand for electricity growing at a robust pace, utilities built fission-
based reactors as fast as they could get approval to do so.  By 1974, 54 commercial 
reactors were operating in the United States with almost 200 more on order.128  Six 
years later, in the wake of the energy crisis and the 1979 accident at Three Mile Is-
land, the bloom was off the rose and some utilities abandoned their nuclear con-
struction projects, leaving billions of dollars on the table.129  Much of this became 
  
125. The phrase is attributed to Lewis Strauss, appointed by President Truman as one of the original 
members of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and by President Eisenhower to be 
Chairman of the AEC in 1953.  Here is what he actually said: “Our children will enjoy in their 
homes electrical energy too cheap to meter. . . . [They] will travel effortlessly over the seas and 
under them and through the air with a minimum of danger and at great speeds, and will experience 
a life span far longer than ours, as disease yields and man comes to understand what causes him to 
age.”  Abundant Power From Atom Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1954, at 5 (quoting Strauss from a 
speech to the National Association of Science Writers). 
126. Lucas W. Davis, Prospects for Nuclear Power, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 53 (2012) (“Nuclear power 
plants are enormous facilities with high construction costs.”). 
127. See, e.g., Michael Brooks, Forever Twenty Years Away: Will We Ever Have a Working Nuclear 
Fusion Reactor, NEW STATESMAN (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.newstatesman.com/sci-
tech/2014/11/forever-20-years-away-will-we-ever-have-working-nuclear-fusion-reactor 
[http://perma.cc/TRG8-Z9JP]; Charles Seife, Fusion Energy’s Dreamers, Hucksters, and Loons: 




128. Lucas W. Davis, Prospects for Nuclear Power 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 17674, 2011) (reporting 54 operating reactors and 197 orders for new reactors as of 1974). 
129. Prior to the recent orders for new nuclear reactors (all of them post–2007), the last order for a new 
nuclear unit in the United States was in 1978 and that order, along with every other order after 
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the subject of disputes with regulators and ratepayer advocates about whether these 
costs could be recovered in rates even though the facilities would never be “used and 
useful.”130  After several billion dollars in disallowances, a fair amount of litigation, 
and some very large hits to utility credit ratings, utility management and their regu-
lators moved on.131 
Today, there are ninety-nine nuclear reactors operating in the U.S.—down 
from 104 a few years ago—that collectively provide close to 20 percent of total 
electricity generation.132  These plants provide cheap, highly reliable baseload 
power (which means they run around the clock).133  Notwithstanding the im-
portant and still unresolved questions about what to do with spent nuclear fuel 
and how to handle the risk of accidents, nuclear power produces zero emis-
sions.134  No sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, or particulate matter.  No mercury or 
volatile organic compounds.  And no carbon dioxide. 
But the “youngest” nuclear power plant in operation in the United States to-
day is almost twenty years old and the average age of the fleet is thirty-five.135  Most 
  
1973, was eventually canceled.  More than 120 reactor orders were eventually canceled.  See 
PARKER & HOLT, supra note 121, at 1, 3. 
130. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. 
FERC, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
131. See RON BINZ ET AL., CERES, PRACTICING RISK-AWARE ELECTRICITY REGULATION: 
WHAT EVERY STATE REGULATOR NEEDS TO KNOW 26 (2012) (“Between 1981 and 1991, 
U.S. regulators disallowed about $19 billion of investment in power plants by regulated utilities.  
During this time, the industry invested approximately $288 billion, so that the disallowances 
equated to about 6.6 percent of total investment.  The majority of the disallowances were related to 
nuclear plant construction, and most could be traced to a finding by regulators that utility 
management was to blame.”); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in 
Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 497–98, 500–02 (1984) 
(discussing problems of overbuilding in the electric power industry in the 1970s). 
132. How Many Nuclear Power Plants Are in the United States, and Where Are They Located?, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=207&t=3 [http://perma. 
cc/Q4RS-ABAY] (last updated Jan. 27, 2016) (reporting 61 commercially operating nuclear 
power plants with a total of 99 nuclear reactors in 30 states); Monthly Energy Review, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 129 tbl.8.1 (Oct. 2015) (reporting nuclear share of electricity generation 
over first seven months of 2015 as 19.5 percent). 
133. Paul L. Joskow & John E. Parsons, The Economic Future of Nuclear Power, 138 DÆDALUS 45, 47 
(2009) (noting that nuclear power plant capacity factors in the United States have increased steadily 
over the last two decades to over 90 percent).  
134. Davis, supra note 126, at 63 (noting that “nuclear power is virtually emissions-free” but that 
“Fukushima has brought to the forefront ongoing concerns about nuclear accidents and the 
handling and storage of spent fuel”); see also MASS. INST. TECH., THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR 
POWER 47–63 (2003), http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-full.pdf (discussing 
reactor safety and high-level waste management issues). 
135. TVA’s Watts Bar Unit 1 went on line in 1996, twenty-six years after the project was initiated.  Its 
sister unit, Watts Bar 2, was recently revived and is expected to come on line in 2016.  The oldest 
operating reactors in the United States today are Oyster Creek in New Jersey and Nine Mile Point 
1 in New York, both of which entered commercial service on December 1, 1969.  The average age 
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existing plants are thus nearing the end of their initial forty-year licenses and many 
have already received additional twenty-year license extensions from the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC).136  While sixty may be the new forty, few want to 
see nuclear power plants operating much beyond six decades.137  And regardless of 
how many license extensions are granted, maintaining nuclear power’s share of 
U.S. generation capacity, much less increasing it, will require new construction. 
For a brief moment in the mid-2000s, there was talk of a nuclear renaissance 
in the United States.  At one point, twenty-eight applications for licenses to build 
and operate new reactors had been filed with the NRC.138  New reactor designs 
promised more efficient and safer plants.139  A streamlined regulatory process 
would avoid the costly delays of the past,140 and Congress made various subsidies 
available for early movers.141  Then came shale gas, which made the economics of 
  
of the current nuclear fleet is around thirty-five years.  See How Old Are U.S. Nuclear Power 
Plants and When Was the Last One Built?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/ 
tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=228&t=21 [http://perma.cc/8GEP-NPCE] (last updated Feb. 4, 2016). 
136. As of January 2016, eighty-four commercial reactors had received twenty-year license renewals 
from the NRC and another eleven license renewal applications were under review.  See Status of 
License Renewal Applications and Industry Activities, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html [http://perma.cc/ 
5NCS-QSXK] (last updated Jan. 29, 2016). 
137. But see recent requests from Duke, Exelon, and Dominion to extend operating licenses for some 
reactors to eighty years.  Robert Walton, Exelon, Duke, Dominion Will Seek to Extend Nuke Plant 
Licenses to Eighty Years, UTILITYDIVE (July 20, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/exelon-
duke-dominion-will-seek-to-extend-nuke-plant-licenses-to-80-years/402532 [https://perma.cc/ 
7SLA-MLEF]. 
138. MARK HOLT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY 8–9 tbl.1 (2014). 
139. See, e.g., Ioannis N. Kessides, The Future of the Nuclear Industry Reconsidered: Risks, Uncertainties, 
and Continued Promise, 48 ENERGY POL’Y 185, 193–95 (2012) (discussing safety and operational 
advantages of generation III and III+ reactor designs developed over the last decade and noting that 
the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design, a generation II+ design, was certified by the NRC in 
2006); see also Declan Butler, Nuclear Power’s New Dawn, 429 NATURE 238, 238–40 (2004) 
(discussing importance of new advanced reactor designs). 
140. In 1989, the NRC issued a streamlined regulatory process that included an early site permit 
program, standard design certification for new reactor designs, and a combined construction and 
operating license procedure.  See Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and 
Combined Licenses for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372 (Apr. 18, 1989).  Congress 
subsequently endorsed the new licensing procedures in the Energy Policy Act of 1992.  See Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486 §§ 2801–07, 106 Stat. 2776, 3120–22 (1992). 
141. As noted above, EPAct 2005 provided a range of incentives for new reactors including loan 
guarantees, regulatory risk insurance for early movers, and production tax credits for new reactors 
placed in service by 2021.  See PARKER & HOLT, supra note 121, at 10–12. 
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new nuclear much more difficult, and then Fukushima.142  By 2012, the so-called 
nuclear renaissance had stalled.143 
But a few utilities and a few states soldiered on, pushing forward with 
plans to build new reactors.  In 2012, Georgia Power and its partners re-
ceived the first NRC licenses issued since 1978 to build two new units at its 
existing Vogtle plant in Georgia.144  Soon after, a consortium of companies 
led by South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. received licenses to construct 
and operate two new units at the VC Summer plant in South Carolina.145  
South Carolina, incidentally, already receives more than half of its electrici-
ty from nuclear energy.146  All four of the new units have experienced delays 
and cost overruns.  As of late 2015, estimated total costs were $7.5 billion 
for the two Vogtle units and $7.1 billion for the VC Summer units.147  All 
  
142. See Paul L. Joskow & John E. Parsons, The Future of Nuclear Power After Fukushima, 1 ECON. 
ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 99 (2012); Martin LaMonica, A Glut of Natural Gas Leaves Nuclear Power 
Stalled, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428737/a-glut-
of-natural-gas-leaves-nuclear-power-stalled [http://perma.cc/UD7T-3927]. 
143. Davis, supra note 126, at 49 (discussing effects of cheap natural gas, global economic recession, and 
the Fukushima accident on the “nuclear power renaissance”). 
144. See Matthew L. Wald, Federal Regulators Approve Two Nuclear Reactors in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/business/energy-environment/2-new-
reactors-approved-in-georgia.html [http://perma.cc/8D73-NT2C] (reporting on NRC decision 
to issue licenses to Georgia Power for two new reactors in Georgia). 
145. Ryan Tracy, U.S. Approves Nuclear Plants in South Carolina, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 30, 2012, 5:54 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303816504577313873449843052 
[http://perma.cc/J3BE-T62A] (reporting on NRC decision to issue licenses to Scana Corp. for 
two new reactors in South Carolina). 
146. See South Carolina: Profile Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia. 
gov/state/?sid=SC [http://perma.cc/MQ7X-AXDX] (last updated May 21, 2015) (reporting that 
“South Carolina’s four existing nuclear power plants supplied 54 percent of the state’s net electricity 
generation in 2014”). 
147. See GA POWER, THIRTEENTH SEMI-ANNUAL VOGTLE CONSTRUCTION MONITORING 
REPORT 6 tbl.1.1 (2015), https://georgiapower.com/docs/about-energy/13th-VCM-Report-
Final.pdf?hp=lnau_box2 [https://perma.cc/7PN2-R9LJ] (reporting total capital cost and 
financing for Vogtle units 3 and 4 of $7.453 billion); S.C. ELEC. & GAS CO., V.C. SUMMER 
NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 2 & 3: QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA 
OFFICE OF REGULATORY STAFF SUBMITTED BY SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS 
COMPANY PURSUANT TO PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER NO. 2009-104(A), at 33 
(2015), https://www.scana.com/docs/librariesprovider15/pdfs/blra-status-reports/3q-2015-
blra-report.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/K286-UQZ5] (noting projected costs of $7.1 billion 
for the two V.C. Summer reactors).  For comparison, the market capitalization for the Southern 
Company, which is the parent company of Georgia Power, the company that is leading the 
consortium building the Vogtle units, was around $42 billion in early 2016.  Southern Co., 
WALL STREET J., http://quotes.wsj.com/SO (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).  SCANA corporation, 
the parent company of South Carolina Electric and Gas, which is leading the consortium of 
companies building the V.C. Summer plants, has a market capitalization of about $8.6 billion.  
Scana Corp., WALL STREET J., http://quotes.wsj.com/SCG (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).  Figures 
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four of the new units are, as of late 2015, expected to be completed in 2019 
and 2020.148 
While these first four reactors benefited from federal subsidies and sup-
port,149 illustrating the importance of federal interventions to de-risk certain in-
vestments, they were only possible because of extensive rate reform efforts in the 
host states.  Working closely with the utilities, both Georgia and South Carolina 
enacted legislation that made cost recovery for these types of investments feasible 
and allowed the financing to proceed.150  Specifically, the new legislation directed 
the Georgia and South Carolina PUCs to provide an enhanced version of what is 
known as “construction work in progress” or CWIP, which allows the utilities to 
put certain construction expenditures into rate base (and rates) immediately, 
thereby earning a rate of return on the expenditures that allows the utilities to pay 
financing charges with money recovered through rates rather than from their 
own balance sheets.151  While CWIP has been used in other areas, particularly as 
an incentive to proceed with transmission investments, it is a departure from the 
traditional model of rate regulation, which typically prohibits putting any costs 
associated with a new asset in rate base until the asset itself is “used and useful” 
(that is, in service and providing electricity to ratepayers). 
  
are taken from the Wall Street Journal website service providing financial data on public 
companies, dated January 18, 2016. 
148. See Vogtle 3 and 4 Project Overview, GA POWER, https://www.georgiapower.com/about-
energy/energy-sources/nuclear/overview.cshtml [https://perma.cc/TT25-J6T7] (last visited Mar. 
20, 2016) (reporting expected start dates of 2019 and 2020 for the two new Vogtle units); see also 
S.C. ELEC. & GAS CO., supra note 147, at 31 (reporting “substantial completion” dates of June 
2019 for V.C Summer unit 2 and June 2020 for V.C. Summer Unit 3). 
149. See HOLT, supra note 138, at 21–27 (summarizing federal incentives for new nuclear plants, 
including subsidies available only to the new reactors under construction at Vogtle and VC 
Summer).  See U.S. Nuclear Power Policy, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/usa-nuclear-power-policy.aspx (last 
updated Nov. 2015). 
150. See, e.g., Georgia Nuclear Energy Financing Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-25 (2010); Base Load 
Review Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-33-210 (2014). 
151. See GA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-25(c.1)(1) (2010) (providing that utility “shall recover” financing costs 
of new nuclear generating plants that have been certified by the commission and providing that 
financing charges shall accrue in the utility’s construction work in progress account); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 58-33-280(B) (2014) (providing that utility “must be allowed to recover through revised 
rates its weighted average cost of capital applied to all or, at the utility’s option, part of the 
outstanding balance of construction work in progress”); id. at §58-33-280(K) (providing for 
recovery of construction and financing costs in cases of abandonment of the project as long as utility 
can show that abandonment was prudent). 
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The new regulatory frameworks also provide for up-front prudence determi-
nations for these projects, and some protections in case a project is abandoned.152  
In sum, these new plants get accelerated and generous rate treatment and they will 
not be subject to second-guessing by regulators even if they fail.  Think of it as 
cost-of-service on steroids. 
Opponents of these plants have charged that they are a massive give away to 
the utilities at the expense of ratepayers—one more example of how regulators 
(and state legislatures) are captured by the industry they are charged with regulat-
ing.153  Maybe.  While it is true that the utilities (and their lawyers) were deeply 
involved in crafting some of this legislation,154 the utilities themselves are taking 
on a fair amount of risk in building the first new reactors in the country in more 
than thirty years.  The utilities and their shareholders are already facing negative 
credit impacts from cost overruns and delays and may ultimately lose the political 
support necessary to maintain favorable rate treatment.155  If natural gas prices 
stay low, moreover, these plants will likely be uneconomic for years.  It seems safe 
to conclude that no company would ever make these investments in the current 
environment without some protection above and beyond that provided by the tra-
ditional cost-of-service model.  Whether the choices that the federal government 
  
152. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-33-225(D), (E), (G), (H) (2014) (providing for prudency 
determinations of pre-construction costs, recovery of such costs in rates, cost recovery in case of 
project abandonment, and denying challenge or re-opening of prudency determinations). 
153. See Direct Testimony of Glenn Carroll on Behalf of Nuclear Watch South Before the Georgia 
Public Service Commission at 6, In re Review of Proposed Revisions and Verification of Expendi-
tures Pursuant to Georgia Power Company’s Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for 
Plant Vogtle Units 3 and 4, Thirteenth Semi-annual Construction Monitoring Report (Dec. 10, 
2015) (No. 29849) (asserting that Georgia Power is making excess profits from CWIP treatment 
of Vogtle construction costs, that the state no longer needs the plants, and that ratepayers would be 
better off if the plants were canceled); Adam Russell, Another Vogtle Debacle? Cost Overruns, Delays 




154. See Sue Sturgis, Power Politics: Big Nuclear's Money Grab, INST. FOR SOUTHERN STUDIES (Mar. 
2, 2009), http://www.southernstudies.org/2009/03/power-politics-big-nuclears-money-grab.html 
[https://perma.cc/M8BL-JR63] (describing intense lobbying efforts by Georgia Power in securing 
favorable legislation for financing of new nuclear construction). 
155. See, e.g., Michael G. Haggarty, Cost Increases and Delays at Georgia Power's New Nuclear Project Are 
Credit Negative but Manageable at Current Rating Levels, MOODY’S (Mar. 11, 2013), 
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Cost-Increases-and-Delays-at-Georgia-Powers-
New-Nuclear—PR_268207 [https://perma.cc/MV2X-7JA5] (discussing impacts of Vogtle plant 
cost overruns and delays on Georgia Power’s credit rating); David Wren, State to Review Financing 
Method for South Carolina Nuclear Plant, CHARLESTON POST & COURIER (Sept 20, 2015), 
http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20150920/PC05/150929989/1177/null [https://perma. 
cc/2LS8-WTEF] (reporting on decision by South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff to review 
financing of VC Summer units under Baseload Review Act and effects on customers). 
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and these states have made to support these investments constitute capture or a 
form of de-risking may depend on one’s perspective. 
Moreover, and at least as important, these new reactors would never be built 
in states operating in hybrid and restructured markets.156  The sheer scale and 
long time horizons associated with these investments together with the uncer-
tainty regarding performance, future prices, and regulations translate into a rela-
tively high cost of capital, which makes financing very challenging in the market 
context.  This is particularly true in the current environment of cheap natural gas.  
Witness the words of John Rowe, former CEO of Exelon Corp., the largest U.S. 
producer of nuclear power: “As long as natural gas is anywhere near current price 
forecasts, you can’t economically build a merchant nuclear plant.”157  Encourag-
ing the development of nuclear generation in the current environment, in other 
words, will require creative ratemaking and federal subsidies.   
Though one could argue that market forces should determine our energy 
mix, at this point carbon emissions are largely unregulated and thus fossil fuel-
powered electricity has a significant economic advantage over nuclear power.  As 
noted, cheap natural gas from shale has made the economics of nuclear even more 
challenging.158  But Georgia and South Carolina have decided that it is worth 
having their ratepayers assume a portion of the risk of new nuclear investment in 
order to determine whether nuclear power can continue to be a viable part of their 
electricity mix.  And these states continue to have some of the lowest electricity 
rates in the country.159  While their motivation may not be principally about gen-
erating zero-carbon electricity, the only way to know if nuclear power can be a key 
component of efforts to decarbonize the power sector is to build new reactors.  
That is, the only way to know how well these new reactors will work and how 
much they will cost is to build them.  And it appears that the only place we can 
build them right now is in traditional cost-of-service states. 
  
156. See generally Jay Apt et al., Promoting Low-Carbon Electricity Production, 23 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 
37, 41 (2007); Tim Laing & Michael Grubb, Low Carbon Electricity Investment: The Limitations of 
Traditional Approaches and a Radical Alternative 4–7 (Univ. of Cambridge Elec. Policy Research 
Grp., Working Paper No. 1032, 2010).  See also Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The 
Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141 (2016) (discussing challenges of 
building nuclear reactors in wholesale electricity markets). 
157. Mark Clayton, Nuclear Power a Viable Competitor in US Energy Market, Study Finds, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 17, 2010) (quoting John Rowe, Exelon CEO), http://www. 
csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0917/Nuclear-power-a-viable-competitor-in-US-energy-
market-study-finds [http://perma.cc/WU25-V66G]. 
158. Davis, supra note 126, at 50 (discussing effects of cheap natural gas on economics of nuclear 
power). 
159. See State Electricity Profiles, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/ 
electricity/state [http://perma.cc/7XXJ-HH76] (providing overview of average retail electricity 
prices by state). 
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The story is similar with carbon capture and storage (CCS) for coal-fired 
power plants.  One possible technological approach to decarbonizing the power 
sector, widely endorsed by the fossil fuel industry, is to capture and store (or se-
quester) in underground reservoirs the carbon emissions from coal-burning power 
plants (and perhaps one day natural gas plants as well).160  CCS presents a com-
plicated technological challenge and hard questions about where to put all of the 
captured CO2 and whether it will stay underground (not to mention liability, 
long-term maintenance and monitoring, and so forth).161  If successful however, 
CCS could be a game changer here in the United States and especially abroad in 
countries such as China and India, which have massive coal reserves and rapidly 
growing emissions and energy requirements.162  If CCS fails, of course, we need 
to find alternatives (and fast) if we want to decarbonize.  Either way, we need to 
know if CCS is a viable and economic option. 
Although CCS is unlikely to work on existing plants because too much en-
ergy is lost with the retrofits,163 it might be possible to develop a new advanced 
type of coal plant that would have CCS designed into the machine itself.  One of 
the most attractive technologies in this respect is Integrated Gasification Com-
bined Cycle or IGCC, which essentially transforms coal into synthetic gas that is 
then burned in a combined cycle gas turbine.  The advantage of IGCC is that it 
makes it easier to separate and capture various streams of emissions, including 
carbon dioxide.  But these plants are also very expensive to build and operate, and 
  
160. See, e.g., Klaus S. Lackner et al., Eliminating CO2 Emissions From Coal-Fired Power Plants, in 
GENERATING ELECTRICITY IN A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD 127–73 (F.P. Sioshani 
ed., 2010) (reviewing basic features of carbon capture and storage, key technological options, and 
novel approaches); MASS. INST. TECH., THE FUTURE OF COAL: OPTIONS FOR A CARBON 
CONSTRAINED WORLD 17–42 (2007) (discussing various coal-based electricity generating 
options and the feasibility of CO2 capture for each); id. at 43–62 (discussing challenges of 
geological sequestration of large volumes of captured CO2 from coal burning power plants). 
161. See MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 160, at 43–52 (discussing reservoir capacity for large–scale 
geological sequestration and associated risks); id. at 56–58 (discussing existing regulatory 
frameworks in United States for geological sequestration and liability issues). 
162. See China and India Drive Recent Changes in World Coal Trade, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov 
20, 2015), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=23852 [https://perma.cc/H2P3-
RLKC] (noting that China and India accounted for 98 percent of the increase in world coal trade 
from 2008 to 2013); MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 160, at 63 (reporting estimate that China and 
India together are projected to account for more than 68 percent of incremental world demand for 
coal through 2030). 
163. See Lackner et al., supra note 160, at 146–52 (discussing economics of retrofitting existing coal 
plants with CO2 capture technology); MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 160, at 28–29 (discussing 
challenges of retrofitting existing pulverized coal plants with carbon capture technology and 
concluding that because of significant losses in operating efficiency retrofits seem unlikely). 
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several utilities and the federal government have already abandoned previous ef-
forts to build IGCC plants (even without any carbon capture technology).164 
There is, however, an ambitious commercial-scale demonstration IGCC 
plant currently under construction in Mississippi: the Kemper Integrated Gasifica-
tion and Combined Cycle Plant (owned by the Mississippi Power Company, a 
subsidiary of the Southern Company).165  This facility will include carbon capture 
and storage technology, with a goal of capturing 65 percent of the carbon dioxide 
emissions from the plant, giving it an emissions profile similar to that of a com-
bined cycle natural gas plant.166  The Kemper Plant was initially projected to cost 
$2.2 billion, but is now expected to cost $6.49 billion (and the cost estimates keep 
rising).167  In addition to receiving $270 million in direct financing and another po-
tential $133 million in investment tax credits from the federal government, the pro-
ject will also benefit from favorable rate treatment for the initial $2.3 billion in costs 
under Mississippi’s 2008 Base Load Act.168  In the absence of new rate increases, 
the company (and its shareholders) will pay the additional costs.169  Needless to say, 
  
164. See MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 160, at 32–39 (discussing IGCC technology and CCS 
options); Jon Gibbins & Hannah Chalmers, Carbon Capture and Storage, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 4317, 
4318–19 (2008) (evaluating different CCS technologies and concluding that pre-combustion 
capture of CO2 from IGCC plants will produce cheaper low-carbon electricity from coal than the 
alternatives).  But see Howard J. Herzog, Scaling Up Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage: From 
Megatons to Gigatons, 33 ENERGY ECON. 597, 599 (2011) (noting that IGCC cost estimates are 
“highly uncertain” and that IGCC costs “may have doubled or tripled since 2004”). 
165. For background on the Kemper project, see Kemper County Energy Facility: Overview, MISSISSIPPI 
POWER, http://www.mississippipower.com/about-energy/plants/kemper-county-energy-facility 
(last visited Mar.20, 2016).  See also Kemper County IGCC Fact Sheet, supra note 122. 
166. See id. (noting that the plant will capture 65 percent of total emissions resulting in 3.5 million tons 
of avoided emissions per year). 
167. Id. (reporting projected costs of $6.49 billion as of February 2016). 
168. See Steven Mufson, The Coal Plant to End All Coal Plants?, WASH. POST (May 18, 2014) 
(discussing history and status of Kemper plant); Alternate Method of Cost Recovery on Certain 
Base Load Generation, MISS. CODE ANN. § 77-3-101 (2013); Final Order on Remand Granting 
a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, Authorizing Application of Baseload Act, and 
Approving Prudent Pre-Construction Costs at 9–10, 20, In re Miss. Power Co. (No. 2009-UA-
014) (Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 2012) [hereinafter Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n] (confirming 
application of Baseload Act to Kemper Plant and capping rate recovery for costs associated with the 
Kemper Plant at $2.4 billion). 
169. See Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, supra note 168 (summarizing regulatory treatment of Kemper plant 
and capping rate recovery for costs associated with the plant at $2.4 billion); see also Jonas J. Monast 
& Sarah K. Adair, Completing the Energy Innovation Cycle: The View From the Public Utility 
Commission, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1345, 1351 (2014) (discussing important role of PUCs in 
commercial scale demonstration projects for new energy technologies); id. at 1374–77 (discussing 
Mississippi Public Service Commission’s involvement in Kemper plant); Mufson, supra note 168 
(discussing history and status of Kemper plant). 
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the project has elicited quite a bit of controversy and is the subject of multiple ongo-
ing regulatory proceedings.170 
Regardless of the individual merits of this project (and others like it), it will 
clearly have broad social benefits that extend far beyond Mississippi.  No one 
knows how much it will cost to build a “clean coal” plant because no one has ever 
done it.  And no one knows how well such a plant will work because no one has 
ever operated one at scale.  The only way to find out whether this technology will 
work is to build and operate a commercial scale facility.  Thus, rather than view 
the Kemper project as yet another example of the excesses of rate regulation or 
the pathologies of capture, it might also be productive to view it as a crucial ex-
periment with a technology that could be a vitally important part of a low-
carbon future.  This is equally true if the venture in question fails.  Although such 
a failure would surely be expensive and while there are obvious limits to the con-
clusions that one can draw from a single experiment, a failed experiment such as 
Kemper could prove quite valuable in terms of the learning experiences it pro-
vides.  On the one hand, the failure could demonstrate problems and pitfalls to 
avoid for the next CCS plant.  But if the problems and pitfalls are unavoidable, 
the failure of the Kemper plant to be completed on time and anywhere close to 
initial budget projections also provides important information about the need to 
focus on other promising technologies as opposed to CCS in the ongoing effort 
to decarbonize our electricity system. 
In sum, current investments in new nuclear plants and in advanced coal 
plants with CCS are taking place in traditional cost-of-service states where cost 
recovery mechanisms provide more certainty with respect to future revenues suf-
ficient to pay financing costs.  These innovative forms of cost recovery provide a 
way of socializing the costs of these investments, thereby allowing utilities to se-
cure financing on more favorable terms.  IOUs in these states are leading the effort 
  
170. The ongoing regulatory proceedings before the Mississippi Public Service Commission are 
primarily in Docket No. 2009-UA-014, 2013-UN-039, 2013-UN-014, and 2013-UN-189.  On 
August 4, 2014, Mississippi Power Co. settled litigation with the Sierra Club, which had been 
ongoing for four years.  In return for an agreement by the Sierra Club to drop all pending legal and 
regulatory challenges to the Kemper Plant, Mississippi Power agreed to, among other things, retire 
or convert several other coal-fired power plants, make certain investments in energy efficiency and 
renewable energy, and drop its opposition to net metering.  See Settlement Agreement Between the 
Sierra Club and the Mississippi Power Company, SIERRA CLUB (Aug. 1, 2014), https:// 
mississippi.sierraclub.org/sites/mississippi.sierraclub.org/files/SierraClub-Mississippi 
PowerSettlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/253S-RDDE]; see also Rebecca Smith, Coal-Fired 
Power Plant Loses Steam, WALL STREET J. (May 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/coal-fired-power-plant-loses-steam-1432330865 [https://perma.cc/YW8X-5D27] 
(discussing problems with Kemper plant and noting that South Mississippi Electric Power 
Association dropped its plan to buy a $600 million, 15 percent stake in the project because of 
ongoing construction delays).   
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in partnership with state legislatures and PUCs, while the federal government has 
played an important role in providing direct subsidies, loan guarantees, and other 
incentives.  Notwithstanding the valid criticisms directed at the way these projects 
have unfolded, it is also important to recognize the valuable learning opportuni-
ties they provide.  Looking across the system as a whole and at the three models 
we have described, this type of innovation seems feasible only in the traditional 
cost-of-service states—an important contrast to the more downstream focus 
of hybrid and restructured states on grid modernization, distributed energy re-
sources, and time-variant pricing, as we describe below. 
Finally, while it is impossible to know with confidence whether these sorts 
of experiments would have proceeded under a single, national system of regula-
tion, there is some evidence to suggest that the federal government would have 
had a difficult time completing these types of experiments under such a system.  
In fact, the federal government abandoned its own CCS project, the proposed 
“Future Gen” project in Illinois, in 2015 after killing the project in 2008 and re-
starting it again in 2010.171  By making various incentives available for early mov-
ers, the federal government has instead allowed specific states (and IOUs) to self 
select and to decide whether and how they want to pursue these risky investments 
in advanced low-carbon baseload generation.  This kind of experimentation, we 
argue, is at least partly an unintended outcome of electricity restructuring, which 
was supposed to lead to a single, unified model but instead resulted in three. 
B. Modernizing the Grid 
The U.S. power system contains a lot of expensive hardware—more than $1 
trillion by some estimates.172  Big power plants make up a large part of this, but so 
do the “wires” that constitute the power grid itself.  As we described above, the 
grid can be divided into two major components: high-voltage transmission lines 
and local distribution systems.  Within each of the three major grids or intercon-
nects in the United States (Eastern, Western, and Texas) networks of high voltage 
transmission lines move bulk power across the system before stepping down 
  
171. See Ari Natter, DOE Suspends $1 Billion in FutureGen Funds, Killing Carbon Capture Demonstration 
Project, BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.bna.com/doe-suspends-
billion-n17179922773/ [https://perma.cc/KUF3-EU62] (discussing Department of Energy 
decision to suspend funding for the FutureGen project, “all but ensuring that the carbon capture 
and sequestration project in Illinois won’t be built”).  
172. The net asset value of the plant in service for all U.S. electric utilities in 2010 was approximately 
$1.1 trillion, which includes $765 billion for IOUs, $200 billion for municipal utilities, and $112 
billion for rural electric cooperatives. BINZ ET AL., supra note 131, at 14. 
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voltage to transmit electricity to end users through thousands of local 
distribution systems.173 
Except in Texas, Alaska, and Hawaii, which have their own transmission 
grids, FERC regulates use of the high-voltage interstate transmission system 
(although siting of new transmission lines is left largely to the states).  Creating a 
more robust and expansive bulk transmission system is critical to getting more re-
newable electricity onto the grid and doing so has proven challenging.174 
But modernizing the high-voltage transmission system really boils down to 
finding ways to build more transmission.  While there are undoubtedly opportu-
nities to improve the intelligence of the system, we are not faced with the task of 
trying to turn it into a different type of infrastructure.175  We mainly just need 
more of it.176  FERC’s efforts to foster regional approaches to transmission plan-
ning and cost allocation, which were recently upheld by the D.C. Circuit, indi-
cate progress in this effort.177  But there is still a long way to go. 
The distribution system, on the other hand, was not designed for the kinds 
of bidirectional power flows that significant deployment of distributed energy 
resources such as rooftop solar and storage require.178  Here, we really do need a 
  
173. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, QUADRENNIAL TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 53 (2015), http://energy.gov/ 
sites/prod/files/2015/09/f26/QTR2015-03-Grid.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX32-M7W9] (reporting 
that the U.S. electric power system includes 642,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines); 
Amin and Stringer, supra note 24, at 400–01 (describing high-voltage bulk transmission grid in 
North America). 
174. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1221, 119 Stat. 594, 946–51 (2005) 
(establishing process to designate national electricity transmission corridors and providing backstop 
siting authority for FERC); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 
2009), cert. denied sub nom. Edison Elec. Inst. v. Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 U.S. 1147 (2010). 
175. See, e.g., Joskow, supra note 28, at 34–37 (discussing need for new investments in monitoring, 
communication, and control equipment to enhance high voltage transmission systems in the U.S. 
but noting that the primary need is for more transmission capacity).  
176. Id.; see also Alexandra B. Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach to Siting 
Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1921–25 (2015) (discussing high-voltage 
transmission system in the United States, need for new transmission lines, and key obstacles to 
building new lines); Amin & Stringer, supra note 24, at 400 (concluding that United States will 
need 50,000 miles of new high-voltage transmission lines by 2025). 
177. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public 
Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (calling for 
regional transmission planning and cost allocation processes); see also S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. 
FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
178. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 173, at 63–64 (noting “passive” nature of traditional 
distribution system design and concluding that “[e]nabling customers to become active 
participants in electric power system operations and energy exchanges will require a 
fundamental shift in how the distribution system is designed, controlled, and protected”); id. at 
63 (noting that the distribution system is the most expensive part of the electric delivery system and 
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different type of infrastructure, and we need it in thousands of local distribution 
systems across the country.  Modernizing this part of the grid will require signifi-
cant investment in overhauling existing infrastructure and deploying new tech-
nologies to enhance the intelligence of the system (the promise of the so-called 
smart grid), to enable two-way communications between customers and their 
electricity providers, which is critical for time-variant pricing, and to accom-
modate the growth and increasing diversity of customer-side generation and 
storage.179  One recent estimate put the range of total investment needed in the 
distribution and consumer segments of the system to achieve a fully functioning 
“smart grid” at $255 to $385 billion.180 
Investments in grid modernization, however, are challenging under the tra-
ditional cost-of-service model.181  Given flat electricity demand and the growth 
of distributed energy resources (not to mention the possibility of grid defection), 
many utilities are understandably anxious about their ability to recover the sub-
stantial, long-term investments needed to modernize the grid through continued 
sales and the risks that they incur during the period of regulatory lag (that is, the 
time between rate cases).182  They need additional certainty regarding cost recov-
ery before they are willing to make such investments, and, in some cases, they 
need advanced forms of cost recovery rather than having to wait for the invest-
ments to be “used and useful” before they can start to recover costs in rates. 
  
the most difficult to upgrade because there are 6.3 million miles of distribution lines in the United 
States connecting to 145 million customers).  
179. Id. at 63–64, 67 (discussing key components of modernized distribution system to enable two-way 
flows of energy and information); ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE INTEGRATED GRID: 
REALIZING THE FULL VALUE OF CENTRAL AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 32 
(2014) (discussing needs for modernized distribution system to accommodate growth of DERs).  
180. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., ESTIMATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE 
SMART GRID 1–5, tbl.1–2 (2011) (estimating range of total investment in distribution, and 
consumer segments of a fully functioning grid). 
181. See, e.g., MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., INVESTIGATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
UTILITIES ON ITS OWN MOTION INTO MODERNIZATION OF THE ELECTRIC GRID 19 (2014) 
(noting that “under conventional cost-of-service ratemaking, electric distribution companies may 
not have the proper incentives for making investments to attain [the Department of Public 
Utilities’] grid modernization objectives”). 
182. See Philip Hanser & Kai Van Horn, The Next Evolution of the Distribution Utility, in 
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UTILITY INDUSTRY 231, 
232–38 (Fereidoon P. Sioshansi ed., 2014) (discussing revenue challenges facing electric 
distribution utilities from declining demand associated with improved efficiency, demand response, 
and growth of distributed generation); William C. Miller et al., Regulatory Policies for the Transition 
to the New Business Paradigm, in DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE UTILITY INDUSTRY 321, 321–34 (Fereidoon P. Sioshansi ed., 2014) (discussing investment 
and cost-recovery challenges facing distribution utilities in current environment of slowing demand 
and growth of distributed energy resources).  
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If traditional cost-of-service principles make these grid modernization in-
vestments difficult, however, relying on markets to provide sufficient compensa-
tion to recover costs is a non-starter.  Indeed, even in the fully restructured states, 
local distribution systems are still managed by distribution utilities and regulated 
under traditional cost-of-service principles.183  Because of the natural monopoly 
characteristics of electricity distribution,184 no one has proposed opening up that 
part of the system to competition.  Investments in grid modernization are thus 
not possible under current market structures.  As a result, even in fully restruc-
tured states, the ratemaking power of PUCs remains quite “traditional” for the 
distribution system, with PUCs using their ratemaking powers to allow cost re-
covery for investments in this part of the grid. 
To that effect, several hybrid and restructured states are deploying their rate-
making powers to promote ambitious grid modernization efforts.  Some of these 
states are using innovative performance-based rates that provide specific rewards 
(or penalties) for utilities if they meet (or fail to meet) certain performance bench-
marks regarding grid investments.185  Other states are using advanced cost recovery 
  
183. See Stephen Polasky, Electricity Restructuring and the Environment, in PAINTING THE WHITE 
HOUSE GREEN: RATIONALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE 
OFFICES OF THE PRESIDENT 141, 144 (Randall Lutter & Jason F. Shogren eds., 2004). 
184. See PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION 59 (1983) (noting that electric power distribution systems are 
generally considered to have “important natural monopoly characteristics within limited geographic 
areas”). 
185. Performance-based rates are structured to allow utilities to capture some or all of the savings that 
result from improved performance across a chosen metric.  See Sonia Aggarwal & Edward Burgess, 
Performance-Based Models to Address Utility Challenges, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 48, 50 (2014) (“Under 
PBR [Performance-based regulation], the utility is rewarded based on its achievement of specific 
performance targets, providing an opportunity to earn a higher return if the company is able to 
perform well.”); Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 1 (1986) (discussing incentive regulation for electric utilities).  Over the last 
several years, targeted performance-based rate programs have been widely deployed in the United 
States and elsewhere to promote energy efficiency.  See SONIA AGGARWAL & EDDIE BURGESS, 
NEW REGULATORY MODELS 12 (2014).  Innovative programs include Massachusetts’s statewide 
energy efficiency program and California’s recently established Efficiency Savings and Performance 
Incentives Program.  These programs are sometimes included in broader revenue decoupling 
efforts, which seek to remove the incentive utilities have to increase electricity sales by ensuring that 
utilities recover their costs even as more consumers participate in demand-side programs that 
reduce overall utility sales.  See generally REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, REVENUE 
REGULATION AND DECOUPLING: A GUIDE TO THEORY AND APPLICATION (2011); 
PAMELA MORGAN, A DECADE OF DECOUPLING FOR US ENERGY UTILITIES: RATE 
IMPACTS, DESIGNS, AND OBSERVATIONS (2012).  See also N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., CASE 
14-M-0101, REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION 49 (2014) (observing that revenue decoupling 
“provides no positive incentive for utility bill management and exposes the utility and customers to 
the risk that as some customers reduce demand, the cost of service is borne by the remaining 
customers”). 
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techniques similar to those used in the case of new nuclear power and CCS dis-
cussed in the previous section.  In all cases, utilities are getting additional protec-
tions and incentives regarding long-term investments necessary for grid 
modernization. 
Illinois (a restructured state), for example, has been a leader in using per-
formance-based rates to encourage large investments in grid modernization.  The 
state’s 2011 Energy Infrastructure Modernization Act186 allows the state’s two 
major distribution utilities to adopt a system of performance-based formula rates 
for their distribution systems if they agree to make substantial investments in grid 
infrastructure and achieve various other performance objectives.187  Under the 
program, the state’s largest utility, ComEd, which serves northern Illinois and the 
Chicago area, is investing $2.6 billion over ten years to upgrade and modernize its 
transmission and distribution systems and deploy various smart grid technolo-
gies.188  The performance-based formula in the legislation allows ComEd to re-
cover its actual costs plus a fixed return on equity as long as it continues to meet 
various performance benchmarks.189  It also includes specific provisions to protect 
customers against excessive rate increases and penalties in cases where the utility 
does not meet certain performance benchmarks.190 
Massachusetts (another restructured state) has taken a different approach to 
grid modernization, providing for advanced cost recovery and up-front prudence 
determinations in a manner similar to what Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi 
and other cost-of-service states are doing with respect to utility investments in 
new nuclear and CCS plants.  In a recent order issued on its own motion, the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) set forth an ambitious 
  
186. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 16-108.5 (2015). 
187. The key provisions of the legislation are codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 16-108.5 to 16-
108.8 (2015).  Section 16-108.5 contains the provisions distribution system investments and 
performance-based formula rates. 
188. See id. at § 16-108.5 (authorizing a ten-year $2.6 billion investment plan for ComEd, which the 
statute identifies as a “participating utility” serving more than one million Illinois customers).  The 
same provision also authorizes $605 million in investments by the state’s smaller distribution utility, 
Ameren).  See also Louis Harris, Smart Grid and AMI: Illinois Pioneers a New Approach, 26 
ELECTRICITY J. 66, 69–71 (2013) (describing features of Illinois program, including ConEd and 
Ameren investments). 
189. The formula rate allows the utility to recover the actual costs of the investments, includes a return-
on-equity equal to 6 percent plus the average yield of 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds for the 
applicable year, and provides for incentive compensation tied to certain operational metrics.  See 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 16-108.5(c) (outlining provisions of the performance-based formula 
rate); id. at § 16-108.5(f) (outlining performance metrics). 
190. Id. at § 16-108.5(f), (f-5), (g) (outlining financial penalties as applied to utility performance metrics 
and customer protections against rate increases). 
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program of grid modernization for the state’s distribution utilities.191  The Order 
requires each distribution utility to submit a ten-year grid modernization plan 
that will reduce outages, optimize demand, integrate distributed resources, and 
improve workforce and asset management.192  Each utility must also propose a 
more specific, five-year, short-term investment plan (STIP) that outlines the 
business case for the utility’s capital investments in grid modernization.193  The 
Order identifies performance metrics, but these are to be used (at least initial-
ly) to track progress rather than to serve as a basis for incentives or penalties.  
Investments elaborated in the short-term investment plan are eligible for 
“pre-authorization” from the DPU, which means that the DPU “will not revisit 
in later filings whether the company should have proceeded with these invest-
ments.”194  This provides, in effect, an ex ante prudency determination for the 
proposed investments, although the DPU does reserve the right to evaluate pru-
dency in the implementation of the investments.195  Finally, the Order provides 
targeted cost recovery through a capital tracker mechanism for investments in ad-
vanced metering functionality and incremental capital investments in grid mod-
ernization.196  This allows the utilities to recover costs in a more timely manner 
(as they make them) rather than having to wait for the results of the next rate 
case.197 
As in Illinois, much of Massachusetts’s grid modernization effort is tied to 
advanced metering functionality, which the DPU describes “as the basic technol-
ogy platform for grid modernization.”198  In fact, as discussed in more detail 
below, Massachusetts has paired its grid modernization effort with a com-
panion order on time-variant rates.  The goal of grid modernization, in other 
words, is largely (but not exclusively) tied to the effort to provide more robust 
price signals to electricity consumers as a means of achieving reductions in peak 
load.  This is particularly important in Massachusetts and neighboring states giv-
en that one-third of the installed electric generating capacity in New England is 
  
191. See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., supra note 181. 
192. Id. at 2. 
193. Id. at 3. 
194. Id. at 3–4. 
195. Id. at 19 (“Department pre-authorization means that the Department will not revisit whether the 
company should have proceeded with these investments.  The Department will, however, 
review the prudency of the company’s implementation of these investments.”). 
196. Id. at 19–20, 22–25.  Targeted cost recovery for incremental capital investments in the grid is 
only available if the utility is also investing in advanced metering functionality.  Id. 
197. Id. at 22.  Investments in advanced metering also need not be “used and useful” by the year during 
which cost recovery is sought.  Id. at 25. 
198. Id. at 14. 
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used to meet peak demand for only 10 percent of the year—that is, one-third of 
the generation in New England sits idle for 90 percent of the year.199 
Other states are launching their own grid modernization efforts, following 
in the footsteps of leaders such as Illinois and Massachusetts. Maryland and 
Pennsylvania, for example, have adopted special cost recovery mechanisms for 
smart meters.200  New York and California are also addressing various aspects of 
grid modernization in their broader efforts on distributed energy resources (as we 
describe below).  And Texas, which has the largest and most competitive elec-
tricity market in the U.S., has pioneered the use and integration of its advanced 
metering infrastructure to make data available to third parties and enhance new 
services offerings to customers.201 
In all of these cases, grid infrastructure investments have been subject to var-
ious forms of advanced cost recovery or performance-based rates.  These efforts 
to modernize the grid recognize the inability of both current market structures 
and traditional cost-of-service regulation to provide sufficient incentives to make 
the necessary investments.  By enabling these investments, these states are seek-
ing to facilitate the broad social benefits that come with grid modernization and 
the fundamental role that the distribution system must play as a platform for the 
continued growth of distributed energy resources and the move to time-variant 
rates.  Here too, the federal government has played a largely catalytic role by 
providing $4.4 billion in funding for smart grid demonstration and technology 
deployment projects, including significant support for advanced metering in-
frastructure, and by continuing to fund research on grid modernization.202  It is, 
of course, possible that these grid infrastructure investments would also proceed 
  
199. Id. at 10–11. 
200. See GRIDWISE ALL., 2014 GRID MODERNIZATION INDEX (GMI) 10–11 (2014), 
https://www.illinois.gov/dceo/Documents/GWA_14_GridModernizationIndex_11_17_14Final.
pdf (summarizing grid modernization efforts in leading states).  
201. See Amanda Levin, Customer Incentives and Potential Energy Savings in Retail Electric Markets: A 
Texas Case Study, 28 ELECTRICITY J. 51, 58–62 (2015) (discussing smart meter deployment in 
Texas and development of new statewide portal, SmartMeterTexas, to make data available to retail 
electricity providers and third parties).  But see id. at 59 (noting that to date customer use of the new 
SmartMeterTexas portal “has been dismal” with less than 0.5 percent of customers using the 
service). 
202. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE & 
ADVANCE METERING: STAFF REPORT 5 (Dec. 2015) (reporting that between 2009 and 2015 
the Department of Energy and the electric industry invested more than $7.9 billion “to accelerate 
deployment of smart grid technologies and systems, strengthen cybersecurity, improve 
interoperability, and collect data on smart grid operations, benefits, and utility impacts”); DOE 
Announces $220 Million in Grid Modernization Funding, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Jan. 14, 2016), 
http://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-announces-220-million-grid-modernization-funding 
[https://perma.cc/9KB7-B6ND]. 
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under a single, national model of regulation, but we likely would not see the di-
versity of approaches—performance incentives, creative cost recovery policies, 
and so forth—that we see now across the different states. 
C. Promoting Distributed Energy Resources 
One of the promises of grid modernization is its ability to serve as a platform 
for continued growth of distributed energy resources (DERs) such as rooftop so-
lar, storage, and electric vehicles.  Over the last several years, the United States 
has witnessed explosive growth in distributed generation, primarily in the form of 
rooftop solar.203  Customer-side storage and electric vehicles have not seen 
widespread deployment, but these are starting to attract much more attention 
from regulators, utilities, and third parties.204 
Along with tax credits and new financing arrangements, rate design has 
played a fundamental role in stimulating the growth of distributed generation.205  
Net metering has been the primary tool, with forty-four states and the District of 
Columbia adopting some form of net metering program.206  As participation in 
these net metering programs has grown, however, concerns have been raised 
  
203. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REVOLUTION NOW: THE FUTURE ARRIVES FOR FOUR CLEAN 
ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 4 (2013) (“In 2012, rooftop solar panels cost about 1% of what they 
did 35 years ago, and since 2008, total U.S. solar PV deployment has jumped by about 10 times—
from about 735 megawatts to over 7200 megawatts.”); Solar Market Insight Report 2014 Q4, 
SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-market-insight-
report-2014-q4 [https://perma.cc/4MJ4-FLFJ] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (noting that residential 
solar in the United States grew at annual rates of over 50 percent in 2012, 2013, and 2014). 
204. See GARRETT FITZGERALD ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE: 
HOW MULTI-USE, CUSTOMER-SITED BATTERIES DELIVER THE MOST SERVICES AND 
VALUE TO CUSTOMERS AND THE GRID 22–34 (2015) (discussing value of multiple services 
provided to the electric power grid by customer-sited storage).  Utility interest in electric vehicles is 
growing in several states, notably California.  In January 2016, the California Public Utilities 
Commission approved a first pilot phase of Southern California Edison’s Charge Ready Program, 
allowing the utility to install 1500 electric vehicle charging stations in its territory.  See Decision 
Regarding Southern California Edison Company’s Application For Charge Ready And Market 
Education Programs, Decision No. 16-01-023, (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 14, 2016).  For a 
more general discussion, see ADAM LANGTON & NOEL CRISOSTOMO, VEHICLE-GRID 
INTEGRATION: A VISION FOR ZERO-EMISSION TRANSPORTATION INTERCONNECTED 
THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM (2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M080/K775/80775679.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PWV-5F67] 
(discussing opportunities for electric vehicles as distributed energy resources in California). 
205. See generally NAIM R. DARGHOUTH ET AL., NET METERING AND MARKET FEEDBACK 
LOOPS (2015) (noting importance of net metering and rate design in supporting the growth of 
distributed solar PV). 
206. See DSIRE, NET METERING (Mar. 2015), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Net-Metering-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HJE-R67Y]. 
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about possible cross-subsidies and their effects on utility business models.207   A 
number of states have thus begun to experiment with new distributed generation 
tariffs that are designed to, on the one hand, reward distributed generators that 
produce their own electricity while on the other hand ensure that distributed gen-
erators pay for the grid services they use. 
Net metering programs to support distributed generation can be traced 
back to PURPA and the efforts of several states to provide alternatives for small 
customer-owned generation.208  As previously discussed, PURPA created a spe-
cial program for QFs—small renewables and co-generation facilities—giving 
them the right to sell power to utilities for a fixed time at the utility’s avoided 
cost.209  In the absence of an alternative, small customer-owned generation would 
be treated as QFs under PURPA, which would require customers to install two 
meters (one for the retail power they used and one for the excess power they gen-
erated and sold back to the utility at avoided cost) and to enter into simultaneous 
purchase and sale agreements with the utilities.210  Net metering sought to avoid 
this complexity and provide additional incentives for customer-owned generation 
by using a single meter that would literally spin backwards during times of excess 
power generation and, in doing so, credit the power generated in excess of the 
customer’s use at the retail rate rather than at the lower avoided-cost rate required 
under PURPA.211 
PUCs established these early net metering programs with the goal of creat-
ing incentives for customer-owned renewable generation.  In 1981, for example, 
the Arizona Corporation Commission (the equivalent of their PUC) allowed net 
metering for small customer generation of 100 kilowatts or less.212  The Massa-
chusetts PUC established a similar program the following year.213 
  
207. See, e.g., ENERGY DIV., CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA NET ENERGY METERING 
(NEM) DRAFT COST-EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION 30–38 (2013) (estimating systems costs 
borne by non-DG customers); CARL LINVILL ET AL., DESIGNING DISTRIBUTED 
GENERATION TARIFFS WELL 29–30 (2013).  But see ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY 
METERING, ZERO NET ENERGY AND THE DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCE FUTURE 36, 
40 (2012) (noting that many questions about the net effects of distributed energy resources remain 
to be answered and that “[u]nder current volumetric rate structures, net metering does not 
accurately recover the costs of a customer’s use of the grid network and, simultaneously, it may not 
be compensating the customer for the value of the power they are providing”).  
208. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978). 
209. Id. § 210. 
210. See YIH-HUEI WAN, NET METERING PROGRAMS 1 (1996) (discussing the history of and 
rationale for net metering programs).  
211. Id. 
212 See id. 
213. See id. 
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In 1983, Minnesota became the first state to enact a net metering statute.  
Since that time nearly all states have established (by statute or regulation) some 
form of net metering program.214  While the details vary, the programs are similar 
in their overall design and function.  In essence, they allow owners of distributed 
generation (DG) to get the full retail price for excess power that is fed back to the 
grid.215  Net metering programs work in both regulated states and in states with 
retail choice.  In states allowing retail choice, there are some differences re-
garding which entity is responsible for the net metering program: the DG 
customer’s retail electricity provider or the distribution company, which is 
usually the incumbent utility.216 
The great advantage of net metering has always been its simplicity.  A single 
meter, with a single rate, provides a simple approach to crediting customer gener-
ation.217  After the programs are established, moreover, there is no need for any 
regulatory interaction or supervision.218  The programs do not require any public 
funding.219  And they have been structured in a manner that allows the states to 
avoid encroaching on FERC jurisdiction.220  It is therefore no surprise that net 
metering has been adopted so widely in the United States. 
As long as the overall penetration of DG remains low, net metering 
programs have little impact on a utility’s bottom line.  In recent years, howev-
er, certain forms of DG, particularly rooftop solar, have experienced dramatic 
growth, driven by rapidly declining costs for solar photovoltaic (PV) modules, the 
  
214. See L. BIRD ET AL., REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXPANDED 
ADOPTION OF DISTRIBUTED SOLAR 29–30 (2013).  Nearly all states have adopted some form of 
net metering tariff.  See DSIRE, supra note 206. 
215. Jocelyn Durkay, Net Metering: Policy Overview and State Legislative Updates, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/net-metering-policy-overview-and-state-
legislative-updates.aspx [https://perma.cc/4J9F-6L7P] (last updated Dec. 18, 2014) (describing 
net metering policies across the U.S.). 
216. See State Electric Retail Choice Programs Are Popular With Commercial and Industrial Customers, supra 
note 87. 
217. WAN, supra note 210, at 4. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. The net metering transaction could be characterized as a wholesale sale of electricity.  By 
structuring it as a “credit” for excess generation, however, state net metering programs have avoided 
triggering federal jurisdiction.  FERC has blessed this in the case of individual customer generators 
and in the case of third parties (such as third party solar leasing companies).  See MidAmerican 
Energy Co., 94 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n Rep. (CCH) ¶ 61,340 (2001) (finding no sale when an 
individual customer installs generation on-site and accounts for its excess generation through 
netting); Sun Edison LLC, 129 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n (CCH) ¶ 61,146 (2009) (finding no 
sale when third party owns customer-sited generation and deals with excess through netting).  For 
a thoughtful discussion of the jurisdictional issues raised by net metering and an argument against 
extending FERC jurisdiction to cover net metering, see Jim Rossi, Federalism and the Net Metering 
Alternative, 29 ELECTRICITY J. 13 (2016).  
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availability of third-party solar leases, and various tax credit and other incentives, 
including, most prominently, net metering.221 
Some utilities, PUCs, and ratepayer advocates have responded by raising 
concerns about the effect of such growth on utility business models and the 
potential cross-subsidies embedded in net metering programs.222  The basic 
argument is that DG customers, even though they are benefitting from their 
connection to the grid, are not paying their fair share of grid services, leaving 
non-DG customers (who are often lower-income customers) to pay a larger share 
of these systems costs.223  While it is surely the case that non-DG customers 
stand to benefit from the growth in DG to the extent that it reduces the need for 
utility investments in new generation, transmission, and distribution, and to the 
extent that it promotes a more reliable and resilient grid, several recent analyses 
have raised concerns about the implications of DG growth for non-DG 
customers who are left paying for a larger share of the utility’s fixed costs.224  
As long as DG accounts for a very small portion of a utility’s customer base, this is 
not much of an issue.  As participation in net metering grows, however, the 
cross-subsidy issues become more important and contentious.225 
  
221. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 203 (“In 2012, rooftop solar panels cost about 1% of what 
they did 35 years ago, and since 2008, total U.S. solar PV deployment has jumped by about 10 
times—from about 735 megawatts to over 7200 megawatts.”); Easan Drury et al., The 
Transformation of Southern California’s Residential Photovoltaics Market Through Third-Party 
Ownership, 42 ENERGY POL’Y 681, 689 (2012) (observing that “[t]hird-party owned residential 
PV systems are rapidly gaining market share in the United States in the regions where they are 
allowed to enter the market” and concluding that “[p]olicies that enable third-party PV products to 
enter new markets . . . represent strong opportunities for stimulating PV demand in concert with 
traditional incentives that reduce system costs or increase revenues”). 
222. See EDISON ELEC. INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND 
STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 11, 13 (2013); Diane 
Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2013, at B1; Navigant Research, 
Distributed Generation Poses Existential Threat to Utilities, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2013, 1:46 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/pikeresearch/2013/08/26/distributed-generation-poses-existential-
threat-to-utilities. 
223. See, e.g, LINVILL ET AL., supra note 207, at 6; N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 185, at 54. 
224. See ENERGY DIV., CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, supra note 207 (estimating systems costs borne by 
non-DG customers); LINVILL ET AL., supra note 207, at 29–30.  But see ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
INST., supra note 207 (noting that many questions about the net effects of distributed energy 
resources remain to be answered and that “[u]nder current volumetric rate structures, net metering 
does not accurately recover the costs of a customer’s use of the grid network and, simultaneously, it 
may not be compensating the customer for the value of the power they are providing”). 
225. In California, for example, a recent study performed on behalf of the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC) estimated that the total costs of distributed generation (DG) with full 
participation in the state’s net metering program through 2020 would be $1.1 billion, or about 3.5 
percent of IOU revenues.  See ENERGY DIV., CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, supra note 207, at 
7 tbl.2. 
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These issues have led a number of states to reexamine their net metering 
programs and to consider alternative tariff designs.226  Some of these efforts have 
been initiated by the legislature as part of a broader program of rate reform.  
Others are being led by PUCs and their staffs, either as part of a broader rate re-
form effort or in specific cases regarding individual utilities.  Still others are 
emerging out of interactions between the PUC and state energy offices, which 
have been established in some states by the governor to play a policy coordination 
role on energy. 
In California, a hybrid state, the legislature has taken the lead on policy but 
largely in response to efforts by the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) to understand and manage the growth of DERs in the state.  New leg-
islation enacted in late 2013, for example, requires the CPUC to develop a new 
tariff for DG customers for offer in 2017 and gives the CPUC new authority 
to approve standby charges assessed to DG customers.227  The law also re-
quires that the new tariff balance benefits and costs for all customers and protect 
against cross-subsidies.228 Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the CPUC adopt-
ed (by a 3-2 vote) a new Net Energy Metering Tariff in January 2016.229  The 
new tariff preserves the basic elements of net metering, but it also requires net 
metering customers to switch to time-of-use rates, which will change the value 
of net metering credits that they receive, and it imposes new interconnection fees 
and adds monthly fixed charges for residential DG customers.230   
In addition to its work on net metering, the CPUC has been exploring a 
broader range of issues regarding distributed energy resources, smart grid, and 
distribution system planning.  Currently, the CPUC has at least eight open pro-
ceedings on topics related to the ongoing effort to increase the amount of DERs 
in the state.231  With a 2020 mandate of six hundred megawatts of storage for 
each of the state’s three IOUs, rapid growth of distributed generation, and goals 
of 5 percent demand response and 1.5 million electric vehicles over the next ten 
years, California is once again embarking on a dramatic overhaul of its electricity 
  
226. For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the cost and benefit considerations that should be 
included in designing such tariffs, see Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Urcel, Managing the Future of 
the Electricity Grid: Distributed Generation and Net Metering (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Research Series, Working Paper No. 16-09, 2016), http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2734911. 
227. A.B. 327, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
228. Id. at §§ 11(b)(3)–(4).  
229. See Decision Adopting Successor to Net Energy Metering Tariff, Decision No. 16-01-044 (Cal. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 28, 2016). 
230. Id. 
231. The key rulemaking is the Distribution Resource Planning Docket No. 14-08-13. 
866 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016) 
 
sector.  The overall goal is “to create a distribution grid that is ‘plug and play’ for 
DERs.”232 
In all of this, policy innovation is emerging out of the interactions between 
the CPUC and the legislature rather than from one body or the other.  This itera-
tive relationship between the PUC and the legislature has proven to be highly 
productive.  As a hybrid state, California is also seeking to harness the power of 
its IOUs in advancing DERs, directing them to plan for and incorporate DERs 
in their distribution planning exercises and including the costs of infrastructure, 
such as electric vehicle charging stations, and new DERs, such as storage, in their 
rates.233 
New York (a fully restructured state) has been pursuing a similarly broad 
agenda of rate reform, but one that has been driven in large part by the staff of 
the New York Department of Public Service with little involvement to date by 
the legislature.234  As in California, net metering reform is being considered in 
the context of a broader set of issues regarding how to create and govern a distri-
bution system that can accommodate multi-directional power flows and large 
amounts of DERs.  In contrast to California, however, the goal in New York is to 
create (“animate”) new markets for DERs and transform existing distribution 
utilities into what the commission is calling “distribution service platform provid-
ers.”235  Under this model, the new distribution platform provider would act more 
as a neutral system operator and market administrator for a “transactive” grid that 
would enable retail electricity providers, third party vendors, and individual own-
ers of distributed energy resources to interact directly in the market.236  Needless 
to say, the ratemaking and rate design implications of this new model are sub-
stantial.  Proposals for specific rate reforms to implement the new model were 
released in July 2015 and are the subject of ongoing discussion.237 
  
232. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER’S RULING ON GUIDANCE FOR 
PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE SECTION 769—DISTRIBUTION RESOURCE PLANNING 3 (2014). 
233. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING—DISTRIBUTION 
RESOURCE PLANNING 4–6 (2014). 
234. See N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. COMM’N, CASE 14-M-0101, REFORMING THE ENERGY 
VISION: ORDER ADOPTING POLICY FRAMEWORK AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2015). 
235. See id. at 31–61. 
236. Id. 
237. See N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., STAFF WHITE PAPER ON RATEMAKING AND UTILITY 
BUSINESS MODELS, CASE 14-M-0101, PROCEEDING ON MOTION OF THE COMMISSION IN 
REGARD TO REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION (2015).  Among other things, the White Paper 
discusses modifications to distribution utility revenue models to encourage utilities to enable 
increased DER penetration (38–44), the use of performance-based rates (51–66), and rate design 
and cross-subsidy issues involved in different approaches to DER compensation (73–107).   
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While New York and California are engaged in the most ambitious exercis-
es to overhaul their distribution systems and find new ways to compensate and 
enable DERs, other states are engaged in more discrete efforts to reform their net 
metering programs and adopt new rate designs for DG.  Arizona (a traditional 
state), for example, is addressing the net metering issue in the narrow context of a 
request from the state’s largest IOU.238  Instead of embracing a broader approach 
to DERs, the Arizona Commission has adopted a simple solution that leaves the 
net metering program in place but seeks to offset it with a charge for the grid ser-
vices that DG customers receive.239  Interestingly, the Arizona Commission 
has also allowed the state’s two IOUs to experiment with limited ownership 
of rooftop solar for low-income customers.240  This is viewed as a possible 
pathway to rate-base treatment for rooftop solar owned and operated by IOUs, 
which could have important implications for solar in Arizona and beyond.241 
Minnesota (a hybrid state) has taken another approach to distributed solar, 
focusing specifically on what it calls the “value of solar” in redesigning its net me-
tering program.  As in California, the legislature has taken the lead, enacting a 
new law in 2013 that allows the state’s IOUs to apply to the PUC for a “value of 
solar” tariff as an alternative to net metering.242  Under the new law, the state De-
partment of Commerce has developed a methodology for calculating the rates 
and charges under the value of solar tariff that separates the various components 
of solar DG, including delivered energy; avoided generation, transmission, and 
  
238. In July 2013, the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) filed an application with the state’s 
Corporation Commission requesting a “cost shift solution” (that is, a new fee for DG customers) to 
address the $18 million cross-subsidy which the company claims is being provided to DG 
customers under the state’s net metering policy.  See In re Application of Arizona Public Service Co. 
for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift Solution at 9, No. E-01345A-13-0248 (July 12, 2013). 
239. In November 2013, the Arizona Corporation Commission voted (3-2) to approve a new fixed 
charge (seventy cents per kilowatt of installed DG capacity per month) on new solar DG customers 
starting in 2014.  See Decision No. 74202 at 29–31, In re Application of Arizona Public Service Co. 
for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift Solution, No. E-01345A-13-0248 (Dec. 3, 2013). 
240. In December 2014, the Commission voted “no objection” to APS’s $28.5 million proposal to own 
ten megawatts of residential solar systems.  Customers that rent their roofs to the utility will put no 
money down and receive a $30 credit on their bill each month for up to twenty years.  The program 
is limited to ratepayers with low credit scores.  APS will need to show that the investment is 
prudent before seeking to recover expenses in its next rate case.  See In re Arizona Public Service 
Company for Approval of its 2015 Renewable Energy Standard Implementation Plan for Reset of 
Renewable Energy Adjustor at 4–7, No. E-01345A-14-0250 (Dec. 18–19, 2014).   
241. See, e.g., Lon Huber, Why Utility Ownership of Rooftop Solar Should Be Explored, UTILITYDIVE 
(July 21, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/why-utility-ownership-of-rooftop-solar-should-
be-explored/402645 [https://perma.cc/F7AM-92UG] (discussing Arizona example and 
implications for rate-base treatment of rooftop solar and DERs generally). 
242. See MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10 (2013). 
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distribution; and avoided environmental costs.243  The PUC approved the value 
of solar methodology in April 2014.244 
Minnesota’s effort is a more ambitious and complex undertaking than the 
simple systems charge that Arizona enacted.  In essence, Minnesota is seeking to 
unbundle the existing structure of volumetric rates and allow various actors to pay 
for the different kinds of grid services that they use (and to receive compen-
sation for the services they provide).245  In all of this, however, the PUC is acting 
more as implementer rather than policy innovator, taking its direction from the 
legislature, a reflection of the fact that the Minnesota PUC has limited staff.246 
New rate reform efforts to promote DERs are also underway in several 
other states, including Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Nevada, South Car-
olina, and Vermont.247  While some of these states are taking a relatively simple 
approach that typically involves some sort of grid services charge for DG custom-
ers (like the Arizona approach mentioned above), others have embarked on am-
bitious efforts to develop new tariff structures for DG.248  And some, such as 
Nevada, have adopted aggressive net metering reforms that will sharply limit the 
growth of rooftop solar.249  The politics of all of this have been quite intense as 
  
243. See DIV. OF ENERGY RES., MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINNESOTA VALUE OF 
SOLAR: METHODOLOGY (2014). 
244. See MINN. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ORDER APPROVING DISTRIBUTED SOLAR VALUE 
METHODOLOGY (2014). 
245. See MIKE TAYLOR ET AL., VALUE OF SOLAR: PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
CONSIDERATIONS 8–11 (2015) (discussing key components of value-of-solar methodology for 
compensating rooftop solar). 
246. See Regulatory Commissions, supra note 46 (reporting that the Minnesota PUC has a staff of 
forty-two).  
247. See, e.g., Mark Jaffe, Battle Over Rooftop Solar Heads to Public Utilities Commission, DENVER POST 
(Jan. 12, 2014, 12:01 AM) http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_24889841/battle-over-
rooftop-solar-heads-public-utilities-commission [http://perma.cc/XV2A-9QG4] (discussing fight 
over net metering in Colorado); Edward Humes, Throwing Shade: How the Nation’s Investor-
Owned Utilities Are Moving to Blot out the Solar Revolution, SIERRA (May/June 2014), 
http://content.sierraclub.org/new/sierra/2014-3-may-june/feature/throwing-shade 
[http://perma.cc/NY8D-574J] (describing fights over net metering in various states). 
248. South Carolina, for example, has recently enacted a new Distributed Energy Resources Program 
Act that commits the state to a value of solar proceeding.  See Distributed Energy Resources 
Program Act, S.B. 1189, 2013 S.C. Gen. Assemb., 120th Sess. (S.C. 2014). 
249. In December 2015, the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada unanimously approved a new solar 
net metering policy that decreases the rate paid to rooftop solar customers for the power they export 
to the grid from the retail electricity rate to the wholesale rate.  The change applies retroactively to 
all solar customers.  In February 2016, the Commission issued a modified final order in response to 
various requests for reconsideration that left the basic elements of the December 2015 order intact.  
See Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Nev., Order on Application of Nevada Power Company d/b/a NV 
Energy for Approval of Cost-of-Service Study and Net Metering Tariffs, No 15-07041 (Feb. 17, 
2016), http://pucweb1.state.nv.us/PDF/AxImages/DOCKETS_2015_THRU_PRESENT/ 
2015-7/9690.pdf.  
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DG advocates argue that utilities, captured regulators, and conventional energy 
producers are trying to stifle the development of rooftop solar and preserve the 
status quo while some utilities, regulators, and consumer advocates point to the 
potential negative effects of widespread net metering on poorer customers and 
the threats to utility business models.250  Irrespective of how these particular bat-
tles play out, however, it seems that there are (again) certain advantages to the di-
versity of current efforts to accommodate the growth of DG and the emergence 
of a more distributed electricity system. 
As for efforts to promote other DERs such as storage and electric vehicles, 
California, as noted, has adopted an ambitious storage mandate for its IOUs and 
is also allowing its IOUs to include some of the costs of electric vehicle charging 
stations in rates.251  And in Texas, the state’s largest distribution utility, Oncor 
Energy, has proposed a $5.2 billion investment in storage—enough to handle 
one-eighth of the state’s power load on an average winter’s day.252  No regulatory 
proceedings have been initiated on the proposal to date and there are some obsta-
cles under current law, but if this moves forward it would be the largest storage 
experiment in the world.253 
In general, innovative rate designs to promote DERs are occurring mainly 
in restructured and hybrid states.  But a number of traditional cost-of-service 
states are engaged in efforts to reform net metering and, in some cases, to develop 
new tariffs to promote DERs, all with varying degrees of ambition.  The more 
complex efforts are, not surprisingly, being undertaken in states with larger, 
more professional PUCs such as California and New York.  Many states seem to 
  
250. See, e.g., Charles J. Cicchetti & Jon Wellinghoff, Solar Battle Lines: The Fight Over Customer 
Rooftops, Grid Funding, and Net Metering, PUB. UTIL. FORT. (Dec. 2015) (discussing ongoing 
battles over rooftop solar); Humes, supra note 247 (describing fights over net metering in various 
states); Cardwell, supra note 222 (discussing challenges to utility business models from rooftop 
solar); Navigant Research, supra note 222 (“To the list of industries at risk of complete 
obsolescence—which at the moment includes daily newspapers, government postal services, and 
men-only barbershops, among others—you can add U.S. power utilities.”). 
251. See generally Zero-Emission Vehicles Proceedings, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca. 
gov/General.aspx?id=5597 [https://perma.cc/FD9R-5QGW] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) 
(summarizing various CPUC proceedings and initiatives for electric vehicles).  See also CPUC 
Decision Approving Phase 1 of SCE’s Charge Ready Program, supra note 204. 
252. James Osborne, Oncor’s Backup Plan for Texas Power Gives Jolt to Energy Storage Industry, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS (Dec. 29, 2014, 11:00 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/ 
energy/20141229-oncors-plan-to-backup-texas-power-gives-jolt-to-energy-storage-industry.ece 
[http://perma.cc/E796-VDL7].  The company is proposing five gigawatts of storage, almost four 
times the California 2020 mandate of 1.3 gigawatts.  See id. 
253. Under the state’s restructuring law, Oncor (a wires company) is prohibited from selling electricity in 
the wholesale market.  See Jim Malewitz, State Law Could Short-Circuit Battery Breakthrough, TEX. 
TRIB. (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/12/15/state-law-could-short-circuit-
battery-breakthrough [http://perma.cc/W3YL-QAVS]. 
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be taking a wait-and-see approach as various innovators test out new ideas and 
approaches.  But in all cases, there is a general recognition that DERs will play an 
increasingly important role in the electricity mix going forward and that the tradi-
tional model of bundled, volumetric rates cannot effectively accommodate these 
resources. 
For its part, the federal government has played an important role in nudging 
and guiding various efforts.  From early support for new rate designs to support 
DG to specific decisions by FERC to forego any assertion of jurisdiction over net 
metering and more recent support for accelerated deployment of electric vehicles 
and storage, federal interventions have facilitated experimentation by various 
states operating under all three models. 
D. Time-Variant Pricing 
While grid modernization carries with it significant promise, advanced me-
tering technologies will have little effect in the absence of rate reform.  With 
widespread installation of smart meters, time-variant pricing could provide a 
mechanism to shift consumer electricity use to times of lower demand. This shift 
can reduce overall energy use, lower carbon emissions, and even help integrate in-
termittent energy resources like solar and wind onto the grid.254 
Though some form of time-variant pricing has existed for decades—first 
introduced as policy by Alfred Kahn during his tenure as Chairman of the New 
York Public Service Commission in the 1970s255—PUCs have largely steered 
away from broad adoption of time-variant rates for residential and small com-
mercial consumers.  Penetration of time-variant pricing for large commercial and 
industrial customers is higher across the country.256  But rate reform advocates 
and a handful of PUCs have begun to focus on residential rates, suggesting that 
we may be seeing the beginning of a dramatic shift in the way such rates are set. 
The idea of time-variant rates is a straightforward one: Customer retail rates 
should increase or decrease to reflect changes in the cost of generating electricity 
  
254. See MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 21, at 150. 
255. See ANDERSON, supra note 60, at 96, 110; see also ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 63–122 (1970) (providing detailed discussion of 
the theory and application of marginal cost pricing); Alfred E. Kahn, Applications of Economics to an 
Imperfect World, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (“One of my proudest accomplishments [as 
Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission] . . . was the progress we made in requiring 
the electric and telephone companies in New York to introduce marginal cost-related prices.”); 
Paul L. Joskow & Catherine D. Wolfram, Dynamic Pricing of Electricity, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 
381, 381–83 (2012) (discussing Kahn’s work on marginal cost pricing and status of efforts to 
expand dynamic pricing). 
256. See MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 21, at 161–62. 
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over the course of the day (and year).257  At times of peak demand, if rates are 
dynamically priced customers can decrease their usage to avoid paying the 
highest prices for electricity, which can be five to ten times more expensive 
than non-peak prices in the wholesale market.258  Some of this decrease may 
lower overall energy usage entirely (using less air conditioning on especially hot 
days and less heat on especially cold ones) while some of the decline in peak use 
may simply shift energy consumption to non-peak times (using the dishwasher at 
night rather than during the day when demand tends to peak, at least during the 
summer). 
Time-variant pricing has a number of aims.  Historically, one of the most 
important goals has been to avoid system overload and blackouts during times of 
peak demand.259  If retail electricity prices are allowed to rise (sometimes dramati-
cally) during peak periods when wholesale generating costs are highest, then 
price-sensitive consumers will curtail their usage.260  But time-variant pricing can 
be used for other purposes as well.  Importantly, if PUCs can use time-variant 
pricing to systematically reduce peak demand, they can reduce the need to 
build additional generating capacity.  Peak demand frequently requires pow-
ering up additional generation, typically less efficient natural gas plants that can 
be brought on line relatively quickly, known as “peaker plants.”261  If peak load 
can be reduced through pricing, these peaker plants need not be built or brought 
on line.  Estimates are that only sixty to one hundred hours out of the total 
number of yearly hours of electricity use (8760 hours) account for between 10 
and 18 percent of our capacity needs.262 
Similarly, if time-variant pricing results in reduced energy usage overall, not 
just shifts in usage based on time of day, it can contribute to GHG emissions re-
duction goals.  And time-variant pricing, together with other forms of demand 
  
257. See MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 21, at 145–67; see also ANDERSON, supra note 60, at 102–110. 
258. See ANDERSON, supra note 60, at 146–47. 
259. See AHMAD FARUQUI & SANEM SERGICI, HOUSEHOLD RESPONSE TO DYNAMIC PRICING 
OF ELECTRICITY—A SURVEY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 3 (2009). 
260. For example, utilities in the Northeast successfully relied on demand response programs, including 
dynamic pricing, to manage supply and demand loads during the polar vortex in 2014.  See FED. 
ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE & 
ADVANCE METERING 12 (2014). 
261. See Half of Power Plant Capacity Additions in 2013 Came From Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15751 (last updated Dec. 16, 2015) 
(explaining that natural gas plants are typically used as peaker plants). 
262. See MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 21, at 146.  Estimates about the capacity of dynamic pricing to 
reduce peak usage in the residential sector range as high as 100,000 megawatts, which is 10 percent 
of current overall installed capacity.  See Harvey Michaels & Kat Donnelly, Energy Innovation: 
Architecting the Consumer Side of the Grid for Energy Efficiency 12 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Indus. 
Performance Ctr., Working Paper No. 11-004, 2011). 
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response and direct load control, could play an important role in integrating more 
wind and solar power into the grid.263  Because these resources are variable and in-
termittent, they cannot be dispatched (turned on and off) like fossil-fuel-burning 
power plants.264  And because electricity cannot currently be stored at significant 
scale, integrating higher amounts of these renewable resources into the grid 
without compromising system reliability is challenging.265  Doing so in a way 
that minimizes the need for backup, carbon-based generation is a significant bar-
rier to fully decarbonizing the grid.  Time-variant pricing, together with other 
forms of demand response, could provide resources and capabilities to balance 
this intermittency.266 
Time-variant pricing can take several forms.  The simplest (and earliest) 
iteration, time-of-use (TOU), simply charges customers differential rates 
depending on the time of day (typically highest during the late afternoon, 
particularly during summer months) or even time of year (typically higher in 
the summer).267  The other three principal forms of pricing are dynamic, altering 
prices based on actual changes in peak generation.  They range from the simplest, 
charging customers more only on critically hot days (critical peak pricing), to 
slightly more complex, variable prices on critically hot dates (variable peak pric-
ing), to real-time, where electricity usage is tied to the wholesale market price for 
electricity.268  For residential customers dynamic pricing typically uses only 
the former two and only for those days with especially high usage.  Thus, 
“time-variant” is a more accurate descriptor for most residential customers.  
Dynamic pricing is now possible with smart meters, and enabling technologies 
like programmable thermostats and “smart” appliances can help customers re-
spond to peak pricing without having to manually control their usage.  Some 
appliances and thermostats can even receive signals from a utility when prices 
are spiking and automatically adjust usage or temperatures downward.269   
  
263. MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 21, at 150. 
264. See INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE ENERGY INTEGRATION IN POWER 
GRIDS: TECHNOLOGY BRIEF 1 (2015), http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/ 
Publications/IRENA-ETSAP_Tech_Brief_Power_Grid_Integration_2015.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/8R9H-AGGT]. 
265. See GENE BERRY, PRESENT AND FUTURE ELECTRICITY STORAGE FOR INTERMITTENT 
RENEWABLES 1 (2010), http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/10-50_Berry.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7P59-3E3C]. 
266. See MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 21,  at 143–48. 
267. See Ahmad Faruqui & Sanem Sergici, Arcturus: International Evidence on Dynamic Pricing, 26 
ELECTRICITY J. 55, 56–57 (2013). 
268. Id. 
269. Id. at 57–58. 
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Despite widespread installation of smart meters and the introduction of 
smarter appliances and thermostats, we have yet to see widespread time-variant 
pricing for residential customers.  Estimates are that only two percent of 
households are on time-varying rates with an even smaller percentage on ac-
tually dynamic (as opposed to TOU) rates.270  Dynamic pricing on the com-
mercial and industrial side is more widespread and smart meters have 
accelerated its use.271   
Most residential and small commercial programs to date, however, have 
been small, pilot experiments and penetration remains low in every state.  
More permanent programs are, without exception, opt-in programs and most 
of these have been plagued by low participation rates.272  Yet the evidence 
about the effectiveness of these programs is largely positive.  The most success-
ful residential programs demonstrate reductions as high as 29 percent of peak 
usage from consumers enrolled in programs that use critical peak pricing and 
enabling technologies.273  The reasons for low participation are varied, including 
consumer concerns about privacy274 and the safety of smart meters.275  But the 
  
270. See Ahmad Faruqui et al., Smart by Default: Time-Varying Rates From the Get-Go—Not Just by Opt-
In, 152 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 25, 25 (2014). 
271. See, MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 21 at 161–62. 
272. An exception is the residential time-of-use program offered by Arizona Power, which has attracted 
about half of residential customers in the service area through aggressive marketing. See Ahmad 
Faruqui, For Customer Savings and Economic Efficiency, the Time for Dynamic Rates Is Now, 
ELECTRICITYPOLICY.COM 8 (2012), http://www.electricitypolicy.com/images/pdf/faruqui-10-
6-12-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2GH-NC9V]. 
273. See Faruqui & Sergici, supra note 267, at 56–57, 60 (evaluating thirty-four studies of residential 
pricing programs and concluding that the size of reductions in peak usage improves both as the 
ratio of peak prices to non-peak prices increases and in programs that incorporate enabling 
technologies like programmable thermostats and in-home displays of energy usage). 
274. In January, 2015, the U.S. Department of Energy finalized a voluntary code of conduct for utilities 
and third parties about smart grid customer data, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DATA PRIVACY AND 
THE SMART GRID: A VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.smart 
grid.gov/sites/default/files/VCC_Concepts_and_Principles_2015_01_08_FINAL_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B49V-JH85], and the California PUC became the first to issue rules to protect 
privacy and the security of customer data.  See Decision Adopting Rules to Protect the Privacy and 
Security of the Electricity Usage Data of the Customers of Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 
Southern California Edison Company, and San Diego Gas & Electric Company, No. 11-07-056 
(Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Jul.29, 2011). 
275. See CAL. COUNCIL ON SCI. & TECH., HEALTH IMPACTS OF RADIO FREQUENCY EXPOSURE 
FROM SMART METERS 1 (2011), http://www.ccst.us/publications/2011/2011smart-final.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/HDE7-A4ZM] (finding no known health risks from smart meters).  Several 
states have adopted policies that allow consumers to opt out of having a smart meter installed, 
though the opt-out rate has been small.  INST. FOR ELEC. INNOVATION, UTILITY-SCALE 
SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS:  BUILDING BLOCK OF THE EVOLVING POWER GRID 1 
(2014), http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iei/Documents/IEI_SmartMeterUpdate_0914.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2UU-A75F]. 
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cost implications for individual consumers, particularly low-income households, 
have also stymied reform despite evidence that widespread implementation of 
time-variant pricing could reduce consumer electricity bills by as much as $7 bil-
lion annually.276 
One way to think about time-variant pricing is that it shifts the risk of 
swings in wholesale electricity prices from ratepayers as a class to the individual 
consumer, who bears the risk of swings in prices but no longer pays a risk premi-
um as part of flat rates and can therefore also see significant cost savings by reduc-
ing peak use.277  If prices spike under dynamic pricing, consumers can experience 
large increases in their utility bills unless they reduce their use.  But recent pilot 
programs have shown that a large majority of low-income consumers benefit 
immediately from the implementation of peak pricing because they use less 
peak power than higher income households and are responsive to increases in 
electricity prices during peak periods and will reduce consumption.278 
Nevertheless, most states have not moved to time-variant residential rates 
on a widespread basis, though the federal government has financed several pilot 
programs around the country with Oklahoma, Delaware, and Maryland adopt-
ing particularly promising programs.279  Arizona’s two principal IOUs have also 
had significant success in getting residential ratepayers to opt into time-of-use 
rates, with about half of Arizona Public Service customers doing so.280  California 
and Massachusetts, however, are poised to mandate that all residential ratepayers 
of their IOUs and distribution utilities, respectively, be placed into a time-variant 
program unless they opt out.  These regulatory experiments should demonstrate 
whether time-variant pricing can deliver the benefits its proponents believe pos-
sible, including significant cost savings for consumers.281   
  
276. See Faruqui et al., supra note 270. 
277. See AHMAD FARUQUI ET AL., INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY, THE IMPACT OF DYNAMIC 
PRICING ON LOW INCOME CUSTOMERS 4 (2010), http://www.edisonfoundation.net/IEE/ 
Documents/IEE_LowIncomeDynamicPricing_0910.pdf [http://perma.cc/J9R9-GN76]. 
278. See id. at 26.  The authors evaluated five residential time-variant pilot programs and found that 
between 65 and 79 percent of low income customers benefitted from the implementation of 
dynamic pricing without changing their behavior.  Id. 
279. See Faruqui et al., supra note 270, at 25–27. 
280. See Faruqui, supra note 272, at 8. 
281. See Decision on Residential Rate Reform for Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Southern 
California Edison Company, and San Diego Gas & Electric Company and Transition to Time-
Of-Use Rates at 88, No. 15-07-001 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Jul. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Cal. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n]; MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., supra note 181, at 19. 
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Although Massachusetts is a restructured state, as we described above, its 
PUC, called the Department of Public Utilities (DPU),282 has made the adoption 
of time-variant rates in the residential sector a key component of its effort to 
modernize the state’s electricity grid.  And more than 75 percent of the state’s res-
idential customers remain customers of the incumbent electricity distribution 
utilities despite having retail choice.283  Thus most residential customers in Mas-
sachusetts remain subject to DPU’s regulatory reach in rate setting. 
Central to the Massachusetts grid modernization effort is widespread 
adoption of time-variant rates to take advantage of DPU’s order requiring its 
distribution utilities to install advanced metering infrastructure for all retail cus-
tomers.284  To that effect, DPU recently finalized an order that sets forth a policy 
framework for requiring default time-varying rates for basic residential service 
provided by the electric distribution providers.285 
DPU is relying on such rates to improve system efficiencies, reduce peak 
demand, and improve the deployment of DERs such as solar.286  The Depart-
ment believes that a significant cause of the need for peak demand—30 percent 
of its generating capacity for just 10 percent of the year—is because its customers 
are not sufficiently price sensitive to the expense of peak capacity because they pay 
flat electricity rates.287 
The key innovation here—striking in its simplicity—is the use of a default 
rule (choice architecture) that will automatically include residential customers in 
TOU pricing with a critical peak price rate plan rather than allowing customers 
the choice to opt in.288  If they prefer, customers will be able to opt out of the de-
  
282. See Department of Public Utilities (DPU), EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/grants-and-tech-assistance/guidance-technical-assistance/agencies-
and-divisions/dpu [https://perma.cc/BSV6-NDNG] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
283. See Electric Customer Migration Data, EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/grants-and-tech-assistance/guidance-technical-assistance/agencies-
and-divisions/doer/electric-customer-migration-data.html [https://perma.cc/96NT-H92R] (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2016).  By contrast, more than 90 percent of large industrial and commercial 
customers are serviced by competitive suppliers.  Id. 
284. See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., supra note 181, at 19. 
285. See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., D.P.U. 14-04-C, ORDER ADOPTING POLICY FRAMEWORK 
FOR TIME VARYING RATES (2014), http://web1.env.state.ma.us/DPU/FileRoomAPI/ 
api/Attachments/Get/?path=14-04%2FOrder_1404C.pdf [http://perma.cc/HF5H-BN77]; see 
also MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., D.P.U. 14-04-B, INVESTIGATION BY THE DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC UTILITIES UPON ITS OWN MOTION INTO TIME VARYING RATES (2014). 
286. See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., supra note 181, at 10–11. 
287. See id. 
288. There is a robust literature on the use of “choice architecture” and “default rules” to channel 
individual behavior.  See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
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fault plan into a flat-rate plan that offers a rebate for reducing usage during critical 
peak times.289  This approach is the first of its kind in the country.290 
Like Massachusetts, California (a hybrid state) is also moving to adopt a de-
fault, opt-out model for residential time-of-use (TOU) pricing.291  The CPUC 
has long worked with its three major IOUs to offer TOU rates for commercial 
and residential customers and its IOUs are required to use TOU pricing for non-
residential customers.292  Residential customers of the IOUs have been offered 
TOU rates since 1977, but only a tiny percentage participate.293  And in 1983 the 
state authorized the first Real Time Pricing program in the country, though the 
program was limited to a small number of large electricity users.294  But it was the 
state’s energy crisis in 2000 to 2001—with rolling blackouts caused by huge price 
spikes in electricity prices295—that led the CPUC to consider dynamic pricing for 
virtually all residential customers, a plan the CPUC adopted in July 2015 after 
years of study, pilot programs, and new legislation.296 
The new rate design, which will be phased in over the next four years, sim-
plifies the state’s residential electricity tariffs and requires each of the state’s three 
IOUs to offer a TOU tariff as their default approach to residential pricing.  The 
details of these new tariffs are to be developed over time, with the CPUC at this 
point endorsing default TOU pricing “in principle.”297  In its order, the CPUC is 
requiring the IOUs to submit default TOU rate proposals that take into consid-
eration customer acceptance and legal requirements, and create rate plans that al-
low customers to react flexibly to the grid and that offer a menu of different 
residential rates.  The plans will not be mandatory but, again, will default 
  
289. See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTILS., supra note 181, at 2, 48–49. 
290. See Laurie Guevara-Stone, California Rolls Out Default Time-of-Use Rates, CLEAN TECHNICA 
(June 8, 2015), http://cleantechnica.com/2015/06/08/california-rolls-out-default-time-of-use-
rates [perma.cc/RL3E-YLAG] (“This is the first example of TOU pricing being the default at 
scale.” (quoting RMI Senior Associate Mark Dyson)). 
291.  See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, supra note 281. 
292. See id. at 88. 
293. See, e.g., In re SoCal. Edison Co. Ordered to Revise Its Proposed Time-of-Day Pricing Tariffs for 
Large Usage Customers in Compliance With General Order No. 96-A, 82 Cal. P.U.C. 437 
(1977), 1977 WL 42821, at *3 (describing SCE’s different time-of-day rates for summer and 
winter months).  See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, supra note 281, at 90. 
294. Re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 14 Cal. P.U.C. 2d 15 (1983) (No. 83-12-068,), 1983 WL 909368.  
Southern California Edison began its own study shortly thereafter.  See Re S. Cal. Edison Co., 16 
Cal. P.U.C 2d 721, 885 (1984) (No. 84-12-068,), 1984 WL 1021399; see also Lori A. Burkhart, 
Real-Time Pricing-Allowing Customers to Respond, 130 PUB. UTILS. FORT. 31 (1992). 
295. See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING DYNAMIC PRICING IN 
CALIFORNIA 1 (2003) (setting forth the need to reduce peak demand through dynamic pricing 
and other demand response programs in response to the electricity crisis). 
296. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, supra note 281, at 88. 
297. Id. at 129. 
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customers into them while allowing customers to opt out.  The rate plans 
must be ready by 2018, for full rollout in 2019.298 
One explanation for the slow uptake of residential dynamic rate programs is 
that effective programs require sophisticated program design, extensive market-
ing efforts, and expensive infrastructure improvements—most importantly ad-
vanced metering, but also enabling technologies.299  With a number of states 
engaged in distribution system improvements that include smart meter installa-
tion, it stands to reason that dynamic pricing programs of one type or another will 
become more common across the country.  But many states will likely want to 
wait and see what happens with the experiments underway in Massachusetts and 
California and the results of the federally sponsored pilot programs around the 
country. 
As with the other rate reform innovations we have described, the feder-
al government has played an important role in encouraging time-variant 
pricing, particularly in the residential sector, in three respects.  First, and most 
importantly, it has heavily subsidized the deployment of advanced meters.300  
Second, by funding  time-variant dynamic pricing pilots around the country, 
which can be labor intensive and costly to administer, it has provided valuable ex-
perience for efforts to design programs that will be effective and acceptable to 
customers.301  Third, Congress has also encouraged states to experiment with var-
ious forms of dynamic pricing in both PURPA and the 2005 Energy Policy 
Act.302  As with the other examples of innovative ratemaking we describe, the re-
sult is a diversity of policies to promote dynamic pricing, with Massachusetts us-
ing its ratemaking power to require its distribution utilities to offer default 
residential TOU pricing and California working with (and mandating) its IOUs 
to do so. 
E. Lessons for Institutional Design 
The four areas of innovation we have highlighted in this Part raise several 
broader questions regarding institutional design, a topic that we can only gesture 
  
298. Id. at 5, 179. 
299. See AHMAD FARUQUI ET AL., TIME-VARYING AND DYNAMIC RATE DESIGN 18–23 (2012) 
(describing challenges to and criteria necessary for successful dynamic pricing for residential 
consumers). 
300. See generally Advanced Metering Infrastructure and Customer Systems, SMARTGRID, 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/deployment_status/ami_and_customer_systems.html## 
[https://perma.cc/ZK8D-VU6D] (last updated Mar. 13, 2015). 
301. See Consumer Behavior Studies, supra note 120; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 120 (describing 
and evaluating pilot programs). 
302. See 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d) (2012); ROSE & MEEUSEN, supra note 119, at 10. 
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to here.  First, these examples show how different states across the three models 
of electricity regulation are using their ratemaking powers to promote innovation 
across all of the major aspects of the machine that state PUCs still regulate—from 
generation to distribution to customer end use.  They also suggest that each of the 
different models has certain advantages depending on which aspect of the ma-
chine one is focused.  As a result, there is value not only in the fact of state exper-
imentation but also in the diversity of models that we have inherited after 
restructuring.  This diversity has, we suggest, created opportunities for a range of 
experiments and innovation that we might not see under a single uniform ap-
proach.  
Second, the focus on ratemaking raises a larger set of questions about the 
relative merits of different ways of supporting innovation.  Obviously, govern-
ments use a variety of tools to support innovation, including intellectual property 
protection, subsidies and tax incentives, government funded R&D, and direct 
and market-based regulation.  And while we almost always end up with some 
mix of these, scholars and policymakers have so far not fully appreciated the role 
of ratemaking as a tool for supporting certain kinds of investments necessary to 
complete the innovation cycle and bring expensive technologies and new practic-
es to maturity.303  Given the truly massive task of decarbonizing the power sector 
over the coming decades, ratemaking could turn out to be a critical tool in fa-
cilitating and scaling key innovations necessary for a low-carbon electricity 
system—all of which raises complex distributional and efficiency questions.304  
At a minimum, ratemaking deserves consideration alongside these other tools 
for supporting innovation.   
Third, the case studies also demonstrate the important role that the federal 
government, and particularly the Department of Energy, has played in helping 
nudge states to use their ratemaking powers to promote innovation and in bear-
ing some of the financial risk of doing so.  The federal government’s support in 
  
303. But see Monast & Adair, supra note 169 (discussing role of PUCs and ratemaking in “completing 
the innovation cycle” for technologies such as CCS); Boyd, supra note 13, at 1704–08 (discussing 
role of PUCs and ratemaking generally in experimentation and innovation). 
304. Distributional questions, particularly those involving cross-subsidies between classes of ratepayers 
and, more generally, the proper balance between ratepayers and utility investors, have long been at 
the center of debates over ratemaking and rate design.  See, e.g., BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
62, at 85–107 (discussing different functions and competing objectives of public utility rates).  For 
an early and influential treatment of the broader distributional consequences of ratemaking, see 
Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22, 29 (1971) 
(positing that utility rates frequently result in cross-subsidies from certain classes of consumers to 
others and developing a theory to explain rate regulation as, in part, “a method of public taxation”); 
see also John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and Electricity Restructuring, 25 ENERGY L.J. 
273 (2004) (endorsing the Posner theory). 
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this respect has allowed states to self-select into the role of policy innovator by en-
couraging and subsidizing experimentation in different areas, from generation to 
large-scale investment in the distribution system.   Given the existence of the dif-
ferent regulatory models in use across a wide range of states, this process of self-
selection has resulted in a diversity of innovations while simultaneously honoring 
state policy preferences.  At the same time, the federal government has not been 
very systematic in guiding state experimentation.  As noted, there are limits to the 
conclusions one can draw from any single experiment, particularly one as compli-
cated as the Kemper project.  Ideally, the federal government would have sup-
ported multiple commercial-scale CCS projects across different states with 
different political and regulatory environments to provide a more substantial basis 
for learning.  Similarly, the $4.4 billion invested in smart meters under the Amer-
ican Recovery and Reinvestment Act did not require utilities that received fund-
ing to use them for time-variant pricing or other clean energy innovations.305  
Nor did the federal government seek to design and coordinate the various smart 
grid pilots it supported across the country with an eye toward a more systematic 
appraisal, further limiting the conclusions that could be drawn from these 
experiments.306 
Yet in the second-best world we are in, with limited appetite or ability at the 
federal level to orchestrate a series of commercial scale experiments, the few indi-
vidual experiments that have moved forward are surely better than none at all.  
Moreover, the Recovery Act money was allocated with considerable urgency 
given dire economic circumstances, making it understandable why the subsidies 
for smart meters were not tied to competitive grant making or conditioned in 
other ways.307  These critiques do suggest, however, that the federal government, 
and particularly the Department of Energy, in providing various incentives and 
nudges to states, would benefit from a more systematic appraisal of how to make 
best use of the three-model system and the diversity of experimentation that 
DOE can support.  
Finally, the case studies provide evidence regarding the power of ratemaking 
as a key tool for climate policy.  In the debate over how to reduce U.S. GHG 
emissions by 80 percent by 2050, most scholars and policymakers have 
  
305. See, e.g., Stephanie Joyce, Why Smart Meters Don't Make a Smart Grid, INSIDE ENERGY (May 
16, 2015), http://insideenergy.org/2015/05/16/why-smart-meters-dont-make-a-smart-grid 
[https://perma.cc/Q2BL-9F52]. 
306. See Joskow, supra note 28, at 43–45 (discussing problems with existing smart grid pilots and need 
for well-designed experiments going forward). 
307. See Michael Grabell, How Not to Revive an Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb 11, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/opinion/sunday/how-the-stimulus-fell-short.html 
[https://perma.cc/L9JK-36UU].  
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emphasized traditional policy tools such as cap-and-trade, taxes, tax in-
centives, and conventional command-and-control regulation.308  Some 
have also advocated for large increases in federal spending on energy re-
search.309  Each of these policy options has significant merit; each also has sig-
nificant cost, either in taxpayer subsidies or in financial burdens on regulated 
entities.  Perhaps more problematic, each policy option also faces substantial po-
litical opposition, especially at the federal level.  To date, with the exception of tax 
incentives for renewable energy and some federal spending on energy research, 
none of these policy options has garnered lasting congressional support.310  And 
even with a policy intended to force large emitters to reduce their GHG emis-
sions, such as putting a price on carbon, the kinds of large investments in low-
carbon electricity needed to get to the 2050 decarbonization goals may never ma-
terialize.  The market structure of electricity pricing up to this point has failed to 
incentivize sufficient investment in low-carbon generation and it is unclear 
whether a carbon price by itself would solve the problem. 
Using innovative ratemaking to encourage investments in a low-carbon elec-
tricity system is, we contend, a policy tool that ought to receive significantly more 
attention because it allows states to socialize the cost of large infrastructure invest-
ments across ratepayers and thus may garner less political opposition than carbon 
reduction efforts in Congress or state legislatures.  Spreading such costs through 
electricity rates may also be a fairer way to distribute costs across users of the ser-
vices the infrastructure investments will provide since rates can be set to reflect 
  
308. See, e.g., HSU, supra note 5; Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 5; Nordhaus & Gutherz, supra note 7. 
309. Two important examples are John P. Holdren, The Energy Innovation Imperative: Addressing Oil 
Dependence, Climate Change and Other 21st Century Energy Challenges, 1 INNOVATIONS 3, 19 
(2006) and Bill Gates, We Need Clean-Energy Innovation, and Lots of It, GATESNOTES (July 29, 
2015), https://www.gatesnotes.com/Energy/Energy-Innovation [https://perma.cc/7JAW-
WKTL]. 
310. Not only has Congress failed to pass a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases, but the House 
of Representatives has voted to repeal the President’s central climate change initiative, the Clean 
Power Plan.  See Stephen Power, Senate Halts Effort to Cap CO2 Emissions, WALL STREET J. (July 
23, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703467304575383373600358634 
[https://perma.cc/7AKH-4FWF]; Alan Neuhauser, Welcome Back, Mr. President: House Votes to 
Scrap Environmental Regs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.us 
news.com/news/articles/2015/12/01/house-votes-to-scrap-obamas-clean-power-plan 
[https://perma.cc/2DCX-CNX2].  Congress has, however, extended the investment and 
production tax credits for wind, solar and other renewable energy sources, most recently in 
December of 2015.  See Stephen Lacey, Congress Passes Tax Credits for Solar and Wind: ‘Sausage 
Making at Its Most Intense’, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.greentech 
media.com/articles/read/breaking-house-passes-1.1-trillion-spending-bill-with-renewable-
energy-tax [https://perma.cc/ZB8Y-7SM6].  For an overview of federal spending on research and 
development, including energy, see JOHN F. SARGENT, JR., FEDERAL RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT FUNDING: FY 2015 (2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43580.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z4QR-D4EV]. 
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considerations like amount of electricity consumed and even ability to pay.  
Without question, there are risks that ratemaking can be distorted by capture or 
burden ratepayers with too much risk.  And ratemaking may not always be the 
best tool to support innovation.  It nevertheless deserves more attention as an im-
portant potential mechanism to decarbonize the power sector.   
III. ACCIDENTS OF FEDERALISM? DIVERSITY AND EXPERIMENTALISM 
IN PUBLIC UTILITY LAW 
Despite the diversity of promising regulatory experiments we have de-
scribed, the federal structure of U.S. electricity law garners plenty of criticism, 
along with calls for new statutory fixes that would remove some of the obstacles 
to a more rational system that can better respond to new problems.311  Most of 
this commentary implies or even makes explicit that more uniformity rather than 
less would result in an improved ability to achieve certain goals.312  Our examples 
suggest, however, that the Federal Power Act (FPA)’s commitment to preserving 
significant areas of state authority (and Congress’s subsequent reticence to disturb 
this balance of responsibility), may have produced more benefits than previously 
recognized.  When combined with federal policy nudges and federal subsidies in 
the form of direct grants, tax credits, and loan guarantees, the U.S. system of en-
ergy regulation—accidental though it may be—appears to be generating substan-
tial experimentation and innovation across all major aspects of the grid. 
It is difficult to know, of course, whether a more uniform system of federal 
regulation would produce a more innovative power sector than the one we have.  
But given the complexity of the machine at its center, combined with the need for 
dramatic reductions in GHG emissions over the coming decades, a system that 
maximizes policy experimentation may turn out to be more of an asset than we 
realize.  Moreover, given differences in fuel sources, political preferences, electric-
ity prices and other local circumstances, policy variability embraces local diversity 
in ways that seem to promote experimentation.  To be sure, the federal govern-
ment could do a better job guiding and disciplining the policy experimentation 
  
311. See, e.g., Freeman & Spence, supra note 16, 43–62 (arguing that Congress should amend the 
Federal Power Act to impose more rationality, provide more guidance to FERC in adopting power 
markets to changing conditions); see also Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy 
Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2014).  But see STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY 
RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES 18–19 (2015) (describing the process of energy 
restructuring as “muddling through,” though suggesting that given the complexity of power 
markets this may have been the only reasonable alternative). 
312. See discussion supra note 14. 
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that is occurring.  But the diversity that we see in the current system is clearly an 
asset that is worth exploiting. 
The move to restructure electricity markets in the 1990s was, as we ex-
plained above, intended to replace regulation with competition in large segments 
of the industry.  Although Congress made clear in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 
that competition in electricity was an important policy goal, it never legislated in 
any detail on the topic, leaving FERC to push competition as far as it could under 
its existing FPA authority.313  Despite FERC’s ambitions, along with those of a 
number of states, to fully restructure both wholesale and retail electricity across 
the country, their efforts did not fully carry the day.  In the end, not all states par-
ticipated in restructuring and quite a few pulled back after the California electrici-
ty crisis.  And they had the ability to do so precisely because the federal scheme 
allowed them to.  The result is the three models we have categorized as tradi-
tional, restructured, and hybrid. 
Our central claim is that there is today—in this moment of significant 
change in the industry (the kind of moment that comes around maybe once in a 
generation)—considerable but underappreciated value in this diversity, illustrat-
ing perhaps (once again) the genius, accidental or otherwise, of our federal sys-
tem.  It may be, in other words, that the failure of restructuring—its limited 
reach—has left us with resources that we might not otherwise have as we face the 
daunting task of trying to decarbonize the power sector over the coming decades.  
And this is true, we argue, regardless of whether Congress passes significant fed-
eral legislation to address climate change.  Even with new federal legislation cre-
ating a cap-and-trade program, adopting a carbon tax, or deploying some other 
mix of policy instruments, we will need every successful innovation in low-carbon 
electricity available—nuclear, carbon capture and storage, smart grids, distributed 
generation, storage, efficiency, demand response, and much more—to have even 
a chance of hitting ambitious decarbonization targets by mid century and beyond.  
Any comprehensive federal policy will also need to learn from mistakes and fail-
ures and build on successes based on the diversity of experiences across the differ-
ent models and across all aspects of the electricity system.  The more experiences 
we have, the more opportunity for successes and failures.  When it comes to de-
carbonizing the electric power sector, it might be a good thing that restructuring 
did not carry the day.  We may be better off with the mess we have. 
  
313. For a detailed description of the leadership role FERC took in opening up wholesale power 
markets, with limited involvement by Congress, see discussion supra notes 80–82. 
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The great appeal of a single, uniform model of regulation is, of course, effi-
ciency.314  Given that the power system operates as one big machine, devel-
oping a single regulatory framework to govern the machine has obvious 
merits and would, in many cases, deliver significant efficiencies not availa-
ble under the balkanized approach of today.  Regulation of the machine, in 
this respect, might be viewed as a quintessential federal function.  Leaving Texas, 
Alaska, and Hawaii aside, the two major interconnects that comprise our 
electric power system extend across the entire country, connecting millions of 
component parts and individual devices—all operating, as the Supreme Court 
once put it, in “electromagnetic unity.”315  If ever a sector should be regulated 
top-to-bottom by the federal government, one might argue, it is electricity.316  
Congress clearly recognized this possibility when it enacted Part II of the FPA in 
1935.  It could have gone much further than it did in extending its authority under 
the commerce power to regulate electricity.317  But it chose not to do so precisely 
  
314. Cf. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515, 530 (1945) (“Congress is 
acutely aware of the existence and vitality of . . . state governments.  It sometimes is moved to 
respect state rights and local institutions even when some degree of efficiency of a federal plan 
is thereby sacrificed.  Congress may think it expedient to avoid clashes between state and 
federal officials in administering an act such as [the Federal Power Act].  Conflicts which lead 
state officials to stand shoulder to shoulder with private corporations making common cause 
of resistance to federal authority may be thought to be more prejudicial to the ends sought 
by an act and regulation more likely to be successful, even though more limited, if it has 
local support.”). 
315. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Florida Power & Light, 404 U.S. 453, 460 (1972); see also New York v. 
FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7 (2002) (“[U]nlike the local power networks of the past, electricity is 
now delivered over three major networks, or ‘grids,’ in the continental United States.  Two 
of these grids—the ‘Eastern Interconnect’ and the ‘Western Interconnect’—are connected 
to each other.  It is only in Hawaii and Alaska and on the ‘Texas Interconnect’—which 
covers most of that State—that electricity is distributed entirely within a single State.  In the rest of 
the country, any electricity that enters the grid immediately becomes a part of a vast pool of energy 
that is constantly moving in interstate commerce.”). 
316. Cf. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for 
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996) 
(suggesting that the geographic scope of an environmental problem should determine the 
appropriate level of governmental jurisdiction to solve it). 
317. See Conn. Light & Power Co., 324 U.S. at 529–30 (“It has never been questioned that 
technologically generation, transmission, distribution and consumption are so fused and 
interdependent that the whole enterprise is within the reach of the commerce power of Congress, 
either on the basis that it is, or that it affects, interstate commerce, if at any point it crosses a state 
line.  Such a broad and undivided base of jurisdiction of the Power Commission would be quite 
unobjectionable and perhaps highly salutary if the United States were a unitary government and the 
only conflicting interests to be considered were those of the regulated company.”); see also id. at 530 
(noting that in preserving state jurisdiction over electricity, Congress may have thought it “wise to 
keep the hand of state regulatory bodies in this business, for the ‘insulated chambers of the states’ 
are still laboratories where many lessons in regulation may be learned by trial and error on a small 
scale without involving a whole national industry in every experiment.”). 
884 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016) 
 
because of the value it placed on state regulation.318  And, although Congress has 
adjusted the structure and practice of electricity regulation since 1935, it has re-
frained from disturbing the basic jurisdictional scheme despite passing four major 
pieces of omnibus energy legislation since 1978.319 
Indeed, under a single, uniform model, we lack the opportunity to gain the 
advantages typically associated with federalism.320  One of these, clearly, is policy 
experimentation and innovation.  Though some scholars suggest that federalism 
is unlikely to produce such innovation,321 we think the current system of electrici-
ty regulation, with its three discrete models together with federal policy nudges 
and subsidies, is doing precisely that.322  It also seems unlikely that a uniform sys-
tem would produce the kind of parallel but distinct experiments across the differ-
ent models that we see today from generation to end use and everything in 
between. 
As we have shown, traditional cost-of-service states, for example, are using 
their ratemaking powers to facilitate large-scale investments in risky, low-carbon 
generation technologies in partnership with their utilities, which continue to own 
and operate generation.  PUCs in these states determine the extent to which the 
costs of large-scale generation can be recovered in rates and, importantly, have 
significant power to reduce the risk utilities face in developing new technologies 
through the way they apply traditional standards of prudency and “used and use-
ful” review.  The utilization of this power, combined with federal subsidies, has 
  
318. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 621, at 48 (1935) (discussing the “policy of Congress” in the proposed Part II 
of the FPA “to extend regulation to those matters which cannot be regulated by the States and to 
assist the States in the exercise of their regulatory powers, but not to impair or diminish the powers 
of any State commission”); H.R. REP. NO. 1318, at 8 (1935) (“The bill takes no authority from 
State commissions and contains provisions authorizing the Federal Commission to aid the State 
commissions in their efforts to ascertain and fix reasonable charges. . . . The new parts are so drawn 
to be a complement to and in no sense a usurpation of State regulatory authority and contain 
throughout directions to the Federal Power Commission to receive and consider the views of 
State commissions.  Probably, no bill in recent years has so recognized the responsibilities of State 
regulatory commissions as does title II of this bill.”); see also Conn. Light & Power Co., 324 U.S. at 
525 (“Progress of the bill through [the] various stages shows constant purpose to protect rather 
than to supervise authority of the states.”); cf. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599 
(2015) (“As we have repeatedly stressed, the Natural Gas Act was drawn with meticulous regard for 
the continued exercise of state power, not to handicap or dilute it in any way.”). 
319. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117; Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776; Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-58, 119 Stat. 594; Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 
Stat. 1492. 
320. For a recitation of the familiar arguments, see Carlson, supra note 19. 
321. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 18; Galle & Leahy, supra note 18; see also Rubin & Feeley, 
supra note 18. 
322. For a defense of the notion that federalism produces policy innovation, see, for example, SHAPIRO, 
supra note 18 (citing theoretical and empirical evidence of policy innovation). 
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yielded valuable information about the viability and cost-effectiveness of new nu-
clear reactors and advanced coal plants with carbon capture and storage.  At least 
to date, these traditional PUCs appear to be less interested in promoting innova-
tive approaches to the modernization of local distribution systems or in the ways 
in which retail rates are set, at least among residential ratepayers.  This is curious 
given that federal subsidies for advanced metering and pilot programs for resi-
dential time-of-use rates are available nationwide.323 
The reasons for this reluctance are not entirely clear.  But it may be that re-
structured and hybrid states that have unbundled generation from transmission 
and distribution and have less control over the development of generation (rely-
ing instead on the wholesale markets) are more likely to use the power they have 
retained—over distribution in the case of the restructured states and distribution 
and retail rates in the hybrid states—in more creative ways.  In other words, as 
they have lost the power to encourage and compensate utilities for building gen-
eration, some PUCs and state legislatures in hybrid and restructured states have 
focused more on what remains within their purview and realized that their 
powers over the remaining portions of the machine, especially their ratemak-
ing powers, are significant.  Thus Massachusetts, as we explained, is using its 
ratemaking powers over only those customers who have not exercised retail 
choice to implement time-of-use pricing.  And it is focusing on its distribution 
utilities to encourage grid modernization by using advanced cost recovery and up 
front prudency determinations that look a lot like the kinds of ratemaking tradi-
tional states are using to incentivize generation investments.  Minnesota, a hybrid 
state, is engaged in using rate design to encourage distributed solar energy while 
ensuring that tariffs for the use of the distribution system are adequate to com-
pensate incumbent utilities for the infrastructure they provide.  California is en-
gaged in a similar process to encourage and incorporate distributed generation 
resources while also using dynamic rates to more effectively manage energy use.  
Each of the innovations we have highlighted is, in some ways, remarkably similar 
in harnessing the ratemaking power of PUCs.  But the three models produce 
quite different substantive outcomes. 
There is, of course, a significant downside to leaving the fifty states to decide 
whether and how much to innovate.  Some—indeed even a majority—can refuse 
to do so.  In this respect, stronger nudges, more funding, and more targeted in-
centives from the federal government might help.  And a robust federal policy on 
carbon emissions is likely necessary to drive decarbonization over the long term.  
  
323. See Recovery Act, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/information-center/recovery-act 
[perma.cc/A74Q-TH5G] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (describing grantmaking process). 
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That said, it seems unlikely that there will be a major shift in the three-model sys-
tem of electricity regulation any time soon, and this system has produced more 
experimentation across different aspects of the power sector than is conventional-
ly acknowledged.  If federalism works as is often predicted, successful innovations 
may eventually diffuse beyond state borders to states that have to date sat on the 
sidelines, particularly if the Clean Power Plan takes effect. 
We have said less about why certain PUCs across the three models have 
chosen to innovate while others have lagged behind.  At this point, we have some 
preliminary observations but more research is needed to draw firmer conclu-
sions.324  Some of the innovation surely comes from political leadership and poli-
cy preferences.  It is not, we think, an accident that more environmentally 
progressive states like California, Massachusetts, and New York are promoting 
rate innovations to produce a grid more reliant on renewables and DERs.  These 
states have also been leaders on aggressive state climate policies like the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the Northeast and California’s Global Warming 
Solutions Act.325  But there are likely more prosaic explanations as well.  The 
leader states frequently have more staff and larger budgets, which can be particu-
larly important in designing and implementing complex programs like dynamic 
pricing.  They may have dedicated sources of revenue and are therefore less sub-
ject to budgetary fluctuations.  Some, like New York and California, have long 
histories of innovating and thus their staffs may view themselves as policymakers, 
not just approvers of utility-proposed rate increases.326  At this point we can only 
observe that there are leaders and laggards across all three models of electricity 
regulation and offer preliminary explanations for why that may be so.  More re-
search can help us to understand individual PUC motivations and capabilities, 
including the incentives affecting the behavior of commissioners and their staffs, 
  
324. There is a vast literature in political science about why some states innovate (innovation in this 
literature is defined simply as whether a state adopts a policy new to it) whereas others lag, and how 
innovative policies travel across different jurisdictions.  The seminal article is Jack L. Walker, The 
Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880, 881 (1969); see also 
Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV 1174, 1182 (1973) 
(finding that per capita wealth and degree of political competition correlate positively with state 
innovation); Frederick J. Boehmke & Paul Skinner, State Policy Innovativeness Revisited, 12 ST. 
POL. & POL’Y Q. 303 (2012) (constructing a state innovation index based on 180 different policies 
and finding that California leads state innovation by a large measure). 
325. See Welcome, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://rggi.org [http://perma.cc/B86P-
NV2K] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (describing RGGI members and policies); Assembly Bill 32 
Overview, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ 
ab32.htm [perma.cc/759G-2A89] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
326. For an argument that we pay too little attention to the structure, funding, and history of state 
regulatory agencies, see generally Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental 
Leadership: California’s Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 63 (2013). 
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as well as how larger institutional and political dynamics can both constrain or 
enable PUC capacity for experimentation.  
If one accepts that significant uncertainty exists about what mix of technol-
ogies, institutions, practices, and behaviors will deliver substantial decarboniza-
tion by 2050, a strong case can be made that our three-model system may actually 
outperform a more uniform national system in producing experimentation.  We 
don’t know whether DG will make up 5 percent or 50 percent of the electric gen-
erating mix in 2050, and there are credible studies supporting both numbers.327  
We don’t know if a breakthrough in storage technology will allow for much high-
er penetration of intermittent renewables or push large numbers of people to exit 
the grid entirely.328  We don’t know how much new nuclear will be available at 
mid century or whether carbon capture and storage is viable.329  And we certainly 
don’t know how much and in what ways consumers will change their behavior in 
response to new technologies, more sophisticated pricing options, and nudges of 
one sort or another.  More, not less, policy experimentation can help provide an-
swers to these questions. 
This leads to two additional observations.  First, much of the debate about 
electricity regulation over the last twenty years has been framed as an ongoing 
battle between regulation and markets (or, in more recent discussions, between 
rent-seeking monopolists and the forces of disruption).330  In fact, as the legal re-
alists and institutional economists pointed out long ago,331 the idea that markets 
and regulation (or law and the economy) can somehow be separated often ob-
scures more than it clarifies.  This is especially true in electricity, given the com-
plexities of operating the system and the need for central administration and 
management of the grid under any circumstance.  In the organized wholesale 
power markets, for example, multiples layers of regulation are required to make 
the markets function, more regulation in some respects than in the traditional 
  
327. See, e.g., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY 1 
(2012) (identifying 5 percent as upper limit of DG contribution to 80 percent renewables by 2050); 
AMORY B. LOVINS, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., REINVENTING FIRE: BOLD BUSINESS 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE NEW ENERGY ERA (2011) (suggesting DG could account for as much as 
50 percent of generation capacity by 2050). 
328. California has mandated that its IOUs procure 1325 megawatts of energy storage capacity by 2020.  
See Decision Adopting Energy Storage Procurement Framework and Design Program, No. 13-
10-040 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n 2013). 
329. See Richard Anderson, Nuclear Power: Energy for the Future or Relic of the Past?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 
27, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30919045 [https://perma.cc/FYE4-R3PS]; INT’L 
ENERGY AGENCY, CCS 2014: WHAT LIES IN STORE FOR CCS? (2014) (assessing potential of 
CCS and obstacles to deployment).   
330. See Boyd, supra note 13, 1630–31, 1661–74 (discussing these debates). 
331. Id. at 1648. 
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cost-of-service states.332  Even in fully restructured states, moreover, significant 
portions of the industry (transmission and distribution) are still regulated under a 
traditional public utility approach.  By framing all of this as a battle between regu-
lation and markets, we underplay the role that public utility regulation plays in all 
of these models.333  In doing so we may be missing important opportunities to 
foster policy innovation. 
Second, contemporary climate policy discussions have focused almost 
exclusively on various policy instruments directed at reducing emissions 
(cap-and-trade, carbon taxes, emissions performance standards, and the like) 
or increasing renewable generation (through renewable portfolio standards, tax 
credits, and so forth).334  While these discussions have obvious import, they also 
ignore the fundamental role electricity ratemaking can and will have in channel-
ing investments and changing behaviors across the whole range of technologies, 
practices, and behaviors that make up the electric power system.  Ironically, 
EPA’s Clean Power Plan regulations under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air 
Act—subject to criticism on numerous grounds including that Congress should 
legislate on a clean slate,335 that the Clean Air Act is ill-suited for climate regula-
tion,336 that Section 111(d) is too untested and too vague to serve as a basis for 
climate policy337—appears to have as one of its primary virtues a system of regula-
tion that embraces diversity in states and allows experimentation across the entire 
power system.  By providing states with principal authority to design their own 
plans to reduce carbon emissions from the power sector, by allowing “beyond the 
fenceline” reductions (new low-carbon generation, improvements in energy effi-
ciency, and so forth), and by permitting regional approaches that track the geog-
raphy of wholesale power markets, the regulations may enhance the prospects of 
  
332. Id. at 1663–64. 
333. Id. (arguing for the importance of a revitalized and expanded concept of public utility in the context 
of efforts to decarbonize the power sector). 
334. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012); HSU, supra note 5; Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 5; Nordhaus 
& Gutherz, supra note 7. 
335. See Jody Freeman, Teaching an Old Law New Tricks, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/opinion/teaching-an-old-law-new-tricks.html 
[http://perma.cc/NZS4-AM83] (describing the Clean Power Plan as “the sad reality of climate 
policy in the United States circa 2014” and adding that “[w]ith Congress paralyzed on the issue, the 
country’s climate and energy policy is being made in arcane legal battles over the meaning of single 
phrases in statutes written long ago, leaving government and industry to duke it out in court”). 
336. This was one of the bases for EPA refusing to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act 
until forced to do so by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
337. See generally Philip A. Wallach & Alex Abdun-Nabi, Debating the EPA’s Clean Power Plan 
Proposal—The Clean Power Plan’s Equity Problems, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 5, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2014/08/05-clean-power-plan-equity-
problems-wallach-abdun-nabi [http://perma.cc/76YD-AVXU]. 
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technological innovation across the sector.  Because different parts of the electric 
power sector have to be approached in different ways, different kinds of rates and 
rate designs are necessary to maximize the collective effort to decarbonize the 
grid.  EPA’s new rules embrace this reality. 
We also think our focus on the innovation produced by the three models of 
electricity regulation within a complex federal system casts interesting light on a 
number of theoretical debates about federalism.  Some of these accounts suggest 
that the U.S. system of federalism should produce too little innovation because 
states face a classic free rider problem, particularly for policies that have a high 
risk of failure.  States will rationally decide not to take policy risks, hoping they 
can free ride on the experimentation of other states if that experimentation leads 
to policy success.338  If states take risks, their residents receive only some of the ben-
efits and bear all of the downside—other states and the federal government gain the 
benefits of knowledge of what works and what doesn’t while the experimenting 
state bears all of the losses from policy failure.339  If all states reason in this way, lit-
tle experimentation will result.  Proponents of this theory argue that this lack of 
incentive to innovate is exacerbated by political incentives, with politicians rea-
soning that short-term policy failure will reduce their chances for reelection and 
that long-term policy success will produce little electoral advantage.340  The prob-
lems of freeriding are even more acute in the case of policies to reduce GHG 
emissions: No state can solve the problem of climate change, nor can any state 
fully realize the benefits of regulating emissions.  The lack of incentive to inno-
vate here seems strong.341 
Nevertheless, across numerous domains, states are innovating, including in 
health care, environmental policy, welfare reform, and employment law.342  Some 
state climate policies, in fact, are among the strongest and most innovative in the 
world.343  Scholars speculate that states engage in climate policy innovation for 
a number of reasons, including competition for investment and for electoral 
  
338. Susan Rose-Ackerman’s article is the leading exposition of this view.  Rose-Ackerman, supra note 
18; see also Galle & Leahy, supra note 18; SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 85–86); Yair Listokin, 
Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 544 (2008). 
339. See WINSTON HARRINGTON, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, PROMOTING INNOVATIVE CLIMATE 
ADAPTATION THROUGH FEDERALISM 4 (2010). 
340. Id.; see also Listokin, supra note 338, at 545–46. 
341. See Carlson, supra note 19. 
342. See SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 86–88. 
343. See DAVID BUCHAN, OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUD., CALIFORNIA’S CLIMATE POLICY—
A MODEL? (2010) (analyzing California’s policies and concluding that other jurisdictions can learn 
lessons from them); Emissions Trading, CLIMATE NEXUS http://climatenexus.org/learn/solutions-
policy/emissions-trading [perma.cc/XG7L-PXY4] (last updated Sept. 25, 2015) (describing the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and calling it a “model”). 
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advantage.344  But the misaligned incentives to innovate probably produce too 
little innovation even though some states continue to innovate despite the risks. 
One way to overcome these incentive problems is for the federal govern-
ment to bear some of the risk of policy failure.  Grant programs to states, for ex-
ample, can both incentivize policy experimentation and shift costs for risk-taking 
away from a state’s taxpayers.345  And the federal government can step in and 
mandate state involvement in the implementation of policy, something com-
monplace in federal environmental statutes like the Clean Air Act, which sets 
overall air quality standards but leaves largely to the states the question of how to 
meet those standards.346 
Our case studies of ratemaking in the electricity sector demonstrate that 
policy innovation appears to be occurring despite significant risk that some of the 
policies may result in expensive failures.  Moreover, this innovation appears to be 
occurring in ways that take advantage of the diversity of regulatory models in the 
delivery of electricity, with states operating under the traditional model using 
their ratemaking powers to support risky investments in capital-intensive 
low-carbon generation, states operating in restructured markets innovating on 
the distribution side, and hybrid states using IOUs to experiment with distribu-
tion, distributed generation, and the like.  Some of this innovation may be occur-
ring for the sorts of reasons states innovate on climate policy: for economic 
development purposes or to gain electoral advantage.  One interesting twist in the 
case of ratemaking, however, is that federal intervention to reduce some of the 
risk that individual states bear may help explain both the diversity of experiments 
and their ambition.  Federal grants and loan guarantees help explain state exper-
imentation with large baseload generation (nuclear and CCS).  Significant feder-
al investment in advanced metering to allow for real-time pricing programs may 
also be partially responsible for state rate experimentation to encourage dynamic 
pricing.  Federal pilot programs to encourage dynamic pricing are also helpful in 
reducing the risk of more widespread implementation by demonstrating how to 
design successful programs.  And federal policy nudges—pricing policies to 
  
344. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate 
Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1516–1521 (2007); Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, 
Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 
190–194 (2005); Barry G. Rabe et al., State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change 
Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 12–41 (2005). 
345. See HARRINGTON, supra note 339,at 5 (2010); Listokin, supra note 338, at 551–52.  But see Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 18, at 615–16 (discussing problems with grants to offset risk). 
346. The system of cooperative federalism in the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts are obvious 
examples.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012) (setting forth state role in implementing National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2), 1342 (2012) (allowing states to implement 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System). 
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encourage small renewable generation and mandates to states to consider 
dynamic pricing—have also helped drive state policy innovation. 
To be sure, these federal interventions are not part of any grand scheme to 
create a coherent national energy policy, and they surely could have benefitted 
from more careful and deliberate design.  But they have, we argue, created a cli-
mate of policy innovation that takes advantage of state diversity and allows for 
experimentation during a moment of great technological and regulatory change. 
We suggest, then, that the current moment of innovative ratemaking in the 
electricity sector is at least partially a result of what we call accidents of federal-
ism—unintended but positive byproducts of the failure of a fully restructured 
electricity sector to take root—combined with directed federal policy to help re-
duce the risk of state policy experimentation.  One might even call it a form of ac-
cidental democratic experimentalism in which Congress and the federal govern-
government “authorize and finance experimental reform by states.”347 
Our observations about this policy innovation are meant to be largely 
descriptive, not normative.  Whether more innovation would have occurred 
in a fully restructured and more uniform national system is difficult to know.  
Whether the current three-model system is sufficiently well organized to 
capitalize on the various innovations across the sector is also hard to deter-
mine.  Nevertheless, we do intend to challenge the mostly negative standard ac-
count of the federal structure of electricity regulation, with its suggestion that we 
lack a coherent national policy and rational system of regulation due to federal in-
action.  Instead, Congress has both retained its commitment to a strong state role 
in electricity regulation and used policy nudges and subsidies in ways that advance 
innovation in policymaking at the state level. 
Our attention to the innovation that is occurring and the interaction of state 
and federal policy aligns us with an emerging school of federalism theory that 
suggests that states can be deployed not just for local ends but also to promote na-
tional policies and values.348  The emergence and persistence of the three models 
of electricity regulation combined with federal subsidies and nudges are helping 
to promote low- and zero-carbon electricity at a time when the U.S. govern-
ment is working to meet ambitious goals to cut carbon emissions.  And they are 
  
347. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 267, 288 (1998).  But see David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic 
Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008) (criticizing 
democratic experimentalism on various grounds and highlighting its shortcomings in the context of 
antipoverty law).   
348. See Gerken, supra note 19, at 1893–94; Gluck, supra note 19, at 1997 (“With almost every national 
statutory step, Congress gives states new governing opportunities or incorporates aspects of state 
law—displacing state authority with one hand and giving it back with the other.”). 
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producing innovation by taking advantage of precisely those traditional values 
federalism is meant to promote: diversity and experimentation.  Yet they are 
doing so at least in part because the federal government has allowed the states to 
continue operating as important players in the national system of electricity regu-
lation.349  Our description thus also provides another example of the dynamic in-
teraction between and among levels of government, one that defies standard 
explanations of our federal system and that recognizes the important role the fed-
eral government often plays in creating and supporting policies that emerge from 
systems of federalism.350 
CONCLUSION 
When Congress passed Part II of the FPA in 1935, it sought to comple-
ment rather than replace existing state authority to regulate the electricity sector.  
In doing so, it recognized the value and importance of state policy experimenta-
tion and the traditional role of state PUCs in regulating electricity rates.   
Today, despite significant change in the sector and in a moment of great 
technological and regulatory innovation, we are still working with the basic juris-
dictional split established in 1935.  Rather than modify this framework, and not-
withstanding multiple opportunities to do so, Congress has left it largely intact, 
leaving states with the ability to choose whether and how to participate in elec-
tricity restructuring.  The resulting system of regulation is messy and uneven, 
with three major models in operation across the country.  But this three-model 
system, combined with specific federal policy nudges and subsidies that have 
worked to de-risk certain state experiments, is also facilitating innovation across 
many aspects of the electricity sector. 
The standard, largely negative account of our current system of electricity reg-
ulation contends that we need a statutory overhaul to bring order and efficiency to 
  
349. See Gluck, supra note 19, at 1996–97. 
350. There is a large literature taking issue with formalist accounts of federalism that suggest either that 
states and the federal government operate in separate and largely independent spheres or only in 
formalized structures like cooperative federalism.  See generally ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND 
THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2011); SCHAPIRO, supra note 19, at 97–98 (2009); Kirsten H. 
Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J 159 
(2006); Carlson, supra note 19; David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The 
Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); 
William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and 
Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145 (2007); William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, 
Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 1, 1 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 
(1996). 
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our regulatory framework to better equip it to deal with new challenges.  Perhaps.  
But what we have sacrificed in efficiency, we may have gained in experimenta-
tion.  Although the counterfactual is impossible to assess with confidence, we 
have argued that the three-model system may be producing more (and underap-
preciated) policy innovation than would occur under a single, national approach.  
At a minimum, we argue, the diversity inherent in the three-model system has, 
when combined with directed federal policy nudges and subsidies, allowed for 
different experiments across different kinds of states and across different aspects 
of the machine than we would expect to see under a more uniform approach.  In a 
very real way, then, the structure of federalism at the heart of the U.S. system of 
electricity regulation, and the diversity and experimentalism it has enabled, may 
be promoting rather than diminishing certain national policy goals—a recogni-
tion that animates much of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan with its embrace of state 
autonomy. 
Basic principles of public utility law and, specifically, the practice of PUCs 
in designing and setting rates have been central to the innovations we describe.  
All of which suggests that we may finally be at a place where we are able to catch 
up with and realize the value of the experimentalist impulse that was at the heart 
of an earlier, more expansive concept of public utility but that has lain dormant 
for so long.  We need this creative force now more than ever as we grapple with 
the need to transform the most complex machine ever built into something vastly 
cleaner, more distributed, and more interactive.  Ratemaking, and the innovation 
it enables, must be front and center in that effort. 
 
